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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR AND ITS
MACROECONOMIC CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS
SEPTEMBER 2009
SOON RYOO
B.A., KOREA UNIVERSITY
M.A., KOREA UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott
This dissertation consists of three independent essays. The first essay, “Long
Waves and Short Cycles in a Model of Endogenous Financial Fragility,” presents a
stock flow consistent macroeconomic model in which financial fragility in firm and
household sectors evolves endogenously through the interaction between real and
financial sectors. Changes in firms’ and households’ financial practices produce long
waves. The Hopf bifurcation theorem is applied to clarify the conditions for the
existence of limit cycles, and simulations illustrate stable limit cycles. The long waves
are characterized by periodic economic crises following long expansions. Short cycles,
generated by the interaction between effective demand and labor market dynamics,
fluctuate around the long waves.
The second essay,“Macroeconomic Implications of Financialization,” examines
macroeconomic effects of changes in firms’ financial behavior (retention policy, eq-
v
uity financing, debt financing), and household saving and portfolio decisions using
models that pay explicit attention to financial stock-flow relations. Unlike the first
essay, the second essay focuses on the effects of financial change on steady growth
path. The results are insensitive to the precise specification of household saving be-
havior but depend critically on the labor market assumptions (labor-constrained vs
dual) and the specification of the investment function (Harrodian vs stagnationist).
The last essay, “Finance, Sectoral Structure and the Big Push,” studies the role of
finance in the presence of investment complementarities using a big push model. Due
to complementarities between different investment projects, simultaneous industrial-
ization of many sectors (big push) may be needed for an underdeveloped economy to
escape from an underdevelopment trap. Such simultaneous industrialization requires
costly coordination by a third party, such as the government. Some recent papers
show that private banks with significant market power may also solve the problem
of coordination failure. We show that private coordination may not work since even
large private banks may find it more profitable to finance firms in the traditional
sector than in the modern sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Chapters in this dissertation represent an attempt to understand changes in fi-
nancial behavior and their macroeconomic causes and implications from three dif-
ferent angles. Chapter 1 examines changes in financial behavior from a perspective
of macroeconomic instability and cycles. Chapter 2 analyzes macroeconomic impli-
cations of financialization from a perspective of long-run steady growth. Chapter 3
studies the role of finance in the presence of investment complementarities from a
viewpoint of development and industrialization.
According to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, a capitalist economy cannot
lead to “a sustained, stable-price, full employment equilibrium” and serious business
cycles are unavoidable due to the unstable nature of the interaction between invest-
ment and capitalist finance (Minsky, 1986, 173). An initially robust financial system
is endogenously transformed into a fragile system as cash-flow relations change during
tranquil years. During expansions, an investment boom generates a profit boom but
this induces investors and bankers to adopt more speculative financial arrangements.
While Minsky’s hypothesis has received growing attention in light of the current fi-
nancial crisis, the logic behind it is intricate and not always easy to understand.1
1For instance, Foley (2001) states “When Minsky’s followers try to formulate his vision into
mathematical models, they face a series of methodological riddles. It is not easy to formulate a
single, generic, range of assets to represent the multifarious vehicles for the financial maneuvers that
lie behind financial fragility. The model needs to be able to represent a shift in the average riskiness
of position... It is not clear exactly where to locate a parameter to represent the financial boldness
of investors. In Minsky’s discourse, the shift toward more exposed financial positions is not simply
a psychological phenomenon based in the increasing optimism or level of denial of investors (though
that is surely part of the process), but involves strong competitive pressures on individual investors
to conform to group norms that are themselves shifting...”
1
Chapter 1 incorporates Minskian ideas into a macroeconomic model in order to
clarify mechanisms of financial instability and cycles. Many attempts have been
made to formalize Minsky’s ideas. Early contributions include Taylor and O’Connell
(1985), Foley (1986), Semmler (1987), Jarsulic (1989, 1996), Delli Gatti and Gallegati
(1990), Skott (1994), Dutt (1995), Keen (1995) and Flaschel, Franke and Semmler
(1998, Ch.12), and recent studies include Setterfield (2004), Nasica and Raybaut
(2005), Lima and Meirelles (2007), Fazzari et al. (2008), and Charles (2008). My
own contributions to this literature are threefold:
First, the model in chapter 1 is stock-flow consistent. Financial stocks are ex-
plicitly introduced and their implications for income and financial flows are carefully
modeled. In particular, unlike the previous studies listed above, capital gains from
holding stocks are not assumed away and enter the definition of the rate of return on
equity.2 The rate of return on equity defined in this way provides a basis of house-
holds’ portfolio decision. Firms’ and households’ financial decisions jointly determine
stock prices and the rate of return on equity in equilibrium. Thus, stock markets
receive a careful treatment in this model and play a central role in producing cycles.
Second, my model pays attention to both firms’ and households’ financial deci-
sions. Minsky’s own account of financial instability tends to privilege the firm sector
as a source of fragility. Most previous studies follow this tradition and tend to neglect
the role of households’ financial decisions in creating instability and cycles. Some of
the previous studies, including Taylor and O’Connell (1985), Delli Gatti and Gal-
legati (1990), and Flaschel, Franke and Semmler (1998, Ch.12), do not suffer from
this kind of limitation but analyze households’ portfolio decision as well. However,
their neglect of the role of capital gains in households’ portfolio decision makes it
difficult to analyze the implication of households’ financial decisions and stock mar-
2Empirically, the movements of capital gains explain most of cyclical movements of the rate of
return on equity.
2
ket behavior for instability and cycles. In contrast to these models, the model in
chapter 1 analyzes both households’ and firms’ financial decisions. Capital gains and
stock markets are considered explicitly in a stock-flow consistent framework and the
interactions between households and firms turn out to be critical to the behavior of
the system. Firms’ financial decision is captured by changes in the debt-capital ratio
and households’ decision by changes in the equity-deposit ratio. Changes in those
two variables represent endogenous changes in financial fragility, and interact with
each other through goods and financial markets.
Lastly, existing Minskian models are not clear about the periodicity of cycles. My
model in chapter 1 is explicit in this matter. It produces two distinct cycles: long
waves and short cycles. Long waves are produced by the interaction between firms’
and households’ financial decisions, while short cycles are generated by the interaction
between effective demand and labor market dynamics. In this framework, Minsky’s
financial instability hypothesis is seen as a basis of long waves.3 To the best of my
knowledge, my model is the first to integrate an analysis of Minskian long waves with
that of short cycles.
Capitalist economies have been often characterized as increasing financializa-
tion and it has been growing concern for some economists. For example, Lazonick
and O’Sullivan argue that the increasing dominance of shareholder value has forced
changes in management strategy from ‘retain and invest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’
and this change in strategy is reflected in increases in dividend rate and corporate
buybacks (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000, p.18). Crotty (2005) has suggested that
3Minsky’s two papers (Minsky, 1964, 1995) provide a strong support for this view. In these two
papers, Minsky argues that there exists a mechanism in a capitalist economy that generates a ‘long
swing’: the “mechanism which has generated the long swings centers around the cumulative changes
in financial variables that take place over the long-swing expansions and contractions.” (Minsky,
1964). “The more severe depressions of history occur after a period of good economic performance,
with only minor cycles disturbing a generally expanding economy.”(Minsky, 1995, p.85) During this
long expansion, an initially robust financial structure is transformed to a fragile structure.
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financialization weakens non-financial corporations and constrained the growth of ag-
gregate demand and Dumenil and Levy (2001) has suggested that financialization
tends to depress growth and employment while destabilizing economies.
Chapter 2 examines the macroeconomic effects on steady growth path of changes
in firms’ financial behavior (retention rate, net equity issues, debt finance), shifts in
the investment function, household saving/portfolio decisions, and interest rates. The
analysis is conducted in fully developed macroeconomic models to avoid the danger of
partial analysis.4 The chapter analyzes several models which are distinguished based
on the assumptions on accumulation behavior (Harrodian vs. Kaleckian) and labor
market (dual vs. mature).
Financial stocks are explicitly introduced in those models and households’ sav-
ing/portfolio behavior is characterized by desired stock-flow ratios (equity/income
and deposit/income ratios in a two-asset context). In addition to these features, this
chapter adopts a novel approach to the analysis of the long-term effects of financial
change. The approach consists of two steps: the first step investigates the effects
of financial change, assuming that the desired stock-flow ratios are exogenous; the
second step examines the effects of induced changes in the stock-flow ratios.5
Chapter 2 is an outcome of a joint work with Peter Skott and published in Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics (Skott and Ryoo, 2008).6 While some of the models
build on previous works by Skott, I carried most of the analysis in the paper. I would
like to list some elements I contribute to this joint work:
First, the main focus of chapter 2 is on the comparative statics regarding the
macroeconomic effects of some financial changes associated with financialization. As-
4Dangers of a partial analysis are discussed in 2.2.2 below.
5For the advantage of this approach, see Ryoo and Skott (2008)
6Ryoo and Skott (2008) complements this work by providing an analysis of Kaleckian economy
with labor constraint.
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suming the desired stock-flow ratios are exogenous, the comparative statics are rela-
tively simple and transparent. The question is whether the qualitative results carry
over to the case with endogenously determined stock-flow ratios. I showed that using
two influential works, Lavoie and Godley (2001-02) and Godley and Lavoie (2007),
empirically plausible specifications yield small induced changes in the stock-flow ra-
tios that do not overturn the qualitative results from the simple model with exogenous
ratios. This approach turns out to be useful to evaluate the results of other models
regarding the effects of financialization. For instance, van Treeck (2008) presents sim-
ulation results as an example of contractionary effects of increasing dividend or stock
buyback. Ryoo and Skott (2008) show that these contractionary effects are based on
implausible adjustments of financial stocks.
Second, the analysis of Lavoie and Godley (2001-02) and Godley and Lavoie (2007)
leads to a conclusion that the qualitative effects of financialization are insensitive to
the precise specification of household saving behavior. Lavoie and Godley (2001-02)
assume that consumption depends on household income and capital gains. Godley
and Lavoie (2007) assume that consumption is determined by household income and
wealth. Our own specification in Skott and Ryoo (2008) directly relates consumption
to stock-flow ratios. All of these specifications produce the same qualitative results
regarding the effects of financialization. In addition, several sensitivity analyses were
conducted to show that the qualitative results are robust to wide ranges of parameter
values in each consumption function.
Third, the analysis in this chapter achieves a substantial degree of generality by
focusing on both Harrodian and Kaleckian specifications of investment behavior. In
particular, the chapter analyzes the Kaleckian framework in great depth (though our
own preference lies with a Harrodian framework). The analysis is performed based on
5
a general form of Kaleckian accumulation function (see equation 2.4. below), which
include most of existing Kaleckian specifications as its subcases.7
Implications of finance for developing countries have been the subject of much
empirical research in the mainstream literature on development. One of the impor-
tant topics is whether financial development explains countries’ growth performance.
Many studies along this line accept the view that “the role of financial markets and
institutions arises to mitigate the effects of information and transaction costs that pre-
vent direct pooling and investment of society’s savings” (Demirguc-Kunt, 2006, p.1)
From this perspective, good financial markets, or more developed financial markets,
are identified as “deep” markets which mean more liquid stock markets and larger
banking sectors. In spite of econometric and measurement issues, it is argued, there
exists a robust positive relationship between financial development in this sense and
growth performance (Levine, 2003). However, a common feature of recent mainstream
studies on finance and development is characterized by its neglect of structural prob-
lems. This literature presumes that underdeveloped countries’ financial structures
gradually evolve toward a more advanced one with deeper and thicker financial mar-
kets. The implications of increasing returns such as multiple equilibria, poverty traps
and uneven sectoral development, which were main topics of traditional development
economics, receive a minor role or are simply ignored in recent trends.
Chapter 3 addresses the role of finance in the presence of investment comple-
mentarities. The key questions are whether a competitive or a monopolistic banking
structure is conducive to solving a coordination failure caused by investment comple-
mentarities and how the sectoral structure of an economy interacts with the banking
structure. Little is known about this in the existing literature, but Da Rin and Hell-
7Skott and Ryoo (2008) considers only a dual economy version of Kaleckian model but Ryoo and
Skott (2008) extends the analysis to include a Kaleckian model with labor constraint.
6
man (2002) recently provides, based on a big push model, a theoretical argument that
banks with market power may be able to solve this kind of coordination problem if
they have sufficient market power to make profits from costly coordination.
The analysis in chapter 3 suggests that the conditions under which banks with
market power can solve the coordination problems are restrictive and depend critically
on the sectoral structure of an economy. Banks with market power, let alone small
competitive banks, may fail to provide a solution to coordination failures if they find
it more profitable to finance firms in the traditional sector than in the modern sector.
Thus, the analysis emphasizes the limitation of private coordination.
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CHAPTER 1
LONG WAVES AND SHORT CYCLES IN A MODEL OF
ENDOGENEOUS FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
1.1 Introduction
Financial crisis hit the U.S and world economy in 2008. Giant financial institutions
have collapsed. Stock markets have tumbled, and exchange rates are in turmoil.
Governments and central banks around the world have responded by implementing
bailout plans for troubled financial institutions and cutting interest rates to contain
the financial panic, and expansionary fiscal packages are being pushed through to
prop up aggregate demand. Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis offers
an interesting perspective on these developments, which came after a long period of
financial deregulation, rapid securitization and the development of a range of new
financial instruments and markets.1
According to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, a capitalist economy can-
not lead to a sustained full employment equilibrium and serious business cycles are
unavoidable due to the unstable nature of the interaction between investment and
finance (Minsky, 1986, 173). An initially robust financial system is endogenously
turned into a fragile system as a prolonged period of good years induces firms and
bankers to take riskier financial practices. During expansions, an investment boom
generates a profit boom but this induces investors and banks to adopt more specula-
tive financial arrangements. This is typically reflected in rising debt finance, which
1Wray (2008), Kregel (2008), Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) and Crotty (2008), among others,
provide perspectives on how shaky are the foundations of these ‘sophisticated’ developments in
financial markets.
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eventually turns out to be unsustainable because the rising debt changes cash flow
relations (or income-payment commitment relations) and leads to various types of
financial distress. Minsky suggests that this kind of endogenous change in financial
fragility can generate debt-driven long expansions followed by deep depressions (Min-
sky 1964, 1995). In Minsky’s theory of long waves, short cycles fluctuate around the
long waves produced by endogenous changes in financial structure. Thus, the distinc-
tion between short cycles and long waves is an important characteristic of Minsky’s
cycle theory.
In spite of difficulties inherent in the formalization of Minsky’s theories, Minsky’s
financial instability hypothesis has inspired a number of researchers to model the
dynamic interaction between real and financial sectors. Taylor and O’Connell (1985),
Foley (1986), Semmler (1987), Jarsulic (1989, 1996), Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990),
Skott (1994), Dutt (1995), Keen (1995) and Flaschel, Franke and Semmler (1998,
Ch.12) are early contributions. Recent studies include Setterfield (2004), Nasica
and Raybaut (2005), Lima and Meirelles (2007), Fazzari et al. (2008), and Charles
(2008). While each of these studies captures a particular aspect of real-financial
interactions, none of these tries to distinguish long waves from short cycles and the
average periodicity in most models is ambiguous.
This chapter presents a stock-flow consistent model that produces long waves
around which short cycles fluctuate. In the model, firms’ and households’ financial
practices endogenously evolve through the interaction between real and financial sec-
tors. The interaction between changes in firms’ and households’ financial practices,
which are captured by the debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio, respectively,
produce long waves. We prove the existence of limit cycles describing the long waves
by using the Hopf bifurcation theorem and conduct simulation exercises to illustrate
stable limit cycles. The resulting long waves are characterized by periodic economic
crises following long expansions. Short cycles, generated by the interaction between
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effective demand and labor market dynamics, fluctuate around the long waves. The
main contribution of this paper is to provide a mechanism which explains both long
waves and short business cycles in a unifying framework.
It is worth noting that long waves in this chapter emerge from the interaction
between firms’ and households’ financial decisions. Minsky’s own accounts of cycles
and crises tend to privilege firm and banking sectors as a source of instability and cy-
cles, while they tend to ignore the role of households’ financial behavior in generating
cycles.2 Our model of long waves pays close attention to both firms’ and households’
financial decisions. The model consists of two subsystems: firms’ debt dynamics and
households’ portfolio dynamics. One interesting result of our analysis is that two sta-
ble subsystems can be combined to produce instability and cycles in the whole system
(See section 1.4). Thus, the resulting instability and cycles are genuinely attributed
to the interaction between sectors rather than characteristics of one particular sector.
The stock-flow consistent approach3 provides a useful framework that enables us to
keep track of the implications of one sector’s decisions for the other sector’s.
Short cycles as well as long waves in our model are the result of endogenous in-
teractions among economic agents, not the result of exogenous shocks. Most of the
mainstream literature on business cycles follows the Frisch tradition in which the
source of cyclical behavior is exogenous shocks external to the models, and agents’
reactions to the shocks are important only as propagation mechanisms. Regarding
this broad aspect, there is little difference between New Classical and New Keyne-
2Minsky’s neglect of the household sector is explained by his observation that “[H]ousehold debt-
financing of consumption is almost always hedge financing.” (1982, p. 32) This position, however, has
been challenged by some Minskian explanations of the sub-prime mortgage crisis. (e.g. Wray(2008)
and Kregel (2008))
3See Skott (1981, 1988, 1989A), Godley and Cripps (1983) and Taylor (1985) for early introduc-
tions of explicit stock-flow relations in a post-Keynesian / structuralist context. Simulation exercises
based on the stock-flow consistent framework have been flourishing since Lavoie and Godley (2001-2).
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sian theories.4 In contrast to those recent theories, the older tradition rooted in
Harrod (1939, 1948), Kaldor (1940), Samuelson (1939) and Goodwin (1967) puts a
great emphasis on the endogenous nature of cycles. The interaction between Key-
nesian multiplier and investment accelerator plays a central role in Harrod, Kaldor
and Samuelson whereas the interaction between saving-constrained accumulation and
class conflict in the labor market provides a basic mechanism in the Goodwin cycle.
Skott (1989A) provides a synthesis of effective demand and labor market dynamics -
two important elements in the older tradition - into a single framework. In the Skott
model, the rate of growth of employment and production depends on both labor
market conditions and effective demand. A limit cycle results from the interaction
between destabilizing forces in the goods market and stabilizing forces in the labor
market. The same mechanism as that in the Skott model is used to generate short
cycles in this paper. However, unlike the Skott model, short cycles in this chapter
oscillate around the long waves for which financial elements play a vital role.5
4It is well known that exogenous stochastic productivity shocks are a main cause of New Classical
real business cycles. While New Keynesian theories emphasize the effect of monetary shocks on
cyclical behavior, the nature of exogenous shocks does not matter in the New Keynesian theories
in the fundamental level, and New Keynesians accept the basic framework of real business cycle
theory. For instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) say: “We present a formal analysis of the role of
borrower’s balance sheets in the business cycle. Our vehicle is a modified real business cycle model,
in which a characteristic of the investment technology is an asymmetry of information between
the entrepreneurs who organize and manage physical investment and the savers from whom they
borrow.”(p.14).
5The Skott model has some weaknesses from a Minskian perspective. Skott assumes that in the
context of two financial assets (equity and deposit), the ratio of the value of equity to net profit and
the ratio of deposit to nominal income are exogenously given. The constancy of the equity-profit
ratio implies that the price-earnings ratio is always constant, not only on steady state path but
also during the course of cycles. More importantly, the assumption of constant deposit to nominal
income ratio suggests that firms’ stock of debt passively moves in proportion to nominal income so
that the debt-income ratio always remains constant on and off steady state path (In the Skott model,
as in this paper, all deposits in banks are lent to firms. Thus, the deposit/income ratio is always
equal to the debt/income ratio). Given this assumption, the debt-capital ratio (leverage ratio) will
follow cyclical change in the utilization rate but the influence of endogenous changes in firms’ and
bankers’ financial practices on the trajectories of real and financial variables are hardly conceivable
in this framework.
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents some of
the stylized facts about financial changes in the firm and household sectors. Section
1.3 sets up our model. Section 1.4 analyzes how the interaction between firms’ and
households’ financial practices produces long waves. Section 1.5 briefly introduces a
model of short cycles into the current context. Section 1.6 combines our model of
long waves with the short-cycle model and provides simulation results. Section 1.7,
finally, offers some concluding remarks.
1.2 Stylized facts
This section provides a brief description of some financial changes in firm and
household sectors which happened in the U.S in the years since 1952.
In Figure 1.1(a), the ratio of debt to the replacement value of capital for non-
farm nonfinancial corporations is shown. This ratio has exhibited fluctuations but an
apparent strong upward trend. In 1952, the debt ratio barely exceeded 30% but in-
creased steadily in the 1950s and 1960s, reaching almost 50% in 1973 before dropping
back to 36% in 1981. The leverage ratio has since displayed a steep rise, with minor
downturns, up to now.
If the profit rate had increased along with the debt ratio, the rising debt ratio
could have been validated by firms’ increasing cash generating capability. This was,
however, not the case. Figure 1.1(b) displays the ratio of debt to profit before tax for
the same sector. The ratio had been below four until the mid 1960s and then began to
rise, reaching at six, the highest point since the World War II. It then fell, reflecting
a significant fall in the debt ratio, and hit the bottom in 1978. The early 1980s was
characterized by a sharp rise in the debt/profit ratio. It has shown fluctuations since
then. The pattern was similar to that of the debt-capital ratio in Figure 1.1(a) but
exhibited much more volatility.
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Figure 1.1. U.S. Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporations (1952-2007)
Notes: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. Author’s
calculation. See Appendix A for details.
Figure 1.1(c) shows the ratio of real interest payment6 to profit before tax. The
trend shows a sharp contrast before and after 1980. Throughout the 1950s and the
1960s, it remained at very low levels below 15%. In the 1970s, this ratio even further
decreased mainly due to the favorable effects on interest payment obligations of high
inflation rates. Interest payments then dramatically increased above 60% of total
6The measures of real interest payments are calculated using bank prime loan rates. Thus the
measures tend to hide the difference in interest rates associated with particular debt units depending
on various maturity and riskiness.
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profit in the early 1980s, reaching the historical high, 80%, in 1986. Since then, it has
exhibited substantial fluctuations and the high peaks hit in 1989 and again in 2000.
Both Figure 1.1 (b) and 1.1 (c) indicate that firms’ profitability relative to their in-
debtedness and payment commitments was sound until the mid 1960s but the upward
trend in the debt-capital ratio since the mid 1960s changed the tendency afterwards.
In the meantime, the importance of equity finance has been greatly reduced.
Figure 1.1 (d) shows that in the 1950s-1970s a small positive fraction of investment
was financed by new issues. Since 1980, however, the ratio has been negative in
most years and fluctuated with much more volatility than in previous periods. The
amount of corporations’ stock buybacks sometimes reaches more than 50% of their
investment.
The household sector also has experienced significant changes since 1952. The
ratio of consumption to disposable income had steadily fallen until the early 1980s
with cyclical movements. The ratio then exhibited an upward trend until recent
years (Figure 1.2(a)). Figure 1.2(b) shows, household indebtedness rose substantially
throughout the whole period. In 1952, household credit market debt was simply
39% of their disposable personal income but it reached 136%. A large part of the
upward movement is explained by the mortgage debt as shown in the figure. In Figure
1.2(c), the ratio of equity to deposit holding, indicating household portfolio, displays
large swings. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the equity-deposit ratio remained at
relatively high levels, on average, 1.45. This tendency was reversed in the 1970s and
1980s: the historical average of the equity-deposit ratio during the period marked
merely 0.67. The ratio, however, began to rise steeply since the early 1990s. The
ratio hit the historical high in 1999, followed by an astonishing collapse in 2000. Two
major collapses in this ratio, 1973 and 2000, match those in the rate of return on
equity shown in Figure 1.2(d).
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Figure 1.2. U.S. Household and Nonprofit Organization (1952-2007)
Notes: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. Author’s
calculation. See Appendix A for details.
1.3 Model
This section presents a model. Firms make decisions concerning pricing/output,
accumulation and financing; households make consumption and portfolio decisions;
banks accept deposits and make loans. It is assumed that there are only two types
of financial assets - equity and bank deposits - and banks are the only financial
institution. It is assumed that the available labor force grows at a constant rate7
7We assume that there is no technical progress but the model can easily accommodate Harrod
neutral technical progress
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and long run growth is constrained by the availability of labor. Thus the economy is
‘mature’ in Kaldor’s (1966) terminology.
1.3.1 Firms
1.3.1.1 The finance constraint
Firms’ flow of funds account consists of sources and uses of funds. Firms have
three sources of funds in our framework: profits, new issue of equity and debt finance.
Using these funds, firms make investments in real capital, pay out dividends and make
interest payments. Algebraically,
pI +Div + iM = Π+ vN˙ + M˙ (1.1)
where I, Π, Div, M , and N are real gross investment, gross profits, dividends, bank
loans and the number of shares, respectively. Bank loans carry the nominal interest
rate (i). p represents the price of investment goods as well as the general price of
output in this one-sector model. All shares are assumed to have the same price v. A
dot over a variable refers to a time derivative (y˙ = dy=dt).
I assume that firms’ dividend payout is determined as a constant fraction of net
profits (= gross profits¡ depreciation¡ real interest payments). The dividend payout
rate is denoted as 1¡ sf and, consequently, sf represents firms’ retention rate. Thus,
we have
Div = (1¡ sf )(Π¡ ±pK ¡ rM) (1.2)
where K and ± are real capital stock and the rate of depreciation of real capital. r
represents the real interest rate, r = i ¡ pˆ (A hat over a variable is used to denote
a growth rate of the variable, for instance, yˆ = (1=y)(dy=dt)). Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2002) and Dos Santos and Zezza (2007), among others, use the specification
(1.2) regarding firms’ retention policy.
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New equity issue can be represented by the growth of the number of shares (Nˆ)
or by the share of investment financed by new issues denoted as x. Skott (1981, 1988,
1989A) and Foley and Taylor (2004) use the former and Lavoie and Godley (2001-
2002) the latter. Two measures, however, are related to each other in the following
manner.8
vNNˆ = xpI (1.3)
Substituting (1.2) into (1.1), we get
pI ¡ ±pK = sf (Π¡ ±pK ¡ rM) + vNNˆ +M(Mˆ ¡ pˆ) (1.4)
Scaling by the value of capital stock (pK), we finally have
Kˆ ´ g = sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm) + x(g + ±) + m˙+ gm (1.5)
where ¼, u, and m is the profit share (¼ ´ Π
pY
), the utilization rate (u ´ Y
YF
, YF is
full capacity output) and the leverage ratio (m ´ M
pK
). The technical output/capital
ratio, ¾ (´ YF
K
), is assumed to be fixed. ± is the depreciation rate. Equation (1.5) has
a straightforward interpretation: firms’ investment (g) is financed by three sources:
retained earnings, sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm), new equity issue, x(g + ±) and bank loans,
m˙ + gm. Given this finance constraint, firms’ financial behavior is characterized by
sf , x (or Nˆ) and m in steady state. Most theories treat the rates of firms’ retention
and equity issue as parameters and debt finance as an accommodating variable (Skott
1988, 1989A, Lavoie and Godley 2001-2002 and Dos Santos and Zezza 2007). This
chapter assumes that the retention rate (sf ) is exogenous as in the above literature
but both the rate of equity issue (x or Nˆ) and the leverage ratio m are endogenous.
However, our way of treating equity finance and debt finance is not symmetric.
8Nˆ = N˙=N . Given this notation, vN˙ = vNNˆ .
17
Debt finance evolves through endogenous changes in firms’ and banks’ financial
practices which are directly influenced by the relationship between firms’ profitability
and leverage ratio (see section 1.3.1.2 below). With debt finance determined in this
way, equity finance (x) serves as a buffer in the sense that once the other sources
of finance ¡ the retention and debt finance policies ¡ and investment plans are
determined, equity issues fill the gap between the funds needed for the investment
plans and the funds available from retained earnings and bank loans. In this regard,
equity finance is seen as a pure residual of firms’ financing constraint. Formally, for
a given set of parameters sf , ¾, ± and r, the trajectories of endogenous variables g,
¼, u, m and m˙ determine the required ratio of equity finance to gross investment:
x =
g ¡ sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm)¡ m˙¡ gm
g + ±
(1.6)
The treatment of equity finance as a residual may not be entirely satisfactory,
especially from a point of view that emphasizes substantial difficulty involved in
raising capital in equity markets compared to the other methods of finance. However,
as Figure 1.1 (d) shows, the degree of flexibility in issuing equities was historically
very large. This was even more prominent when the rate of net issue of equity was
negative (x < 0).
1.3.1.2 Endogenous changes in firms’ liability structure
Endogenous changes in firms’ liability structure, which are captured by changes
in firms’ debt-capital ratio (m), are central in this paper, and a Minskian perspective
suggests that the debt-capital ratio evolves according to sustained changes in firms’
profitability relative to their payment obligations on debt. Changes in profitability
that are perceived as highly temporary have only limited effects on desired leverage.
I, therefore, distinguish cyclical movements in profitability from the trend in average
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profitability and assume that changes in liability structure are determined as the
trend of profitability.9
The perception of strong profitability relative to payment commitments during
good years, Minsky argues, induces bankers and businessmen to adopt riskier financial
practices which typically results in increases in the leverage ratio. Following Minsky’s
idea (Minsky, 1982, 1986), I assume that changes in the ratio of profit to debt service
commitments drive changes in the debt structure. Formally,
m˙ = ¿
³ ½T
rm
´
; ¿ 0(¢) > 0 (1.7)
where ½T represents the trend rate of profit
10and ¿ is an increasing function. The
equation suggests the ratio of profit to debt service commitments drives changes
in the debt structure. More specifically, during the period of tranquility when the
level of profit is sufficiently high compared to interest payment obligations, firms’ and
bankers’ optimism reinforced by their success tends to make them adopt riskier finan-
cial arrangements which involve higher leverage ratios. A high profit level compared
to debt servicing is typically associated with a low probability of default which helps
bankers maintain their optimism. Recent history characterized by strong profitability
may motivate firms to implement riskier projects that require a large amount of debt.
The opposite is true when the ratio of profit to interest payments is low. Firms’
failure to repay debt obligations - defaults and bankruptcies in the firm sector - puts
financial institutions linked to those firms in trouble as well. To the extent that
financial institutions are intricately linked to each other through complex financial
networks, a financial failure in one unit can easily produce that in another unit. When
the profitability of the firm sector turns out to be too weak, situations can lead to
9See section 1.4.1 for more discussion.
10A definition of the trend rate of profit will be provided in section 1.4.
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systemic crises. A collapse in the financial system may be unavoidable especially
when financial networks are so complex that the level of systemic risk is high. A
financial crisis forces firms and bankers to reduce their indebtedness and it is often
manifested in a system-wide credit crunch. Thus, this situation may be represented
by a sudden collapse of the debt-capital ratio.
1.3.1.3 Accumulation
In general, capital accumulation is affected by several factors including profitabil-
ity, utilization, Tobin’s q, the level of internal cash flows, the real interest rates and
the debt ratio, but there is no consensus among theorists concerning the sensitivity
of firms’ accumulation behavior to changes in the various arguments. In particular,
the long run sensitivity of the accumulation rate to changes in the utilization rate has
been in debate among the structuralist/post-Keynesian economists.11 This chapter
follows the Harrodian perspective in which capacity utilization has foremost impor-
tance in firms’ accumulation behavior (Harrod, 1939, 1948). A Harrodian perspective
is characterized by the assumption that firms have a desired rate of utilization. In the
short run, the actual rate of utilization may substantially deviate from the desired
rate since firms’ demand expectations are not always met and capital stocks slowly
adjust. If the actual rate exceeds the desired rate, firms will accelerate accumulation
to increase their productive capacity and if the actual rate is smaller than the de-
sired rate, they will slow down accumulation to reduce the undesired reserve of excess
productive capacity. However, in the long run, it is not reasonable to assume that
the actual rate can persistently deviate from the desired rate because capital stocks
11See Auerbach and Skott (1988), Dumenil and Levy (1993), Park (1997), Dutt (1997), Kurz
(1986), Lavoie (1995), Lavoie et al. (2004), Skott (2008A, 2008B) and Dallery and van Treeck
(2008).
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flexibly adjust to maintain the desired rate. This perspective naturally distinguishes
the short-run accumulation function from the long-run accumulation function.12
A simple version of the long-run accumulation function can be written as
u = u¤ (1.8)
where u¤ is an exogenously given desired rate of utilization. (1.8) represents the idea
that in the long run, the utilization rate must be at what firms want it to be and
capital accumulation is perfectly elastic so as to maintain the desired rate. The strict
exogeneity of the desired rate in (1.8) may exaggerate reality but tries to capture
mild variations of the utilization rate in the long-run. Taking an example of the
U.S. economy from 1948 to 2008, Figure 1.3 (a) and 1.3 (b) plot the rate of capacity
utilization for the industrial sector and the manufacturing sector, respectively. The
Hodrick-Prescott filtered series (dotted lines) are added to capture the long-run vari-
ations in the utilization rate. The figures show that the degree of capacity utilization
is subject to significant short-run variations but exhibits only mild variations around
80% in the long-run.
In this chapter, I use the long run accumulation function (1.8) to analyze long
waves: as long as we are interested in cycles over a fairly long period of time, the
assumption that the actual utilization rate is on average at the desired rate is a
reasonable approximation.
For the analysis of short cycles, however, the accumulation function (1.8) cannot
be an appropriate specification because the deviation of the actual from the desired
rate normally occurs in the short run. Thus, we will use the following specification
(1.9) to describe accumulation behavior during a course of short cycles.
12This Harrodian perspective is elaborated in Skott (1989, 2008A, 2008B) in greater detail.
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Figure 1.3. Capacity Utilization. U.S (1948-2008)
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization
Kˆ ´ g = Á(u); Á0(u)À 0; Á(u¤) = n (1.9)
The strong positive effect of utilization on accumulation in (1.9) embodies the
Harrodian accelerator principle and the function Á is configured so that the desired
rate of utilization is consistent with steady growth at a natural rate. We will use
(1.9) in section 1.5 where short cycles are analyzed.13
1.3.2 Banks
In the model, banks’ active role in shaping firms’ financial structure is represented
by equation (1.7) which reflects both firms’ and banks’ behavior. For a given profit-
interest ratio, equation (1.7) determines the trajectory of the debt-capital ratio m.
At any moment, the amount of loans supplied to firms will be M = mpK. I assume
13The specification (1.9) is clearly an oversimplification since it leaves out other determinants of
investment. For instance, it does not capture the direct impact of financial variables such as cash
flow and asset prices which are highly emphasized by Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986) and Tobin (1969), as
well as current New Keynesian economics (Fazzari et al.(1988) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1996), among others). However, equation (1.9) can be easily extended to accommodate the effect
of those variables without affecting major results of this study. In fact, the effect of cash flow
and Tobin’s q on accumulation, it can be shown, reinforces the utilization effect on accumulation
embodied in (1.9). The merit of simple specification in equation (1.9) is that it shows the underlying
mechanisms in a transparent way.
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that neither households nor firms hold cash, the loan and deposit rates are equal and
there are no costs involved in banking. With these assumptions, the amount of loans
to the firm sector must equal the total deposits of the household sector.
M = MH (1.10)
where MH represents households’ deposit holdings.
Banks set the nominal interest rate i, which is typically affected by inflation. To
simplify the analysis, I assume that banks effectively control the real interest rate r.
1.3.3 Households
Households receive wage income, dividends in return for their stock holdings and
interest income. Thus, household real disposable income denoted as Y H is given as:
Y H =
W +Div + rMH
p
(1.11)
Households hold stocks and deposits in our two financial asset world and household
wealth is denoted as NWH . Thus, we have
NWH =
vNH +MH
p
(1.12)
Based on their income and wealth, they make consumption and portfolio decisions.
We adopt a conventional specification of consumption function.
C = C(Y H ; NWH); CY H > 0 ; CNWH > 0 (1.13)
The life cycle hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani, 1963), among others, may justify
this specification. Similar specifications have been used by Boyer (2000), Godley and
Lavoie (2007) and Dos Santos and Zezza (2007).
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For simplification, we assume that the function takes a linear form. We then have,
after normalizing by capital stock and simple manipulations,
C
K
= c1[u¾ ¡ sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm)] + c2q (1.14)
where u¾¡sf (¼u¾¡±¡rm) is disposable income scaled by capital stock and Tobin’s
q captures household wealth. c1 and c2 are household propensities to consume out of
disposable income and wealth.
In addition to consumption/saving decisions, households make portfolio decisions.
The long run evolution of household portfolio plays a pivotal role in generating long
waves in this model. We denote the equity-deposit ratio as ®:
® ´ vN
H
MH
(1.15)
We assume that the composition of households’ portfolio is affected by their views
on stock market performance. Applying a Minskian hypothesis to household behavior,
it is assumed that during good years, households tend to hold a greater proportion
of financial assets in the form of riskier assets. In our two-asset framework, equity
represents a risky asset and deposits a safe asset. Thus, a rise in fragility during
good years is captured by a rise in ®. We introduce a new variable z to represent the
degree of households’ optimism about stock markets. We can normalize the variable
z so that z = 0 corresponds to the state where households’ perception of tranquility
is neutral and there is no change in ®. Given this framework, the evolution of ® is
determined by an increasing function of z.
®˙ = ³(z); ³(0) = 0; ³ 0(z) > 0 (1.16)
The next question is what determines the degree of households’ optimism about
stock markets, z. It is natural to assume that household portfolio decisions, the
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division of their wealth into stocks and deposits, will be affected by the difference
between the rates of return on stocks and deposits.
Our specification of the process in which households form their views on stock
markets emphasizes historical elements in financial markets. Thus, the past trajecto-
ries of rates of return on assets as well as those of ® matter in the formation of z. As a
crude approximation of this perception formation process, the following exponential
decay specification is introduced:
z =
Z t
¡1
exp [¡¸(t¡ º)]· (reº ¡ r; ®º) dº (1.17)
where re is the real rate of return on equity, ·re ´ @·(re¡r;®)@re > 0 and ·® ´ @·(r
e¡r;®)
@®
<
0. In expression (1.17), · (reº ¡ r; ®º) represents the information regarding the state
of asset markets at time º. The higher the rate of return on equity relative to
the deposit rate of interest, the more optimistic households’ view on stock markets
becomes (·re > 0). However, other things equal, a higher proportion of their financial
wealth in the form of stock holdings (high ®) tempers the desire of further increases
in equity holdings, i.e. ·® < 0.
Information on asset markets at different times enters in the formation of z with
different weights. The term, exp [¡¸(t¡ º)], represents these weights, implying that a
more remote past receives a smaller weight in the formation of households’ perception
of tranquility. Thus, ¸ may be seen as the rate of loss of relevance or loss of memory
of past events. The higher ¸, the more quickly eroded is the relevance of past events.
14
14An alternative specification to (1.16) and (1.17) is possible. Consider the following specification.
®˙ = ³(®¤ ¡ ®) (1.16a)
®¤ =
Z t
¡1
exp [¡¸(t¡ º)]·¯ (reº ¡ r) dº (1.17a)
where ·¯0(¢) > 0 and ®¤ is the desired equity-deposit ratio. (1.17a) tells us that households’ desired
portfolio is determined by the trajectory of the difference between the rates of return on equity and
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Differentiation of (1.17) with respect to t yields the following differential equation:
z˙ = · (re ¡ r; ®)¡ ¸z (1.18)
Two dynamic equations (1.16) and (1.18), along with the equation describing the
evolution of firms’ liability structure, (1.7), are essential building blocks for our model
of long waves. To proceed, we need to see how the rate of return on equity, re, is
determined. re is defined as follows:
re ´ Div + Γ
vNH
=
(1¡ sf )(Π¡ ±pK ¡ rM) + (vˆ ¡ pˆ)vNH
vNH
(1.19)
where Γ is capital gains adjusted for inflation (Γ ´ (vˆ ¡ pˆ)vNH).
The rate of return on equity is determined by stock market equilibrium. Stock
market equilibrium requires that the number of shares supplied by firms equals that
of shares held by households, N = NH , which implies N˙ = N˙H in terms of the change
in the number of shares. The issue of shares is determined by firm’s financing needs.
Firms issue new shares whenever retained earnings and bank loans fall short of the
funds needed to carry their investment plans. Thus firms’ finance constraint (1.1)
implies that:
deposit. This desired ratio may not be instantaneously attained so that the adjustment of the actual
to the desired ratio takes time. (1.16a) represents this kind of lagged adjustment of the actual equity-
deposit ratio toward the desired ratio. In spite of different interpretations, the two specifications,
(1.16)-(1.17) and (1.16a)-(1.17a), are qualitatively similar. To see this, let z ´ ®¤ ¡ ®. Then
z˙ = ®˙¤ ¡ ®˙. Differentiating (1.17a) with respect to t, we have ®˙¤ = ·¯(re)¡ ¸®¤ = ·¯(re)¡ ¸(®+ z).
Therefore, we can rewrite (1.16a) and (1.17a) to:
®˙ = ³(z) (1.16b)
z˙ = ·¯(re)¡ ¸®¡ ³(z)¡ ¸z (1.18a)
One may want to compare (1.16b) and (1.18a) with (1.16) and (1.18).
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N˙ =
1
v
[pI +Div + iM ¡ Π¡ M˙ ] (1.20)
Simple algebra shows that capital gains can be expressed as follows:
Γ = (vˆ ¡ pˆ)vNH = (®ˆ+ mˆ+ Kˆ)vNH ¡ vN˙H (1.21)
(®ˆ + mˆ + Kˆ)vNH represents the total increase in the real value of stock market
wealth15 but some of the increase is attributed to the increase in the number of shares
(= vN˙H). To get the measure of capital gains, the latter should be deducted from
the total increase.
Using N = NH , substituting (1.20) in (1.21) and plugging this result in (1.19),
we get the new expression for re:
re =
Π¡ iM + M˙ + (®ˆ+ mˆ+ Kˆ)vNH ¡ pI
vNH
(1.22)
Normalizing by pK, we finally get the expression for re as a function of ¼, u, m,
m˙, ® and ®˙:
re =
¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm+ (1 + ®)[m˙+mÁ(u)] + ®˙m¡ Á(u)
®m
(1.23)
= re(¼; u;m; ®; m˙; ®˙) (1.24)
Substituting this expression in the dynamic equation (1.19), we have:
z˙ = · [re(¼; u;m; ®; m˙; ®˙)¡ r; ®]¡ ¸z (1.25)
(1.25) shows that households’ views of tranquility are affected by a number of
variables and the relationship is complex. We consider several cases according to the
property of (1.25) in section 1.4.
15Note that ®ˆ+ mˆ+ Kˆ = vˆ + Nˆ ¡ pˆ.
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1.3.4 Goods market equilibrium
The equilibrium condition for the goods market is:
C
K
+
I
K
=
Y
K
(1.26)
The definition of q implies that q = (1+®)m. Using this, the equilibrium condition
for the goods market can be written as:
c1[u¾ ¡ sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm)] + c2(1 + ®)m+ Á(u) + ± = u¾ (1.27)
We take the profit share (¼) as endogenous and the equilibrium value of ¼ can be
found for given u, m and ®. Explicitly, we have:
¼ =
Á(u) + ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sfu¾
(1.28)
´ ¼(u;m; ®) (1.29)
As u, m and ® evolve over time, the profit share changes as well. The Harrodian
investment function adopted in this paper emphasizes a high sensitivity of investment
to changes in the utilization. Specifically, it assumes that investment rises much faster
than saving as the utilization rate changes. Algebraically,
@(I=K)
@u
= Á0(u)À (1¡ c1)¾ + c1sf¼¾ = @(S=K)
@u
(1.30)
This Harrodian assumption has an implication for the effect of changes in uti-
lization on profitability: utilization has a positive effect on the profit share and the
magnitude will be quantitatively large. The partial derivative is given as
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@¼
@u
=
Á0(u)¡ (1¡ c1)¾ ¡ c1sf¼¾
c1sfu¾
À 0 (1.31)
The large effect of changes in utilization on the profit share plays an important
role in generating short cycles. (See section 1.5)
It is also readily seen that changes in the debt ratio and the equity-deposit ratio
positively affect the profit share. Increases in the debt ratio or the equity-deposit
ratio raise consumption demand though increases in disposable income or wealth,
thereby increases the profit share.
@¼
@m
=
c1sfr + c2(1 + ®)
c1sfu¾
> 0 (1.32)
@¼
@®
=
c2m
c1sfu¾
> 0 (1.33)
The effects of changes in the state variables (u, m and ®) on the current profit
rate are straightforward. Since the current profit rate equals ¼u¾, the positive effects
of changes in u, m and ® on the profit share all carry over to those on the profit rate.
1.4 Long waves
This section shows how endogenous changes in firms’ and households’ financial
practices generate long waves. Our model of long waves consists of two subsystems:
one describes changes in firms’ liability structure and the other specifies changes
in households’ portfolio composition. Section 1.4.1 analyzes the evolution of firms’
liability structure, assuming households’ portfolio composition is frozen. Section 1.4.2
examines households’ portfolio dynamics, given the assumption that firms’ liability
structure does not change. Section 1.4.3 combines two subsystems and shows how
long waves emerge from the interaction between two subsystems.
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1.4.1 Long-run debt dynamics
This section analyzes the long-run evolution of firms’ debt structure. For conve-
nience, we reproduce equation (1.7).
m˙ = ¿
³ ½T
rm
´
where ¿ 0(¢) > 0 (7)
Regarding the shape of ¿ in (1.7), Minsky’s discussion suggests that the prosperity
during tranquil years tends to induce firms and bankers to gradually raise the leverage
ratio; the rise in the leverage ratio, however, cannot sustain because it worsens the
profit/interest relation. Minsky points out that the financial system is prone to crises
as the ratio of profit to interest traverses a critical level (Minsky, 1995). The resulting
systemic crisis may prompt a rapid de-leveraging process. To capture this idea, we
assume that ¿ 0(¢) takes relatively small positive values within a narrow bound when
½T
rm
is above a threshold level (good years), whereas it takes relatively large negative
values when ½T
rm
is below the threshold level (bad years). When falling profit/interest
ratio passes through the threshold level, m˙ sharply falls reflecting a rapid del-everaging
process. Thus, ¿ 0(¢) is likely to be very large when ½T
rm
= ¿¡1(0). Figure 1.4 reflects
this assumption.
T
rm
U
m
()W 
1
(0)W 
Figure 1.4. Debt-Capital Ratio and Profit-Interest Ratio
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As briefly discussed in section 1.3.1.2, we use the trend rate of profit ½T as a basis
of the evolution of firms’ liability structure. Behind equation (1.7) is the idea that
firms’ liability structure evolves endogenously over time and that the key determinant
of the evolution is firms’ and banks’ perception of tranquility. The level of firms’ profit
relative to payment commitments on liabilities is an indicator of firms’ performance
and solvency status. Movements of the profit rate in general include both trend and
cyclical components. It seems reasonable to assume that the long-run evolution of
firms’ liability structure is primarily determined by the trend of the profit rate rather
than the current profit rate.16
The driving force of the short-run cyclical movements in the current profit rate
is changes in capacity utilization while the desired rate, u¤, provides a good ap-
proximation of the long-run average of actual rates of utilization. Thus setting the
utilization rate at the desired rate, the short-run cyclical component in the profit rate
is effectively eliminated, and we have
½T = ¼(u
¤;m; ®)u¤¾
=
n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sf
(1.34)
The trend rate of profit defined as (26) depends positively on the debt-capital
ratio m and the equity-deposit ratio ® (@½T
@m
> 0 and @½T
@®
> 0). The profit-interest
ratio, the key determinant of the liability structure, is written as
½T
rm
=
n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sfrm
(1.35)
16This perspective is in line with Minsky’s statement that “[T]he inherited debt reflects the history
of the economy, which includes a period in the not too distant past in which the economy did not do
well. Acceptable liability structures are based on some margin of safety so that expected cash flows,
even in periods when the economy is not doing well, will cover contractual debt payments”(Minsky,
1982, 65).
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(1.35) implies that for a given value of ®, the profit-interest ratio is uniquely
determined by the debt-capital ratio m. Minsky’s implicit assumption that a rising
debt ratio deteriorates the profit/commitment relation can be written as:
n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c1sf± > 0 (1.36)
The average gross saving rate is typically greater than household marginal propen-
sity to save out of disposable income, and this condition ensures that (1.36) will be
met: if S
Y
= I
Y
= n+±
u¤¾ > (1 ¡ c1), then n + ± ¡ (1 ¡ c1)u¤¾ + c1sf± > 0. Thus, we
assume that this condition is satisfied.17
Using (1.7) and (1.35), m˙ can be written as a function of m and ®.
m˙ = ¿
µ
n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¤¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sfrm
¶
´ F(m
¡
; ®
+
) (1.37)
(1.37), along with the condition (1.36), implies that for any value of ®, (i) F is
decreasing in m, (ii) there exists a unique value of the debt ratio m¤(®) such that if
m = m¤(®), m˙ = 0, and (iii) m¤(®) depends positively on ®, i.e. m¤0(®) > 0. By
setting m˙ to zero and solving for m, we obtain the algebraic expression for m¤(®):
m¤(®) ´ n+ ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u
¤¾ + c1sf±
[¿¡1(0)¡ 1]c1sfr ¡ c2(1 + ®) (1.38)
Using these properties (i), (ii) and (iii), Figure 1.5 illustrates the motion of the
debt-capital ratio.
It is straightforward from Figure 1.5 that (assuming ® is constant) our dynamic
specification of Minksy’s financial instability hypothesis implies that firms’ debt struc-
ture monotonically converges to a stable fixed point m¤(®). The intuition is simple.
17Otherwise, an increase in the debt ratio will raise the profit-interest ratio which leads to a
self-repelling process of debt ratio without any ceiling.
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Figure 1.5. Motion of Debt-Capital Ratio
When the actual debt ratio (m) is lower than m¤(®), the corresponding profit-interest
ratio is greater than the threshold level at which the debt ratio does not change. This
will induce firms to raise the debt ratio. The same kind of event will happen as long
as m < m¤(®): m will eventually converge to m¤(®). The opposite will happen when
the debt ratio is greater than the critical level (m > m¤(®)).
It is worth noting that since the slope of the graph in Figure 1.5 is very steep
at m = m¤(®), the derivative of F(m;®) with respect to m is strongly negative
at m = m¤(®), i.e. jFmj is very large. In a limiting case where the de-leveraging
process is instantaneous at m¤(®), the graph in Figure 1.5 takes a step-like shape and
Fm ! ¡1.
Given assumption (1.36), a stable dynamics is inevitable in a one-dimensional
continuous time framework. Moving from continous to discrete time framework may
change the picture so that firms’ debt dynamics alone can produce long-run cyclical
movements. In this paper, however, I explore another avenue toward long waves by
integrating firms’ debt dynamics into households’ portfolio dynamics.
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1.4.2 Household portfolio dynamics
The other subsystem of our model of long waves, which describes households’
portfolio dynamics, consists of two dynamic equations:
®˙ = ³(z) (1.39)
z˙ = · (re ¡ r; ®)¡ ¸z (1.40)
Analogously to the analysis of firms’ debt dynamics, we are interested in the long-
run evolution of household portfolio decisions and, to simplify the analysis abstracts
from the effect of short-run variations in capacity utilization. The rate of return on
equity evaluated at u = u¤ equals
reju=u¤ = ½T (m;®)¡ ± ¡ rm+ (1 + ®)[F(m;®) +mn] + ³(z)m¡ n
®m
(1.41)
Given this expression for re, equation (40) becomes
z˙ = · (reju=u¤ ¡ r; ®)¡ ¸z ´ G(m;®; z) (1.42)
(1.37), (1.39), and (1.42) constitute a self-contained three-dimensional dynamical
system. To better understand the mechanics of the three dimensional system, let
us take a look at the subsystem (1.39) and (1.42), assuming that m is fixed. By
differentiating (1.42) with respect to ® and z, the effects of ® and z on z˙ are given
by:
G® = ·re
@re
@®
+ ·® S 0 (1.43)
Gz = ·re
@re
@z
¡ ¸ = ·re ³
0
®
¡ ¸ S 0 (1.44)
The effect of changes in ® on z, G® in (1.43), is decomposed into two parts. First,
changes in ® affect the rate of return on equity, which changes households’ views on
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stock markets, ·re
@re
@®
. The effect of an increase in ® on re, @r
e
@®
, can be negative or
positive in the steady state. Second, an increase in ® mitigates the desire for further
increases in equity holdings (·® < 0). Thus, the overall effect depends on the precise
magnitude of these two effects.
The effect of z on z˙ is also unclear. On the one hand, an increase in households’
optimism about stock markets accelerates stock holdings, which raises capital gains
and the rate of return on equity. The increase in re reinforces their optimism (·re
@re
@z
>
0). On the other hand, the degree of optimism will erode at a speed of ¸, holding re
and ® constant. Thus, the net effect is ambiguous.
Let JH be the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the fixed point of (1.39) and (1.42).
The ambiguity of the signs of G® and Gz yields four cases. Table 1.1 summarizes it.
Table 1.1. Classifying fixed points
Gz < 0 Gz > 0
G® < 0
Case I Stable
Tr(JH) < 0 and
Det(JH) > 0
Case II Unstable
Tr(JH) > 0 and
Det(JH) > 0
G® > 0
Case III Saddle
Tr(JH) < 0 and
Det(JH) < 0
Case IV Saddle
Tr(JH) > 0 and
Det(JH) < 0
A locally stable steady state in the subsystem is obtained when Gz and G® are
both negative (Case I). In this case, ¸ is large relative to ·re
@re
@z
, and ·re
@re
@®
is negative
or, if positive, relatively small compared to the absolute value of ·®. Thus, to get
a local stable steady state for households’ portfolio dynamics, the positive effect of
changes in ® and z on z˙ via the rate of return on equity needs to remain relatively
small in the neighborhood of the steady state.
Moving from Case I, as ¸ gets smaller than ·re
@re
@z
(Gz > 0), keeping the condition
G® < 0, the steady state becomes locally unstable, yielding Case II. In this case, a
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high optimism further boosts households’ optimistic views on stock markets, creating
destabilizing forces. The locally unstable steady state, along with nonlinearities of
(1.39) and (1.42), can produce limit cycles as long as ¸ is not too small (See Figure
1.6). Thus, in this case, households’ portfolio dynamics alone can generate persistent
long waves.
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Figure 1.6. A Limit Cycle Generated by Household Portfolio Dynamics Alone (Case
II)
If G® > 0, i.e.
@re
@®
is positive and its magnitude is large so that ·re
@re
@®
is greater
than j·®j, then the fixed point of the households’ portfolio dynamics becomes saddle,
regardless of the sign of Gz (Case III and IV). In both Case III and IV, a high
level of equity holdings creates increasing optimism (G® > 0), making the steady
state a saddle point. However, Case IV is distinguished from Case III because it
is an exceptional case: it turns out that the destabilizing force in Case IV is too
strong to produce a limit cycle for the three dimensional full system ((1.37), (1.39),
and (1.42)), whereas, in all other three cases I, II, and III, an appropriate choice
of parameter values can produce a limit cycle for the full system. The next section
analyzes the full system of long waves.
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1.4.3 Full dynamics: long waves
We now put together firms’ debt and households’ portfolio dynamics and obtain
the following three dimensional dynamical system:
m˙ = F(m;®) (1.37)
®˙ = ³(z) (1.39)
z˙ = G(m;®; z) (1.42)
Let us first consider the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated at the steady
state.
J =
266664
Fm F® 0
0 0 ³ 0
Gm G® Gz
377775 =
266664
¡ + 0
0 0 +
¡ +=¡ +=¡
377775 (1.45)
G® and Gz are ambiguously signed but the partial derivative of G with respect to
m is likely to be negative:
Gm = ·re
@re
@m
(1.46)
where
@re
@m
=
£
@½T
@m
m¡ ½T
¤
+ (1 + ®)mFm + n+ ±
®m2
(1.47)
in the steady state. The sign of (1.47) may appear to be indeterminate: while @½T
@m
m¡
½T is negative due to assumption (1.36) and (1 + ®)mFm is negative since Fm < 0,
n+± is positive. The discussion on the shape of ¿(¢) in section 1.4.1, however, suggests
that Fm is large in magnitude at the steady growth path. Thus, at the steady state,
the negative terms in the numerator in (1.47) dominate, and the rate of return on
equity will decrease as firms’ indebtedness increases in the neighborhood of the steady
state. Thus, we have Gm = ·re
@re
@m
< 0.
We are interested in the conditions under which the system exhibits limit cycle
behavior. As 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 showed, the specification of firms’ financial decisions,
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(1.37), leads to asymptotically stable dynamics, whereas households’ portfolio dy-
namics, (1.39) and (1.42), produces several cases presented in Table 1. Our analytic
result suggests that if households’ portfolio dynamics is neither strongly stabilizing
nor strongly destabilizing, our baseline system of (1.37), (1.39) and (1.42) tends to
generate limit cycles. Our analysis of limit cycles is based on the Hopf bifurcation
theorem. The Hopf bifurcation occurs if the nature of the system experiences the
transition from stable fixed point to stable cycle as we gradually change a parameter
value of a dynamical system (Medio, 1992, section 2.7). I will use ¸ as the parame-
ter for the analysis of bifurcation. ¸ is particularly useful for the analysis not only
because it has an obvious behavioral importance but also because it provides ana-
lytic tractability due to the fact that changes in ¸ do not affect steady state values.
Proposition 118 provides the main results of our analysis of long waves:
Proposition 1 Consider the three dimensional system of (1.37), (1.39) and (1.42)
and the Jacobian matrix (1.45) where the partial derivatives are taken at the steady
state values. Let
b ´ (jFmj
2 ¡ ³ 0G®)¡
p
(jFmj2 ¡ ³ 0G®)2 + 4³ 0jFmjjGmjF®
2jFmj < 0
(I) (Case I and Case II) Suppose that G® < 0 and Gz < min
n
jFmj; ³0jG®jjFmj
o
.19
Then a Hopf bifurcation occurs at ¸ = ¸¤ ´ ·re @re@z + jbj. As ¸ falls passing
through ¸¤, the system with a stable steady state loses its stability, giving rise
to a limit cycle.
18The proof of Proposition I is found in Appendix B but the proof is concerned about only the
existence of a limit cycle. The computation of the coefficient that shows whether the limit cycle is
stable is very complicated and hard to interpret. Therefore, we extensively use simulation exercises
to observe the stability of cycles.
19Note that Case I automatically satisfies the second condition since Gz < 0 in Case I.
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(II) (Case III) Suppose that Gz < 0 and 0 < G® < min
n
jFmjjGz j
³0 ;
F®jGmj
jFmj
o
. Then
a Hopf bifurcation occurs at ¸ = ¸¤ ´ ·re @re@z + jbj. As ¸ falls passing through
¸¤, the system with a stable steady state loses its stability, giving rise to a limit
cycle.
(III) (Case IV) Suppose that G® > 0 and Gz > 0. Then the steady state is unstable.
There exists no limit cycle by way of the Hopf bifurcation.
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Figure 1.7. A Limit Cycle in the 3D System of Long Waves (Case I)
Part (I) in the proposition suggests that the existence of a limit cycle requires
at least three conditions: first, the mitigation effect of a high proportion of equity
holdings on increasing optimism (j·®j) is sufficiently large so that G® < 020; second,
households’ optimistic or pessimistic view on stock markets is not excessively persis-
tent (Gz < min
n
jFmj; ³0jG®jjFmj
o
); third, the rate of loss of relevance of past events (¸)
20Or the positive effect of changes in ® on z˙ via its effect on the rate of return on equity should
not be too large.
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should not be too large (¸ < ¸¤).21 The second and third conditions imply that for
the existence of a limit cycle, ¸ should be of appropriate magnitude:
·re
@re
@z
¡min
½
jFmj; ³
0jG®j
jFmj
¾
< ¸ < ·re
@re
@z
+ jbj (1.48)
All of these conditions imply that to get a limit cycle, households’ portfolio dynamics
should be neither strongly stabilizing nor strongly destabilizing.
One interesting aspect of Part (I) in Proposition 1 is that the interaction between
two stable subsystems - firms’ debt and households’ portfolio dynamics - can generate
an unstable steady state and a limit cycle in the whole system (Case I). Thus, in this
case, the source of the resulting long waves does not lie in a particular sector but purely
in the interaction between both firm and household sectors. Figure 1.7 depicts the
emergence of a limit cycle in this case in a three dimensional space. Figure 1.8 shows
the trajectories of the debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio in this case. The
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Figure 1.8. Long Waves
debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio steadily increase for about twenty nine
21If ¸ exceeds ¸¤, then the system will be stabilized.
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years and twenty seven years, respectively.22 This expansion is followed by a sharp
fall in m and ®, which have significant negative impacts on effective demand and
trigger an abrupt downturn in the real sector (See section 1.5 below).
Part (I) also covers Case II where the subsystem of households’ portfolio dynamics
is unstable. As shown in 1.4.2, in Case II, portfolio dynamics alone can create a limit
cycle. Part (I) in the proposition suggests that the system can still have a limit
cycle when the portfolio dynamics is combined with firms’ debt dynamics. Then
what is the implication of introducing the debt dynamics into portfolio dynamics?
The qualitative analysis does not tell much about the answer to this question. A
numerical experiment, however, provides a case in which the amplitude and period
of long waves get larger and the quantitative effect is very large as we move from the
2D subsystem of portfolio dynamics to the full 3D system (Figure 1.9).23
Full 3D system
2D Household Portfolio Subsystem
t
0.5
1
1.5
D
Figure 1.9. Comparison Between 2D and 3D Systems (Case II)
22The functions and parameter values for this simulation, which are also used for the simulation
in section 1.6, are found in Appendix C. A sufficiently long period of time (from t = 0 to t = 30000)
is taken in all simulation exercises in this paper.
23In the simulation behind Figure 1.9, the exogenous debt-capital ratio in the subsystem of house-
hold portfolio dynamics is configured to the same value as the steady state level of m in the full 3D
system.
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Part (II) in the proposition concerns Case III where the household portfolio sub-
system yields a saddle point steady state. Thus, this part of Proposition 1 shows
how stabilizing debt dynamics and households’ portfolio dynamics with the saddle
property are combined to produce a limit cycle. Not surprisingly, not all saddle
cases can generate a limit cycle. First, the destabilizing effect that makes the fixed
point in the 2D household subsystem saddle ¡ the magnitude of G® ¡ should be
mild: G® < min
n
jFmjjGz j
³0 ;
F®jGmj
jFmj
o
. Second, Gz should be negative. If it is positive
(Gz > 0), the condition for the saddle point, G® > 0, eliminates the possibility of the
emergence of a limit cycle by way of the Hopf bifurcation. Proposition 1-(III) makes
this point. Intuitively, if both G® > 0 and Gz > 0 (Case IV), the portfolio dynamics
in the household sector is excessively destabilizing in the sense that stabilizing forces
in firms’ debt dynamics cannot contain such a strong destabilizing effect.
To understand the mechanism behind the long waves, it is illuminating to compare
the full system with the subsystem of debt dynamics. As seen in section 1.4.1, with
households’ portfolio composition (®) fixed, the debt-capital ratio (m) monotonically
converges to its steady state value m¤(®) (See Figure 1.5). The main reason for
this convergence is the inverse relation between m and ½T
rm
: a rising debt-capital
ratio deteriorates firms’ profit-interest ratio. Thus, for any given ®, m and ½T
rm
move
in the opposite direction. However, once households’ portfolio composition evolves
endogenously, this kind of strict inverse relationship breaks down because changes in
® also affect ½T
rm
. Figure 1.10 illustrates this. In Figure 1.10, the horizontal dotted
line represents the threshold level (= ¿¡1(0)) of the profit-interest ratio that makes
m˙ zero. In the area above the horizontal line, the debt-capital ratio increases and
in the area below the line, it decreases. With ® held fixed, the movement along the
curve AB is not possible since for any given ®, a rise in m is incompatible with a rise
in ½T
rm
. However, increases in ® fueled by households’ optimism during an expansion
have a positive effect on the profit-interest ratio by raising aggregate demand. Thus,
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Figure 1.10. The Relationship Between the Debt-Capital Ratio and the Profit-
Interest Ratio
from A to B, the economy experiences increases in both ® and m (The positive effect
of the rise in ® on the profit-interest ratio dominates the negative effect of the rise
in m and consequently the profit-interest ratio also increases during this period).
However, households’ optimistic views on stock markets eventually fade as both m
and ® increase. As a result, the negative effect of a rise in the debt ratio starts
to be dominant at some point and the profit-interest ratio begins falling (point B).
Because the profit-interest ratio is still above the threshold level, the debt ratio still
keeps increasing and the profit-interest ratio falls along the curve BC. When the
profit-interest ratio passes through point C, the debt-capital ratio starts to fall. If
® is fixed, this fall in the debt-capital ratio quickly restores profitability but during
contractions, ® falls as well and the profit-interest ratio tends to relatively slowly
improve along the curve from C to A. When the economy reaches point A, a new
cycle begins.
Figure 1.11 depicts the same story from a slightly different angle. The solid line
plots a trajectory of the actual debt-capital ratio over time (m) and the dotted line
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Figure 1.11. Actual and Desired Debt Ratios
a trajectory of the desired debt ratio (m¤(®)). Figure 1.5 suggests that the actual
debt ratio m tends to gravitate toward the desired ratio m¤(®). However, when ®
changes, the desired ratio becomes a moving target of the actual ratio. From this
perspective, a period of expansion (contraction) is the time when the actual ratio is
below (above) the desired ratio, i.e. m < m¤ (m > m¤), and consequently the actual
debt ratio is increasing (decreasing). In words, a stock market boom (rising ®) tends
to raise the tolerable level of the debt-capital ratio which the actual ratio is chasing.
When the relation between m and m¤ is reversed, a long downturn begins (See point
C in Figure 1.11).
1.5 Short cycles
The model of long waves in section 1.4.3 can be combined with a model of short
cycles. To complete our model of short cycles, we need to introduce short-run accu-
mulation function and firms’ pricing/output decisions.
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In our analysis of long waves, the degree of capacity utilization is set at its long
run average in order to remove its short-run impact on profitability and to focus
on the trend profitability. However, when it comes to short cycles, the utilization
rate can deviate from the desired rate due to falsified demand expectations and slow
adjustment of capital stocks. As briefly discussed in section 1.3.1.3, we introduce the
following accumulation function for the analysis of short cycles.
g = Á(u); Á0(u) > 0; Á(u¤) = n (1.9)
In 1.3.4, using this accumulation function (1.9) and the consumption function
(1.14), I derived the profit share that ensures the goods market equilibrium. For
convenience, I reproduce the expression for the equilibrium profit share.
¼(u
+
;m
+
; ®
+
) =
Á(u) + ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sfu¾
(1.28)
The positive effect of u on ¼ is obtained from the Harrodian assumption (1.30):
investment rises faster in response to changes in u than saving. Note that both the
debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio have an expansionary effect on the
profit share.
Regarding firms’ pricing/output decisions, this paper adopts a Marshallian ap-
proach elaborated in Skott (1989A, 2008B). The Keynesian literature often assumes
that prices are sticky while output adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to absorb
demand shocks but the Marshallian approach assumes the opposite. Output does not
adjust instantaneously due to a production lag and substantial adjustment costs. For
instance, increases in production and employment require substantial search, hiring
and training costs. Hiring or layout costs include not only explicit costs but also
hidden costs such as a deterioration in industrial relations and morale. The approach
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assumes the adjustment of prices is fast compared to slow output expansion. In this
framework, fast adjustments in prices and the profit share establish product market
equilibrium for a given level of output (and stocks of real capital and financial as-
sets). In a continuous-time setting, sluggish output adjustment can be approximated
by assuming that output is predetermined at each moment and that firms choose the
rate of growth of output, rather than the level of output. Then output growth is
determined by comparing the costs and benefits involved in the output adjustment
which in turn are determined by the labor market conditions and the profit signal in
the goods market, respectively. Thus we can formulate:
Yˆ = h(¼; e); h¼ > 0; he < 0 (1.49)
where e is the employment rate. A higher profitability induces firms to expand
output more rapidly whereas the tightened labor market gives firms negative in-
centives to expand production.24 Assuming a fixed-coefficient Leontief technology,
Y = minf¾K; ºLg, the employment rate can be expressed as:
e =
Y=º
L¯
(1.50)
where º is constant labor productivity and L¯ is available labor force which exponen-
tially grows at a constant natural rate n. (1.50) implies:
eˆ = Yˆ ¡ n (1.51)
From the definition of u, we have:
24For more details about the behavioral foundation of (1.49), see Skott (1989A, Ch.4).
46
uˆ = Yˆ ¡ Kˆ (1.52)
Putting together (1.9), (1.28), (1.49), (1.51) and (1.52), we get the following sys-
tem of short cycles.
uˆ = h(¼(u
+
;m
+
; ®
+
); e
¡
)¡ Á(u
+
) (1.53)
eˆ = h(¼(u
+
;m
+
; ®
+
); e
¡
)¡ n (1.54)
When m and ® are fixed, the system of (1.53) and (1.54) exhibits essentially the
same dynamic properties as Skott (1989A). As Skott shows, under plausible assump-
tions, the system of (1.53) and (1.54) guarantees the existence of a steady growth
equilibrium and the steady state is locally asymptotically unstable unless the neg-
ative effect of employment on output expansion is implausibly large.25 Once the
boundedness of the trajectories is proved, the system (1.53) and (1.54) will generate
a limit cycle by way of the Poincare-Bendixson theorem (See Skott 1989A, Appendix
6C for the proof). The limit cycle is characterized by a clockwise movement in e¡ u
space. The underlying mechanism is the interaction between destabilizing output
dynamics and stabilizing labor market dynamics. Simply put, a high level of effective
demand associated with a high level of output creates strong profitability which tends
to stimulate output growth. This kind of positive feedback between demand and pro-
duction tends to destabilize the system. Output growth, however, cannot last forever
25Local stability is determined by inspecting the trace and the determinant of the Jacobian matrix
of (1.53) and (1.54), denoted as J(u; e). They are given
J(u; e) =
·
(h¼¼u ¡ Á0)u heu
h¼¼ue hee
¸
; T r(J) = (h¼¼u ¡ Á0)u+ hee; Det(J) = ¡Á0 heue > 0
The determinant is always positive, so the possibility of saddle point instability is excluded. If the
sign of Tr is negative (positive), the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable (unstable). The
sign of the trace will be positive unless the negative employment effect is implausibly large (Skott,
1989A).
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because it increases the employment rate and the tightened labor market negatively
affects the condition of output growth.
1.6 Putting all together: long waves and short cycles
This section finally puts all elements together in order to integrate long waves
with short cycles. Our full model of long waves and short cycles is a five dimensional
dynamical system that consists of (1.37), (1.39), (1.42), (1.53), and (1.54). We have
seen that (1.37), (1.39), and (1.42) provide a model of long waves, whereas (1.53)
and (1.54) generate a mechanism of short cycles. By using (1.34) as our definition of
trend profitability based on u = u¤, the system of long waves becomes independent of
that of short cycles, while the latter depends on the former. This kind of unilateral
dependence can be relaxed by adopting an alternative formulation of trend profitabil-
ity. For instance, we can use a weighted moving average of current profit rates as a
measure of the trend rate of profit (See Appendix D). Then the two systems become
interdependent but as long as the alternatively defined trend rate of profit exhibits
sufficiently smooth movements over time, the qualitative results based on (1.34) still
remain valid. The rest of this section presents our simulation results based on (1.37),
(1.39), (1.42), (1.53) and (1.54).26
As seen in section 1.5, if m and ® are fixed, (1.53) and (1.54) produce a limit cycle
under plausible conditions. It can be shown that the resulting limit cycle exhibits
a clockwise movement on the e-u space, or alternatively, the e-¼ space. Figure 1.12
(a) presents an example of the limit cycle on the e-¼ space. The system of (1.37),
(1.39) and (1.42), however, generates long waves of the debt-capital ratio (m) and
the equity-deposit ratio (®), which are represented in Figure 1.8. As m and ® change
endogenously, the limit cycle in Figure 1.12 (a) breaks down and the clockwise move-
26Parameter values and functions used for this simulation are available in Appendix C. The sim-
ulation is based on Case I in Table 1.
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Figure 1.12. Profit-Employment Cycle
ment of e and ¼ spirals up to the northeast or down to the southwest, depending on
the direction of changes in m and ®. Figure 1.12 (b) illustrates this. The upward
spiral from A to B represents a long expansion driven by increases in the debt-capital
ratio and the equity-deposit ratio, whereas the downward spiral from B to A an
economic downturn prompted by sharp decreases in m and ®.
Figure 1.13 (a) and (b) reproduce Figure 1.8 (a) and (b) for convenience.27 Figure
1.13 (c) displays Tobin’s q (=(1+®)m). Corresponding changes in household wealth
have immediate consequences for aggregate demand via the wealth effect. Figure
1.13 (d) shows fluctuations of net issues of equity as a share of gross investment. The
pattern is a mirror image of changes in the debt-capital ratio. Increases in debt-
capital ratio during a long expansion lead to a fall in the ratio of net equity issues,
27Figure 1.8 (b) shows the steady increase in the equity-deposit ratio during a long expansion.
This implies that firms’ debt/equity ratio steadily falls during that period (Note that firms’ stock
of debt is always equal to total household deposit in this model. Thus, firms’ debt/equity ratio
is given by 1=®.). Minsky often uses the debt/equity ratio to refer to the degree of indebtedness.
The result in this paper, however, shows that rising indebtedness, measured by the debt-capital
ratio (m), is consistent with falling debt-equity ratio (1=®). Interestingly, Lavoie and Seccareccia
(2001) question the empirical relevance of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis based on their
finding that the debt-equity ratio is not procyclical. The result of this paper suggests that Minsky’s
Instability Hypothesis does not necessarily imply the procyclical movement of debt-equity ratio.
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Figure 1.13. Simulation Paths I
which amounts to the substantial volume of stock buybacks (negative net issues of
equity).28
During each long expansion, the profit share exhibits a strong upward movement
with mild cyclical fluctuations around the trend (Figure 1.14(a)). The similar pattern
characterizes the movements in the profit rates (Figure 1.14(b)). During crises, the
rate of profit net of depreciation and interest payment (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm) tumbles even
28Increasing stock buybacks in corporate firms have been highlighted in the financialization liter-
ature (For an analysis of financialization and critical reviews on related studies, see Skott and Ryoo
(2008)), where rises in stock buybacks are viewed as a consequence of shareholder value orientation
in management and finance. The result of the analysis in this paper proposes an alternative view on
this development: increasing stock buybacks may be seen as a consequence of increasing financial
fragility embodied in firms’ decisions on the liability structure during long expansions.
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Figure 1.14. Simulation Paths II
to negative rates. A change in the debt structure has large impacts on the real sector
performance through its effect on the profitability. This is prominently shown in the
behavior of the employment rate (Figure 1.14(c)). Figure 1.14 (d) depicts a trajectory
of the rate of return on equity. During long booms, the rate of return on equity is
strong and sound on average but during crises, it suddenly drops to significantly
negative rates.
Figure 1.15(b) shows the growth rate of output where the Hodrick-Prescott filtered
trend is added.29 A financial sector induced crisis triggers a deep recession in the real
29The filtered series is only for illustrative purpose since it simply smoothes the original series and
it does not adequately capture asymmetric features and structural breaks in the original series.
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Figure 1.15. Simulation Paths III
sector which is reflected in the negative growth rates during periodic deep downturns.
Capacity utilization and capital accumulation follow the pattern similar to that of
output growth(Figure 1.15 (a) and (c)). Figure 1.15(d), finally, plot the ratio of
consumption to disposable income. The series follows the basic long waves/short
cycles patten as shown in the profit share and the employment rate but the movement
in the consumption/income ratio is noticeably smooth compared to other simulated
series.30
30The long run behavior of consumption is closely related to movements in household net worth
to income ratio: C
Y H
= c1Y
H+c2NW
H
Y H
= c1 + c2NW
H
Y H
where NW
H
Y H
= (1+®)mu¾¡sf (¼u¾¡±¡rm) .
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1.7 Conclusion
The U.S. economy is going through a deep recession triggered by the biggest
financial crisis since the Great Depression. A Minskian perspective suggests that the
explanation of this crisis should be found in endogenous changes in financial fragility.
This study has modeled a Minskian theory of long waves. The model clarifies the
underlying mechanism of endogenous changes in financial fragility and the interac-
tion between real and financial sectors. At a theoretical level, the study provides a
promising way of integrating two types of instability principles: Minsky’s Financial
Instability Hypothesis and Harrod’s Instability Principle. While both principles pro-
vide a source of cycles, they have distinct frequencies and amplitudes in this model.
The Minskian instability hypothesis creates long waves and the Harrodian instability
principle produces short cycles. The limit to the upward trend created by Minskian
instability is imposed by financial crisis, while explosive trajectories implied by Har-
rodian instability are contained by stabilizing labor market dynamics.31 When two
principles are combined into a coherent stock-flow consistent framework, the proposed
pattern of long waves and short cycles emerges.
A purely mathematical model of this kind may clarify the logic of interactions but
clearly has many limitations. The depth of the current crisis and the time needed to
initiate a new cycle depend on institutional and policy dimensions. Minsky devotes a
large part of his analysis to the institutional and historical developments of financial
markets and policy responses. Thus, the patterns of long waves are heavily affected
by these elements. The full account of long waves and crises is possible only when
one takes a serious look at these dimensions.
31The following quote from Minsky (1995, 84) is suggestive: “As reasonable values of the pa-
rameters of the endogenous interactions lead to an explosive endogenous process, and as explosive
expansions and contractions rarely occur, then constraints by devices such as the relative inelastic-
ity of finance or an inelastic labor supply need to be imposed and be effective in generating what
actually happens.”
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Disregarding the historical contingencies of actual movments, it may be useful to
extend the model in a number of directions. First, it may be desirable to explicitly
treat the banking sector as an active profit-seeking unit. Bankers’ perception of tran-
quility, possibly affected by their own profitability, may not always agree with those
of the firm and household sectors.32 Next, this paper did not explore the implications
of households’ indebtedness. Instead, it has focused on an increasing share of stocks
(riskier asset) in households’ financial wealth as an indicator of increasing fragility
in the household sector. It would be interesting to see the effect of the introduction
of the evolution of household debt into the model.33 Third, the proposed model is
inflation neutral in the sense that the decisions on real quantities such as investment,
consumption and output expansion are made with no reference to inflation and the
banking sector holds the real interest rate at a constant level. In some account of
Minskian ideas (e.g see Fazzari et al., 2008), changes in the inflation rate play an
important role. Finally, the assumption of a closed economy in this paper is another
major limitation. Unfettered international capital flows, in contrast to the belief of its
proponents, have created growing instability and global imbalances (Blecker, 1999).
Several authors suggest that Minsky’s theory can be extended to an international
context (e.g. Wolfson, 2002), but few attempt has been made to formalize the ideas
and to propose precise mechanisms behind them. Addressing these issues is left for
future research.
32Setterfield (2004) assumes that the private sector (the aggregate of firm and household sectors)
and the banking sector have different fragility functions but does not try to justify the assumed
shapes of those functions.
33To introduce this aspect, the model may have to be extended to allow heterogeneity among
households as long as the household sector as a whole is in a net credit position.
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CHAPTER 2
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
FINANCIALIZATION
2.1 Introduction
Along with neoliberalism and globalization, financialization has become a buz-
zword in recent years.1 The precise definition is not always clear but in a broad
sense the term refers to “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets,
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and in-
ternational economies” (Epstein 2005a, p. 3). More specifically, financialization has
been associated with a number of developments. These developments include shifts
in central bank policy toward a near-exclusive focus on price stability, large increases
in financial flows both internationally and in domestic financial markets, improved
financing for households and elements of consumption / credit driven growth, changes
in corporate governance and attempts to align managerial incentives with shareholder
interests via stock option plans, and an increased influence of financial institutions
and institutional investors. Financial pressures, it is argued, have induced changes in
management strategy from “retain and invest” to “downsize and distribute” (Lazon-
ick & O’Sullivan (2000, p. 18)) and have affected firms’ dividend, new issue and debt
finance policies. In some accounts non-financial corporations have been “forced to
1Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Blecker (1999), Crotty (2005), Stockhammer (2004, 2006), Dume´nil
and Le´vy (2001), Boyer (2000), Aglietta and Breton (2001) and Froud et al (2000) are among
the contributions to the growing literature on financialization. An International Working Group
on Financialisation has also been set up with the aim of bringing together “an interdisciplinary
network of researchers and practitioners interested in financialization and all the issues around
relations between the capital market, firms and households.” (http://www.iwgf.org/Events.htm).
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fund most of their capital investment externally in the neoliberal era” (Crotty 2005,
p. 99).
These various changes associated with financialization may have implications for
macroeconomic performance. Crotty (2005) has argued that financialization weakens
non-financial corporations and constrains the growth of aggregate demand. In a sim-
ilar vein, Dume´nil and Le´vy (2001) suggest that financialization leads to instability
and undermines growth and employment. Meanwhile, most of mainstream economics
has been praising the potential benefits of financial liberalization, and some non-
mainstream contributors have also seen financialization as a spur to growth. Thus,
Boyer (2000) has suggested the potential for finance-led growth regimes as an alter-
native to the defunct Fordist regime.
Although most of the existing literature on financialization has been descriptive
and empirical, more precise analytical treatments of some of the macroeconomic link-
ages have been presented by Boyer (2000), Aglietta and Breton (2001), Dutt (2005),
Stockhammer (2004, 2006), and Hein and van Treeck (2007).
According to Aglietta and Breton “[g]rowing financial liberalization has profoundly
changed the connections between finance and the rest of the economy” (2001, p. 434).
Their analysis, however, is hard to follow, and the formal model does little to eluci-
date the mechanisms that could support the claims that are being made in the paper.2
Boyer’s model of finance-led growth basically boils down to profit-led / exhilirationist
regimes with a profit-wealth-consumption nexus as a driving force. Given the cen-
2It is difficult, for instance, to justify their assumption of an exogenously given and constant
(average) net rate of return (E(½)). The firm’s credit constraint, second, is peculiar, as is the
assumption that a risk premium is added to the risk-free interest rate only if the quantity constraint
is binding. This problem has implications for the analysis of the firm’s optimization problem. In this
analysis, the crucial first order condition with respect to the debt ratio d overlooks the dependence
of the interest rate r on the debt ratio. Intuitively, why would any firm ever want to choose d = dmax
if by reducing its debt ratio marginally the interest rate on its debt drops by a finite amount? The
calculation of solutions for r and dmax in the constrained regime is also wrong since it overlooks
the fact that the default probability is itself a function of r (aside from this important point, the
expressions for r and dmax also contain a minor error).
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trality of this nexus, however, a more careful modeling of the stock-flow relations
and of the effects of financialization on wage formation would have been desirable.
Boyer, for instance, assumes an exogenously given, constant q¡ratio. This constancy
assumption with respect to a key financial variable seems particularly unsatisfactory
in a model that addresses the effects of financialization. The mechanism through
which an increase in the ‘profitability norm’ generates a decline in the wage bill (for
given values of output and the capital stock) is also unclear, as is the determination
of the “profitability norm”.3
The Stockhammer and Dutt papers do not suffer from weaknesses of the same
kind. Stockhammer’s 2004 analysis, however, is partial and his 2006 model is rudi-
mentary in its treatment of the financial system; Dutt’s analysis focuses exclusively
on the relaxation of households’ credit constraint and considers neither capital gains
nor firms’ financial decisions and balance sheets. Hein and van Treeck, finally, analyse
the effects of changes in firms’ financial behavior in a Kaleckian model. They assume,
however, that these changes have no effect on the debt-capital ratio, the equity-capital
ratio and the accumulated earnings-capital ratio. Since changes in financial behav-
ior will, in general, lead to movements in these ratios, their analysis appears to be
confined to the very short run.
In this chapter we explore the macroeconomic implications of changes in firms’
financial decisions (retention rate, new equity issues, debt finance), ‘animal spirits’
(shifts in the investment function), household financial behavior (saving and portfolio
decisions), and the level of interest rates. These changes are among the ones that
have been highlighted by the financialization literature but clearly make up only a
small subset of the issues that have been raised.
3Is this norm fixed without any feedback from actual profit rates? On p. 124 it is suggested
that, as an extension, the norm could be determined “using an adaptive process taking into account
the past record of the achieved rate of profit”, but this extension is not pursued in the paper and it
would seem to undermine the exogenous ‘financialization’ argument.
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Three further limitations should be emphasized at the outset: (i) we limit our-
selves to a closed economy, (ii) the emphasis is on the medium- and long-run effects
with little or no attention to questions of stability and short-run fluctuations, and (iii)
we ignore fiscal policy altogether and our treatment of monetary policy is kept almost
embarrassingly simple. We limit the analysis in this way partly to keep it tractable,
but also because many of the arguments advanced by the financialization literature
concern the medium- and long-run effects of the changes in financial behavior and ap-
pear to be unrelated to open-economy complications or government policy. Thus, our
simplifications may be justified by the limited objective of our analysis: to examine
the logic underlying some of the claims that have been made in the financialization
literature.
The specification of expectations would be critical in a full dynamic analysis of
the trajectory of the economy but, given our focus on the medium and long run,
we simply assume that expectations are being met. If the economy follows a steady
growth path, this assumption will be satisfied for any standard process of expecta-
tions formation. More generally, fluctuations around a steady growth path will be
associated with an approximate consistency between average expectations and av-
erage outcomes. It should be noted, however, that financialization may affect the
properties of cyclical fluctuations, leading perhaps to an increase in the amplitude of
fluctuations, and our analysis is clearly incomplete since we ignore these effects on
the higher moments of the variables. A more radical perspective, finally, may regard
increasing financialization as merely a phase in a long cycle of endogenous changes
in financial behavior and Minskian fragility. From this Minskian perspective our fo-
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cus in this chapter may be misleading and our neglect of the dynamic interactions
underlying the observed changes in financial behavior represents a major limitation.4
Two different settings are examined. The economy may be ‘mature’ in Kaldor’s
(1966) terminology and have a growth rate that is constrained by the available labor
force. Alternatively, in the ‘dual-economy’ setting, the labor supply to the modern
/ capitalist sector of the economy is perfectly elastic. Both of these settings are an-
alyzed using two alternative models: one is derived from Skott (1981, 1988, 1989)
and the other from Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002). Both of the models are in a
broadly structuralist/ post Keynesian tradition and both pay explicit attention to
balance sheets and financial stock-flow relations. The two models differ in a number
of respects. Interestingly, however, the differences with respect to the specification of
financing, saving and portfolio decisions have little effect on the qualitative results.
By contrast, the effects of financialization depend critically on the labor market as-
sumptions (labor-constrained vs dual) and the specification of the investment function
(Harrodian vs Kaleckian).
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss some of
the stylized facts relating to financialization and comment on the dangers of a purely
partial analysis. Section 2.3 outlines our general framework, and Sections 2.4 and
2.5 consider the implications of changes in key financial variables in the context of
the different models. Section 2.6, finally, discusses the main results and offers a few
concluding comments and suggestions for further research.
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Figure 2.1. The Retention Rate (1952-2005)
Notes: The retention rate adjusted for inflation = 1¡f Net Dividends ¥ (U.S.
Internal Funds + Net Dividends + Inflation rate £ Net Liabilities)g. The inflation
rates are based on the CPI and Net Liabilities refer to nonfarm nonfinancial
corporate net liabilities. U.S internal funds = Profit (before taxes and after net
interest payments) ¡ Taxes on corporate income ¡ Net dividends + Consumption
of fixed capital + capital consumption adjustment.
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
F.102 and Table B.102; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price Index.
Authors’ calculation.
2.2 Evidence
2.2.1 Some stylized facts
The stylized facts are largely well-known, and we confine ourselves to a brief
description of some US data. The retention rate, first, has declined from around 85%
in the 1970s to about 73% (Figure 2.1). It is worth pointing out that this change
marks a return to retention rates that are at or below the levels of the 1950s. Looking
4Minskian models of endogenous movements in financial fragility have been presented by, among
others, Taylor and O’Connell (1986), Lavoie (1986/87), Delli Gati and Gallegati (1990), Semmler
(1987), Skott (1994).
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at the whole period since 1950, the aberration may have been the high retention rates
of the 1970s and 1980s.
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Figure 2.2. The Rate of Net Issues of Equities (1952-2005)
Notes: Net issues of nonfinancial corporate equities divided by the market value of
nonfinancial corporate equities outstanding
Sources:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
F.213 and Table B.102. Authors’ calculation.
The behavior of non-financial corporations with respect to new equity issues shows
a clearer picture. Whether measured in terms of the value of new issues divided by
the market value of outstanding equities (Figure 2.2) or, alternatively, by the share
of new investment financed by new equity (Figure 2.3), there has been a significant
decline in new issues. In the 1950s-1970s a small positive fraction of gross investment
- on average about 5 percent - was financed by new issues. Since 1980, however,
the rate of net issues has been negative in most years, and on average non-financial
corporations have spent an amount equal to about 12 percent of their gross fixed
investment to buy back equity.
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Figure 2.3. The Ratio of Net Issues of Equities to Fixed Investment (1952-2005)
Notes: Net issues of nonfinancial corporate equities divided by nonfarm nonfinancial
corporate (gross) fixed investment Quarterly data.
Sources:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
F.213 and Table F.102. Authors’ calculation.
Debt finance has become increasingly important. As shown in Figure 2.4, the
ratio of debt to the replacement value of capital has increased from a level just above
30 percent in the 1950s to about 60 percent. The ratio increased steadily in the
1950s and 1960s reaching about 50 percent in the early 1970s before dropping back to
about 35 percent around 1980. Thus, the increase has been very steep over the last
25 years. It should be noted, however, that Figure 2.4 depicts gross debt. Insofar
as non-financial firms hold increasing amounts of financial assets, the movements in
net debt could be very different. Data issues make it difficult to get a clear picture
of changes in net debt.
Real rates of interest have fluctuated substantially (Figure 2.5). The early 1980s
saw historically very high interest rate, but rates gradually decrease in the late 1980s
and early 1990s and, after another increase in the mid 1990s, are now at, and in some
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Figure 2.4. The Ratio of Gross Debt to Capital: Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporations
(1952-2005)
Notes: Gross debt = commercial paper + municipal securities + corporate bonds +
bank loans + other loans and advances + mortgages. Capital = replacement cost of
structures + replacement cost of equipment and software.
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,
Table B.102. Authors’ calculation.
cases below, their historical average. Thus, there is little support for common view
that financialization has led to persistently high real rates of interest.
Turning now to household behavior, the well-known rise in the ratio of personal
consumption to disposable personal income comes out clearly in Figure 2.6. The
ratio of households’ net financial wealth to disposable income, however, has shown
much more stability (Figure 2.7). The stock market boom of the 1990s shows up in
this ratio, but the value of the ratio is now back at the level that characterized the
“golden age” of the 1950s and 1960s. The effects of stock market fluctuations, finally,
show up strongly in the ratio of capital gains to disposable income in Figure 2.8. The
distribution of these gains has been very unequal, but as an average for the household
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Figure 2.5. Real Rates of Interest (1952-2006)
Notes: Nominal rates minus CPI inflation rates
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Statistical Release; Bureau of
Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price Index. Authors’ calculation.
sector the capital gains (and losses) on financial assets have been very significant in
some periods.
2.2.2 Dangers of a partial analysis
While the stylized facts of changes in financial variables are (relatively) clear, the
interpretation and importance of these changes for the performance of the economy
may not be obvious, and many of the arguments that have been advanced by the
financialization literature have a partial flavor. As a case in point we may consider
Stockhammer (2004). This paper, with its combination of theoretical argument and
econometric work, presents a clear and interesting analysis. The partial nature of the
analysis, however, is a limitation.
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Figure 2.6. The Ratio of Personal Consumption Expenditures to Disposable Per-
sonal Income (1952-2006)
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National
Income and Product Account, Table. 2.9. Authors’ calculation.
Financialization, Stockhammer argues, has generated a shift in firms’ behavior
from growth objectives toward shareholder interests. He formalizes this argument
by assuming that the representative firm faces a growth-profit tradeoff. Managers
pick some point on this g ¡ r frontier, and an increased emphasis on shareholder
interests (partly because of increased takeover threats and partly because of changes
in managerial pay structures) moves the optimal position in the direction of higher
profit rates and lower growth.
The macroeconomic implications of this microeconomic analysis are not as straight-
forward as they may seem. Stockhammer does not specify firms’ finance constraint
or discuss firms’ financing decisions in any detail. Presumably, however, the move-
ments along a g¡ r frontier must be reflected - via the finance constraint - in changes
in retention rates, external finance or the rate of new share issues. The changes in
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Figure 2.7. The Ratio of Households’ Net Financial Worth to Disposable Personal
Income (1952-2006)
Notes: Net Financial Worth = Households’ Net Worth ¡ Households’ Tangible
Assets. In other words, the gap between two graphs shown in the figure represents
households’ tangible assets divided by disposable person income
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
B.100. Authors’ calculation.
investment and firms’ financial decisions interact with household and government be-
havior, and these macroeconomic interactions - equilibrium conditions for financial
and goods markets - are ignored in the analysis. Putting it differently, an individual
firm may face a perceived g ¡ r tradeoff but this perceived tradeoff does not extend
to the macroeconomic level: changes in accumulation and financial behavior affect
aggregate demand and thereby the position of the g ¡ r frontier. Thus, the micro
tradeoff may not be stable.
Stockhammer tests the theory by estimating an investment function that includes
“rentiers’ share of the non-financial business sector” as an explanatory variable. It is
unclear, however, how one should interpret the results. One might have thought, first,
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Figure 2.8. The Ratio of Capital Gains on Financial Assets to Disposable Personal
Income: Households and Nonprofit Organizations (1952-2005)
Notes: Capital Gains on Corporate Equities = (Holding gains on corporate equities
¡ inflation rate using the CPI £ corporate equities outstanding held by households
and nonprofit organizations)/ disposable personal income. Capital Gains on
Financial Assets =(Holding gains on all financial assets ¡ inflation rate using the
CPI £ all financial assets held by households and nonprofit organizations)/
disposable personal income.
Sources:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
B.100 and Table R.100; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price Index.
Authors’ calculation.
that a shift in firms’ accumulation behavior would imply changes in the parameters
of the investment function. Stockhammer does not consider this possibility. Instead,
he argues, the behavioral shift is captured by an increase in the “rentiers’ share”,
and a negative coefficient on this variable is seen as lending support to the theoretical
argument. Even assuming, however, that an increase in the “rentiers’ share” captures
financial implications of a behavioral shift, a negative coefficient on this variable in
the empirical work does not necessarily imply that the changes in financial behavior
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have had a negative effect on accumulation.5 Aggregate demand and thereby the
values of other explanatory variables in the regression may have been affected by the
changes in financial behavior, and these indirect effects need to be taken into account.
Unlike in the 2004 paper, the macroeconomic dimension of shareholder-induced
shifts in firms’ investment behavior is analyzed by Stockhammer (2006) but this
happens in a setting without differentiated financial assets and explicit stock-flow
relations.
2.3 General framework
2.3.1 Firms, banks and households
This section presents our general framework. The framework leaves out open
economy issues, there is no analysis of the short run and stability issues, and very
limited attention to government policy. The purpose is to look at the interaction
between firms and households across labor, goods and financial markets. Firms, it is
assumed, make decisions concerning pricing / output, accumulation, and financing;
households receive a return on their financial assets as well as wage income, and they
make consumption and portfolio decisions; banks accept deposits and make loans.
There are only two types of financial assets, equity and bank deposits, and banks are
the only financial institution in the model.6
5In fact the coefficient on rentiers’ share is not negative in all specifications and it is insignificant
in many. Moreover, there may be several explanations for a negative coefficient. Net financial
income, first, is included in the gross profit share and for any given profit share, an increase in
financial income implies a reduction in operating profits which presumably reduces the incentive to
accumulate fixed capital. As noted by Stockhammer, second, an increase in gross financial income
may mirror an increase in the cost of capital. Firms have both financial assets and liabilities and if
the return on these move together, a rise in the cost of capital will be associated with an increase in
gross financial income. This correlation becomes particularly important if the cost-of-capital variable
that is included in the analysis provides a poor approximation to the actual cost of capital.
6The liquid asset could also be interpreted as a short bond.
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This framework - which generalizes the one in Skott (1988, 1989) - covers a number
of special cases, including Harrodian specifications with or without labor constraints
and Kaleckian models.
2.3.1.1 Firms
2.3.1.1.1 Finance constraint Consider first the finance constraint facing a sin-
gle firm. The firm invests in real capital and pays out dividends and interest on
its debt (bank loans). These expenses have to be matched by income flows and the
proceeds from new issues of equity and new debt. As argued by the financialization
literature, the firm may hold equity in other firms and own other financial assets
(bank deposits). Income flows therefore include both profits and the interest and
dividend income from the firm’s current holdings of financial assets. Algebraically,
the finance constraint can be written
pIj +Div
L
j + iM
L
j + vN˙
A
j + M˙
A
j = Πj + vN˙
L
j + M˙
L
j + iM
A
j +Div
A
j
where I;Π; Div;M and N denote real investment, nominal profits, dividends, bank
loans / deposits and the number of shares. Subscripts j indicate firm, and superscripts
denote assets (A) and liabilities (L); thus MAj is firm j’s bank deposits and M
L
j the
firm’s bank loans. Bank loans and deposits carry the same nominal interest rate (i),
the price of investment goods (p) equals the general price of output in this one-sector
model and, for simplicity, it is assumed that all shares have the same price, v. A dot
over a variable is used to denote a time derivative (x˙ = dx=dt).
If we aggregate across firms, the cross holdings of financial assets net out, and the
aggregate finance constraint for the firm sector simplifies to:
pI +Div + iM = Π+ vN˙ + M˙
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where I;Π; Div;M and N without sub- and superscripts - denote aggregate invest-
ment and aggregate profit, net dividend payments from firms to other sectors, net
debt to other sectors, and the aggregate number of shares held by other sectors.
We assume that dividends are given by
Div = (1¡ sf )(Π¡ rM) (2.1)
where r is the real rate of interest, r = i¡ pˆ, and sf is the retention rate out of profits
net of interest payments. This specification is used by, among others, Lavoie and
Godley (2001-02) and Dos Santos and Zezza (2007),7 but clearly, other specifications
are possible. Skott (1989), for instance, assumes Div = (1 ¡ sf )Π; and another
alternative would be to assume that dividends are set so as to leave sufficient retained
earnings to cover some fraction of current investment. These specifications all imply
that real dividend payments will be unaffected by a change in the rate of inflation,
keeping constant the real rate of interest. This ‘inflation neutrality’ ceases to hold
if the real rate of interest is replaced by the nominal rate in equation (2.1) since in
this case an increase in inflation reduces the ratio Div=Π of dividends to profits.8 As
long as the inflation rate is constant, however, the switch to a nominal interest rate
in equation (2.1) would not affect any of the qualitative results.
Using equation (2.1), the finance constraint can be rewritten
pI = sf (Π¡ rM) + vNNˆ +M(Mˆ ¡ pˆ) (2.2)
7Both Lavoie and Godley (2001-02) and Dos Santos and Zezza (2007) assume a constant price
level, but Lavoie and Godley’s discussion on p. 300 of changes in interest rates indicates that they
view the real interest rate is the relevant rate in the case of inflation.
8As shown in Figure 2.1, the ratio (Π¡rM¡Div)=(Π¡rM) increased in the high inflation years
of the 1970s. Inflation effects of this kind may have contributed to this increase.
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where a hat over a variable denotes the growth rate of the variable (xˆ = x˙=x =
(dx=dt)=x). The finance constraint (2.2) shows that, given the levels of investment
and profits and the inherited debt, firms cannot choose the retention rate, the rate of
new issues and the amount of new debt independently. One of these three variables
will have to accommodate so as to ensure that the finance constraint is being met.
In reality, of course, there may be dynamic feedback effects: an unexpected need for
external finance in one period, for instance, may influence firm’s retention and/or
new issue policies in subsequent periods.
Our purpose is to examine the comparative statics of changes in financial behavior
and from this perspective it does not matter much which financial variable is desig-
nated as residual. In the analysis below we describe firms’ financial behavior in terms
of their retention rate (sf ). New issue policies can be captured by the growth of the
number of shares (Nˆ) or by the share of investment that is being financed by new
issues. Skott uses the former and Lavoie-Godley the latter parameterization, and we
follow these different parameterizations in the respective versions of the model.9
2.3.1.1.2 Pricing / output: the growth function It is often assumed that
firms set prices and that output adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to match
demand. The empirical evidence in favour of significant price rigidity is quite weak,
however,10 and output does not adjust instantaneously. Production is subject to a
9One could also, following Eichner (1976) and Wood (1975) - assume that firms set the shares
of investment that are to be financed by the three different sources, with both sf and Nˆ varying in
response to changes in accumulation. This case is considered in Skott (1989, chapter 7); it is also
the approach used in Godley and Lavoie (2007).
10The study by Levy et al. (1997) of menu costs in five supermarkets, for instance, is often cited
in support of menu costs and price stickiness (e.g. Romer 2001, pp. 315-316). This study found
that on average 16 percent of all prices were changed each week. These frequent changes in prices
were not costless but the finding that menu costs constitute a significant proportion of net profits
is largely irrelevant for an evaluation of price flexibility. With prohibitively high menu costs, for
instance, there would be no price changes and the share of menu cost in revenue would be zero;
negligible menu costs on the other hand may allow firms to change prices frequently as part of their
marketing strategies, and the observed share of menu costs in net profits could be very high in this
case.
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production lag, and increases in production and employment give rise to substantial
search, hiring and training costs; firing or layoffs also involve costs, both explicit costs
like redundancy payments and hidden costs in the form of deteriorating industrial
relations and morale.
In a continuous-time setting one may approximate the effects of lags and adjust-
ment costs by assuming that output is predetermined at each moment, that firms
choose the rate of growth of output at each moment, rather than the level of output,
and that this choice is made so as to balance the costs of changes against the benefits
of moving toward a preferred level of output and employment. These costs and ben-
efits are determined by demand signals from output markets and cost signals from
input markets.
The demand signal can be captured by the prevailing profit share if prices are
fully flexible. By assumption the level of output is predetermined, and with flexible
prices a rise in demand leads to an increase in the price of output. Wage contracts are
cast in terms of money wages and in the absence of perfect foresight or instantaneous
feedbacks from output prices to money-wage rates, the real wage rate and the share
of profits in income respond to unanticipated movements in prices: a positive demand
shock generates a rise in the profit share.
The assumption of fully flexible prices is extreme, of course. Our reading of
the evidence suggests that prices are less sticky than output, but in general there
will be some stickiness in both prices and output, leaving changes in inventories
and/or quantity rationing as accommodating variables. For the aggregate economy,
however, quantity rationing is insignificant and movements in inventories tend to
amplify fluctuations in other demand components - even in the short run - and thus
do not obviate the need for price adjustments. For simplicity, we therefore disregard
movements in inventories and assume that the demand signal is reflected in the profit
share.
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Turning to the signals from input markets, we leave out intermediate inputs and
take labour to be the only input that is variable in the short run; changes in the
capital stock take longer to implement and, partly because of that, firms typically
maintain excess capital capacity. As far as production decisions are concerned, the
labour market therefore provides the relevant signal, and we use the employment rate
as the indicator of the state of the labour market. The rate of employment influ-
ences the costs of changing output through its effects on the availability of labour
with the desired qualifications. High rates of employment increase the costs of re-
cruitment, and since the quit rate tends to rise when labour markets are tight, the
gross recruitment needs associated with any given rate of expansion increase when
low unemployment makes it difficult to attract new workers. High employment and
high turnover of the labour force, on the other hand, may allow firms to contract pro-
duction and employment more rapidly without significant redundancy costs. These
standard microeconomic effects may be reinforced by broader Marxian effects on the
social relations of production. A high rate of employment may have a negative impact
on firms’ growth plans because it strengthens workers vis-a-vis management and may
lead to increased shop-floor militancy.
The analysis suggests that the rate of growth of production will be positively re-
lated to the profit share (¼) and negatively related to the employment rate (e). Thus,
the pricing / output decisions can be described by the following ‘growth function’11
Yˆ = h(¼; e);h¼ > 0; he < 0: (2.3)
The case of unlimited labor supplies can be obtained by setting he = 0; and the growth
function yields the standard Kaleckian assumption of a fixed profit share ¼¯ (a fixed
11Or ‘output expansion function’, using the terminology in Skott (1989, 1989a). The behavioral
foundations of the function are discussed in greater detail in Skott (1989, chapter 4).
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markup on wage cost) if we have both h¼ =1 at ¼ = ¼¯ and he = 0. There is also an
affinity between the growth function (2.3) and Robinson’s (1962, pp. 48-49) analysis
of the rate of accumulation induced by a rate of profit. Since Robinson assumes that
utilization is at an exogenously given normal level, the profit rate and the profit share
move together, and a constant utilization rate implies that the accumulation rate is
equal to the growth rate of output. Equation (2.3) generalizes the relation between
growth and profits by allowing for the influence of labor market conditions.12 One
may note, finally, that a static counterpart to equation (2.3) can be obtained by
setting Yˆ = 0. The equation then defines the profit share as an increasing function of
the employment rate. A short-run equilibrium relation of this kind could be derived
from profit maximization if firms have monopsony power and the perceived elasticity
of labor supply to the individual firm is inversely related to the aggregate rate of
employment.13
2.3.1.1.3 Accumulation With a fixed coefficient production function, a general
specification of the investment function includes the rate of capital utilization, the
profit share, and financial variables like the real rate of interest, the valuation ratio
(Tobin’s q), and the ratios of debt and retained earnings to the value of the capital
stock. Algebraically,
I
K
= f(u; ¼; r; q;m; c) (2.4)
12Comparing Robinson’s analysis to our ‘Harrodian - dual economy’ case below, the difference
is that in Robinson’s model competition and pricing decisions keep utilization at the normal level
while the profit share and the growth rate are determined by the equilibrium condition for the
product market; the Harrodian - dual economy case assumes that the long-run properties of the
accumulation function pins down utilization at the normal level, with the profit share and the
growth rate determined by the ‘growth function’ in combination with saving behavior.
13A positive relation between employment and the profit share could also arise from an inverse
relation between the perceived demand elasticity and aggregate employment or as a result of a fixed
markup on variable cost in a setting with overhead labor.
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where u = Y=K is a measure of utilization, q is the valuation ratio (q = M+vN
pK
), and
m and c the ratios of debt and retained earnings to capital (m = M
pK
; c =
sf (Π¡rM)
pK
).
There is no consensus in the structuralist / post Keynesian literature concerning
the long-run sensitivity of the accumulation rate to changes in the various argu-
ments.14 In the analysis below, we explore both Harrodian and Kaleckian specifica-
tions.
2.3.1.2 Banks
Banks give loans to firms and accept deposits from households. Neither firms nor
households hold cash. When banks provide a loan to a firm, the money therefore
returns to the bank immediately, either as deposits from households or because other
firms use their increased revenues to reduce their debt. The loan and deposit rates are
equal and there are no costs involved in banking. Thus, banks make neither profits
nor losses,15 and the firm sector has a net debt (M) that must equal the total deposits
of the household sector (=money demand, MH):
M = MH
Banks determine the nominal interest rate. This nominal rate, however, will
typically depend on inflation and to simplify the exposition, we treat the real rate
of interest r (= i ¡ pˆ) as the variable that is set by the banking system (and kept
constant in steady growth).
14See, among others, Auerbach and Skott (1988), Dutt (1997), Kurz (1986), Lavoie (1995) and
Flaschel and Skott (2006).
15The share valuation of banks therefore is zero, and this simple version of the model does not
capture the increasing share of the financial sector in GDP and of financial-sector profits in total
profits.
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2.3.1.3 Households
In analogy with firms, households face a budget (or finance) constraint. For the
household sector as a whole it takes the form
pC + vN˙H + M˙H = W +DivH + iMH (2.5)
where C is consumption, W wage income, NH ;MH indicate household holdings of
shares and deposits (money), and DivH is dividend payments received by the house-
hold sector.
The steady-growth implications of household consumption and saving behavior
can be described in terms of stock-flow ratios of assets to income. Specifically, let
MH = ¯(i; r; re; ¼; :::)pY (2.6)
vNH = ®(i; r; re; ¼; :::)pY (2.7)
where the stock-flow ratios ® and ¯ may depend on a number of variables, including
the real rates of return on deposits (r) and equity (re). Theories differ with respect
to the determination of the (steady-growth) values of these stock-flow ratios, and in
sections 2.4-2.5 we examine different specifications. Some theories are cast in terms
of flow-flow relations (e.g. consumption as a function of distributed incomes and
capital gains, as in the Lavoie-Godley model) but even when this is the case, the
specification of the flow-flow relations have implications for the steady-growth values
of the stock-flow ratios, and the implied stock-flow ratios provide a clearer picture of
the mechanisms behind the effects of changes in financial behavior.
The relation between the stock-flow ratios and consumption is straightforward.
Using the budget constraint (2.5) and the dividend equation (2.1), the stock-flow
relations (2.6)-(2.7) imply the following consumption function:
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CK
= u[1¡ sf (¼ ¡ r¯) + ¯(pˆ¡ Mˆ)¡ ®Nˆ ] (2.8)
2.4 Harrodian accumulation
In this section we follow the Harrodian tradition and assume that the degree of
excess capital capacity is at (or near) where firms want it to be. Firms will typically
want a reserve of excess capacity, but if the degree of excess capacity persistently
exceeds the desired reserve, they reduce their accumulation rate; conversely, if they
find themselves with less than the desired excess capacity, they will gradually increase
their rate of accumulation. Thus, a steady growth path with a constant accumulation
rate requires the consistency of desired and actual degrees of excess capacity, that is,
u = u¤ (2.9)
where u is the output-capital ratio and u¤ denotes the value of u when firms have
the desired degree of excess capacity.16 Equation (2.9) expresses the steady-growth
accumulation function. The equation need not be satisfied outside steady growth,
but a simple Harrodian specification implies that if Kˆ fluctuates within a relatively
narrow band, the time-average of the output-capital ratio u must be approximately
equal to u¤ when the average is taken over a long period. To see this, consider a
Harrodian investment function
d
dt
Kˆ = ¸(u¡ u¤);¸ > 0
Integration implies that u¯¡ u¤ = Kˆt1¡Kˆt0
¸(t1¡t0) where u¯ is the average output-capital ratio
over the interval [t0; t1]. If j Kˆt1¡Kˆt0 j is bounded below some constant for all (t0; t1),
16The u = u¤ condition is necessary but not sufficient. Firms must also make positive profits, cf.
note 17 below.
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it follows that u¯ is close to u¤ if the period is long (u¯ converges to u¤ for t1¡ t0 going
to infinity).
2.4.1 A mature economy: labor-constrained steady growth
The growth rate in a mature economy is labor constrained and the employment
rate is constant in steady growth. The growth rate therefore must be equal to the
growth of the labor force and, for simplicity, we shall take this ‘natural rate of growth’
(n) to be an exogenously given constant. Thus, in steady growth
Yˆ = n (2.10)
Using (2.9) and (2.10) the equilibrium condition for the product market can now be
written
C
K
+ n = u¤
or, using (2.6), (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10),
[1¡ sf (¼ ¡ r¯)¡ ¯n¡ ®Nˆ ] = u
¤ ¡ n
u¤
(2.11)
The effects of changes in firms’ financial behavior (sf ; Nˆ), bank policy (r), or house-
hold saving and portfolio behavior can be derived from this equation. The qualitative
results, however, depend on the properties of the ® and ¯¡functions that describe
household behavior.
2.4.1.1 Inelastic stock-flow ratios
Assume first that ® and ¯ are both independent of the various rates of return
and other variables in the expressions (2.6)-(2.7). In this case with ® and ¯ are
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parameters rather than functions and the constancy of the term on the right hand
side of equation (2.11) implies that
@¼
@sf
= ¡¼ ¡ ¯r
sf
< 0 (2.12)
@¼
@Nˆ
= ¡ ®
sf
< 0 (2.13)
@¼
@r
= ¯ > 0 (2.14)
@¼
@®
= ¡Nˆ
sf
@¼
@¯
=
sfr ¡ n
sf
The signs of the effects of changes in sf ; Nˆ and r are unambiguous. If firms raise
the retention rate or increase the rate of new issues, this will depress profitability,
while an increase in the real interest rate raises the profit share.17 The intuition is
simple. An increase in sf increases aggregate saving, given the share of profits, and
to bring saving back into line with the steady-growth requirement, a reduction in the
profit share is needed. An increase in the real interest rate (r) has the opposite effect
since it reduces retained earnings and thus saving at any given share of profits. An
increase in new issues (Nˆ); like increases in the retention rate, raises aggregate saving
but the mechanism may be a little less transparent. Saving goes up because the rise
in Nˆ induces households to raise their saving. Share prices adjust so as to maintain
a constant ratio (= ®) of the value of shares to income. The growth of real income is
given, and if the rate of new issues has gone up, this means that real share prices will
increase at a lower rate. Capital gains therefore are smaller and as a result households
choose to save a larger proportion of their wage, dividend and interest income.
17A capitalist economy would not be viable if the steady growth path implied that profits fell
short of real interest payments on the debt. Thus, the condition ¼ ¡ ¯r > 0 must hold, otherwise
accumulation would collapse.
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Financialization has been associated primarily with increased dividends (a decline
in sf ), a decrease in the rate of new issues (Nˆ) and an increase in the real rate of
interest (although, as shown in section 2.2, the evidence for interest rates is ques-
tionable). Strikingly, in this model all of these changes unambiguously generate a
rise in the steady-growth profit share and the steady-growth employment rate. The
employment effect follows immediately from the growth function (2.3): whenever the
profit share goes up, the employment rate must do the same in order to keep the
growth rate unchanged.18
So far we have taken the stock-flow ratios ® and ¯ to be constant parameters.
Even leaving aside the functional dependence of these ratios on, inter alia, the rates
of return, financialization might generate a shift in the values of these parameters:
Thus, it could be argued that financialization increases the availability of consumer
credit and thereby tends to reduce the ratio ¯: A reduction in ¯ has two effects: it
increases retained earnings (which tends to reduce consumption) but if the growth
rate of income is positive it also reduces the amount of saving that households need to
carry out in order to maintain the money-income ratio at the desired value. Depending
on parameter values, the balance of these two effects can be positive or negative.19
18In this paper we do not consider nominal wage formation and inflation explicitly. The NAIRU
literature is enormous; Skott has analysed reasons for the absence of a NAIRU in earlier work (Skott
1997, 1999, 2005).
19Our results for changes in ¯ are closely related to those of Dutt’s (2005) analysis of changes
in consumer debt. Using a Kaleckian (stagnationist) model, Dutt shows that the short-run effect
of an increase in households’ debt-income ratio (corresponding to a decrease in ¯ in this model) is
unambiguously positive. This short-run result is not surprising since the the transition to a higher
debt ratio is associated with extra consumption. The long-run effects on growth are ambiguous,
however. In the long run, the debt ratio has increased (¯ has decreased), and this increase in the
debt ratio implies a shift of disposable income from low-saving workers to high-saving capitalists.
This contractionary effect may or may not be offset by a positive effect. Consumer debt grows at the
same rate as output (and the capital stock) and this expansionary effect - consumers being allowed
to increase their debt when output grows - depends on the growth rate. Thus, in Dutt’s model, an
increase in consumer debt will raise the growth rate if the initial growth rate is high while if output
grows slowly, the increase in debt will reduce the growth rate. In this version of our model, the
growth rate is exogenous but the analogous result in our model is that a decrease in ¯ raises the
profit share if the growth rate is high but reduces the profit share if the growth rate is small is low.
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Changes in the ® ratio are not usually seen as a key mechanism behind changes
in economic performance.20 Moreover, in this model the effects of autonomous shifts
in ® depend on the values of Nˆ . This result is quite intuitive. The value of the
equity-income ratio (®) simply does not affect saving if there are no new issues.
Households can only save in the form of shares if other sectors (firms) are willing to
sell shares. If that is not the case then an increase in the desire to own shares will
simply generate higher share prices, and the desire will be met without any extra
saving. With positive new issues, a higher valuation of shares (a higher ®) implies an
increase in household saving; with negative new issues, on the other hand, a higher
valuation of shares implies that households receive higher revenues from their net sale
of shares, and their saving out of wages, dividends and interest income is reduced.
In addition to the changes in financial behavior, financialization may have been
associated with a downward shift in the investment function. In this Harrodian
setting, such a shift would be reflected in a rise in the desired output-capital ratio u¤.
This kind of change has the consequences that one would expect. Equation (2.11)
implies that a rise in u¤ leads to a decline in the profit share and, using the growth
function (2.3), a fall a employment. Thus, according to this model the changes
associated with neoliberalism and financialization have contradictory effects. The
net effect may have been a deterioration of economic performance, but the negative
impact comes from the shift in the investment function, rather than from the changes
in financial behavior that have been highlighted in the literature.
How general are these conclusions? The assumption of exogenous ®¡ and ¯¡
ratios is clearly restrictive, but the qualitative results survive as long as ® and ¯ are
20One might consider the possibility that u¤ depend on the valuation ratio (Tobin’s q) and thereby
on ® and ¯. A high valuation ratio indicates a rate of profit that exceeds the cost of finance.
The desired output-capital ratio may therefore be inversely related to the valuation rate. This
expansionary impact of an increase and ® and ¯ is considered by Skott (1988, 1989).
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relatively insensitive to changes in the financial parameters (sf ; Nˆ ; r) and the profit
share (¼).
Differentiating equation (2.11) totally, we get
¡sfd¼ ¡ ¼dsf + (sfr ¡ n)d¯ + ¯(sfdr + rdsf )¡ ®dNˆ ¡ Nˆd® = 0 (2.15)
where
d® =
@®
@sf
dsf +
@®
@Nˆ
dNˆ +
@®
@r
dr +
@®
@¼
d¼ (2.16)
d¯ =
@¯
@sf
dsf +
@¯
@Nˆ
dNˆ +
@¯
@r
dr +
@¯
@¼
d¼ (2.17)
sf ; Nˆ ; r and ¼ may not influence ® and ¯ directly but they will do so indirectly
via their effects on the various rates of return. Thus, the partial @®
@sf
includes the
indirect effect on ® of changes in rates of return generated by the change in sf .
The rate of return on equity, for instance, is given by re =
(1¡sf )(¼¡r¯)pY
vN
+ vˆ ¡ pˆ =
(1¡sf )(¼¡r¯)
®
+ n¡ Nˆ and an increase in sf reduces re21
Using (2.15)-(2.17) we get
@¼
@sf
= ¡
¼ ¡ ¯r ¡ (sfr ¡ n) @¯@sf + Nˆ @®@sf
sf ¡ (sfr ¡ n)@¯@¼ + Nˆ @®@¼
(2.18)
@¼
@Nˆ
= ¡®¡ (sfr ¡ n)
@¯
@Nˆ
+ Nˆ @®
@Nˆ
sf ¡ (sfr ¡ n)@¯@¼ + Nˆ @®@¼
(2.19)
@¼
@r
=
sf¯ + (sfr ¡ n)@¯@r ¡ Nˆ @®@r
sf ¡ (sfr ¡ n)@¯@¼ + Nˆ @®@¼
(2.20)
The signs of the partials of the profit share with respect to these three financial
parameters are the same as in (2.12)-(2.14) as long as
21Mathematically, perverse results are possible in which a rise in sf increases the return. This
could happen, for instance, if there is a strong inverse relation between ® and re. The conditions
that would give these perverse results can be ruled out on economic grounds.
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¼ ¡ ¯r > (sfr ¡ n) @¯
@sf
¡ Nˆ @®
@sf
® > (sfr ¡ n) @¯
@Nˆ
¡ Nˆ @®
@Nˆ
sf¯ > ¡(sfr ¡ n)@¯
@r
+ Nˆ
@®
@r
sf > (sfr ¡ n)@¯
@¼
¡ Nˆ @®
@¼
These ‘inelasticity conditions’ will automatically be satisfied if (sfr ¡ n) = Nˆ = 0,
irrespective how sensitive are ® and ¯ to variations in their arguments. Empirically,
both sfr ¡ n and Nˆ are close to zero, having at times been positive and at times
negative. In fact, setting (sfr ¡ n) = Nˆ = 0 is arguably a reasonable empirical
benchmark. Thus, the qualitative results in (2.12)-(2.14) survive - at least as an
outcome that holds for a range of empirically very plausible parameter values - in a
more general model in which the stock-flow ratios are determined endogenously. It
should be noted also that the different specifications used in Skott (1981, 1988, 1989)
are special cases of the general model with endogenous ® and ¯ ratios;22 all of these
special cases satisfy the inelasticity conditions for any reasonable set of parameters,
as does the flow-flow specification used by Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) and the
stock-flow specification in Godley and Lavoie (2007) (see below).
Overall, then, while the implications of assuming elastic stock-flow ratios are clear
- the comparative statics will be reversed - inelastic ratios appear to be the more
interesting and empirically relevant case.23
22Skott (1989), for instance, assumes that ¯ is exogenous and that vN = ®(¼; u; r; ¯)pY = (¼ ¡
±
u ¡ r¯)pY where ± is the rate of depreciation; thus, share valuation is proportional to profits net of
depreciation and real interest payments.
23We use the terms ‘inelastic’ and ‘elastic’ to denote the cases when the conditions hold and fail
to hold, respectively. Intermediate cases in which some but not all of the conditions hold are clearly
possible; in these cases only some of the signs of the partials in (2.12)-(2.14) will be preserved.
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2.4.1.2 The Lavoie-Godley specification of consumption
In the Lavoie-Godley model, consumption is a function of distributed income and
capital gains. Thus, the consumption function is specified as a flow-flow relation.
Using our notation, a general version of their consumption function can be written
as:
C
K
= Ã(y; °); Ãy > 0; Ã° > 0 (2.21)
where y is households’ distributed income and ° is capital gains, both variables as
ratios of the capital stock (y = [1 ¡ sf (¼ ¡ r¯) + pˆ¯]u and ° = vN(vˆ¡pˆ)pK ). The
proportion of the investment expenditure that is financed by equity issues is denoted
as x. Lavoie and Godley take this proportion as the parameter describing new issue
policies (instead of Nˆ ). By definition
vN
pK
Nˆ = x
I
K
= xg
where g is the accumulation rate. Thus, the ratio of capital gains to capital can be
written
° = ®ug ¡ xg
The equilibrium condition (2.11) is general and still holds in the Lavoie-Godley
specification and - using the definition of x - the equation can be written
u¤ ¡ n = u¤
h
1¡ sf (¼ ¡ r¯)¡ ¯n¡ xn
u¤
i
= Ã(y; °) (2.22)
The steady growth value of ¯ (and ®) is affected by the consumption / saving function
(2.21) and household portfolio decisions. In the Lavoie-Godley model these portfolio
decisions are described by
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MM + vN
´ ¯
®+ ¯
= z(r; re; y; q); zr > 0; zre < 0; zy > 0; zq < 0 (2.23)
where re is the rate of return on equities (re =
(1¡sf )(¼¡¯r)u+n(®u¡x)
®u
) and q can be
written as (®+ ¯)u.
For some functional forms of Ã in (2.22) and z in (2.23) it may be possible to
obtain analytical expressions for ® and ¯; as in our general representation for the
stock-flow ratios, (2.6) and (2.7); other specifications - including the ones used by
Lavoie and Godley - may preclude explicit analytical expressions but the stock-flow
implications can still be evaluated numerically.
With the relevant definitions, (2.22) and (2.23) determine the equilibrium values of
¼, ® and ¯. Each exogenous variable (sf , x, r, among others) affects the equilibrium
stock-flow ratios ® and ¯ as well as the profit share ¼; and we get expressions that
are analogous to (2.18)-(2.20):
@¼
@sf
= ¡
¼ ¡ ¯r ¡ (sfr ¡ n) @¯@sf
sf ¡ (sfr ¡ n)@¯@¼
@¼
@x
= ¡ n¡ (sfr ¡ n)u
¤ @¯
@x
sfu¤ ¡ (sfr ¡ n)u¤ @¯@¼
@¼
@r
=
sf¯ + (sfr ¡ n)@¯@r
sf ¡ (sfr ¡ n)@¯@¼
The total effect on the profit share of each parameter can be decomposed into the
effect for a given ® and ¯, and the derived effect via changes in ® and ¯. The first
effect is clear and straightforward as shown in section 2.4.1.1. Our main concern here
is whether ‘the inelasticity conditions’ for stock-flow ratios hold in the Lavoie-Godley
specification.
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Table 2.1. Harrodian mature economy I
Constant ® and
¯ regime
Variable ® and
¯ regime
The retention ratio -0.238 -0.238
Equity issues -0.386 -0.228
Real interest rate 2.589 2.575
Utilization -1.948 -1.634
Propensity to hold equity - 0.0717
1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the profit share with respect
to the parameters listed in the first column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002) including the specification of consumption, but the closure of
the model is different.
Using Lavoie and Godley’s values for the parameters,24 we find that in the Har-
rodian mature economy, the indirect effects via changes in ® and ¯ are quite small,
with the direct effects corresponding to constant stock-flow ratios explaining most of
the total effects. Table 2.1 shows the numerical results. The numbers in Table 2.1
indicate the derivatives of the profit share with respect to each exogenous parameter,
evaluated at the equilibrium associated with Lavoie and Godley’s original values of pa-
rameters. A thorough examination of whether our ‘inelasticity conditions’ are robust
with respect to reasonable variations in all parameter values has been left for future
research; preliminary results, however, show robustness as we vary the parameters of
the consumption function.25
Lavoie and Godley have changed their consumption function in recent work. God-
ley and Lavoie (2007) use a stock-flow specification with consumption as a linear
24Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) did not report parameter values but have provided the values in
private correspondence. These parameter values and our procedure of decomposition are given in
Appendix E.
25Below we report some of the sensitivity results for the ‘Kaleckian - dual economy’ case, which
is the case that is closest to Lavoie and Godley’s own model.
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Table 2.2. Harrodian mature economy II
Constant ® and
¯ regime
Variable ® and
¯ regime
The retention ratio -0.296 -0.296
Equity issues -0.342 -0.261
Real interest rate 1.023 1.005
Utilization -1.102 -0.564
Propensity to hold equity - 0.091
1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the profit share with respect
to the parameters listed in the first column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002) except the specification of consumption and the closure of the
model. The alternative specification of consumption is given by the one in Godley
and Lavoie (2007).
function of income and wealth. This specification is closer in spirit to our analysis in
section 2.3.1.3 and, using their new specification and parameter values, our inelastic-
ity conditions are still satisfied; Table 2.2 lists the derivatives of the profit share for
this case.26
2.4.2 Dual economies: endogenous growth
We now turn to the case of dual economies, that is, economies in which the labor
force does not constrain the rate of growth. This case may correspond to economies
with large amounts of hidden unemployment in backward, non-capitalist sectors, or it
could depict the case where the labor supply to the capitalist sector is perfectly elastic
for other reasons (immigration, women’s participation rate, endogenous fertility, or
technical progress).
26The numerical results in Table 2.2, 2.4, 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 are based on CK = c1fu ¡ sf (¼u ¡
rm)g + c2q where c1 = 0:75 and c2 = 0:064, which is equivalent to the one in Godley and Lavoie
(2007) if there is no consumer loan, no bank profit and no inflation.
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The growth function can be simplified in a dual economy of this kind. The em-
ployment rate no longer serves as a relevant signal and therefore drops out of the
growth function. Hence,
Yˆ = h(¼);h0 > 0
In steady growth we still have g = Yˆ = Kˆ and u = u¤, and the equilibrium condition
for the product market takes the form
[1¡ sf (¼ ¡ r¯)¡ ¯h(¼)¡ ®Nˆ ] = 1¡ 1
u¤
h(¼) (2.24)
2.4.2.1 Inelastic stock-flow ratios
In the case with exogenous ® and ¯ ratios, equation (2.24) gives the following
comparative statics:
@¼
@sf
= ¡ ¼ ¡ r¯
sf + (¯ ¡ 1u¤ )h0(¼)
@¼
@Nˆ
= ¡ ®
sf + (¯ ¡ 1u¤ )h0(¼)
@¼
@r
=
¯sf
sf + (¯ ¡ 1u¤ )h0(¼)
@¼
@®
= ¡ Nˆ
sf + (¯ ¡ 1u¤ )h0(¼)
@¼
@¯
=
sfr ¡ n
sf + (¯ ¡ 1u¤ )h0(¼)
The signs of these partials depend on the magnitude of h0(¼): The expression
¯¡ 1
u¤ =
M¡pK
pY
is negative for any empirically reasonable specification, and it follows
that compared to the labor constrained case, the comparative statics are unchanged
if h0 is ‘small’ but reversed if h0 is ‘large’. The standard Kaleckian formulation with
¼ = ¼¯ corresponds to the limiting case with h0 !1. This may be an extreme case,
but in the absence of labor constraints one would expect a high sensitivity of growth
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to variations in profitability. Thus, the large-h0 case with the reversal of comparative
statics for the profit share seems the most reasonable.
Changes in the profit share influence the growth rate in a dual economy, rather
than the employment rate as in the labor-constrained economy. Expressions for the
growth rate effects are readily obtained in the limiting case with a constant markup
formulation (h0(¼) ! 1 at ¼ = ¼¯). In this limiting case equation (2.24) can be
rewritten
[1¡ sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯)¡ ¯g ¡ ®Nˆ ] = 1¡ 1
u¤
g
and
@g
@sf
=
(¼¯ ¡ r¯)u¤
1¡ ¯u¤ > 0
@g
@Nˆ
=
®u¤
1¡ ¯u¤ > 0
@g
@r
= ¡ sf¯u
¤
1¡ ¯u¤ < 0
@g
@®
=
Nˆu¤
1¡ ¯u¤
@g
@¯
=
(g ¡ sfr)u¤
1¡ ¯u¤
The signs of the effects of changes in sf ; Nˆ and r are clear. If firms raise the
retention rate or increase the rate of new issues, this will increase the rate of capital
accumulation, while an increase in the real interest rate slows down accumulation.
The intuition is simple. Since u¤ and ¼¯ are unaffected by changes in sf ; Nˆ and r, the
effects on accumulation of changes in sf ; Nˆ and r derive exclusively from their direct
impacts on saving and the amount of available finance. Given that u = u¤ and ¼ = ¼¯,
an increase in sf or Nˆ must increase the amount of financial resources available to
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firms - raising the rate of capital accumulation - while a rise in r has the opposite
effect on accumulation since it reduces the amount of retained earnings.27
2.4.2.2 The Lavoie-Godley specification of consumption
As we have seen in section 2.4.1.2, households’ consumption/saving and portfolio
decisions in Lavoie-Godley (2001-2002) implicitly define the stock-flow ratios, ® and
¯, as functions of a number of variables, and the accumulation rate becomes an
additional influence on ® and ¯ in the dual economy. Analogously to the analysis in
section 2.4.1.2, we obtain the following comparative statics.
@g
@sf
=
¼¯ ¡ r¯ ¡ (sfr ¡ g) @¯@sf
1
u¤ (1¡ ¯u¤ ¡ x) + (sfr ¡ g)@¯@g
@g
@x
=
1
u¤ g ¡ (sfr ¡ g)@¯@x
1
u¤ (1¡ ¯u¤ ¡ x) + (sfr ¡ g)@¯@g
@g
@r
= ¡ sf¯ + (sfr ¡ g)
@¯
@r
1
u¤ (1¡ ¯u¤ ¡ x) + (sfr ¡ g)@¯@g
We follow a decomposition procedure that is similar to the one in 2.4.1.1 in order
to check if the inelasticity conditions for the stock-flow ratios hold in Harrodian dual
economies. Table 2.3 reports the numerical results based on Lavoie and Godley’s
parameter values.
The signs of the derivatives of g with respect to the parameters are the same in the
variable ® and ¯ regime as in the constant ® and ¯ regime, that is, our ‘inelasticity
conditions’ hold in Harrodian dual economies with a Lavoie-Godley specification of
consumption and portfolio behavior. However, the absolute values of the derivatives
in the case of constant ® and ¯ are much greater than those in the case of variable
27It is easy to understand these comparative statics by looking at the closed-form solution for the
rate of capital accumulation, i.e. g = [sf (¼¯¡r¯)+®Nˆ ]u
¤
1¡¯u¤ .
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Table 2.3. Harrodian dual economy I
Constant ® and
¯ regime
Variable ® and
¯ regime
The retention ratio 0.073 0.037
Equity issues 0.118 0.021
Real interest rate -0.790 -0.396
Utilization 0.595 0.348
Profit share 0.305 0.154
Propensity to hold equity - -0.011
1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the growth rate with respect
to the parameters listed in the first column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002) including the specification of consumption, but the closure of
the model is different.
® and ¯. Thus, the adjustment of ® and ¯ caused by changes in the parameters
produce significant and partially offsetting effects on accumulation.
The implications of the alternative specification of the consumption function in
Godley-Lavoie (2007) are given in Table 2.4. The inelasticity conditions are satisfied
and the effects of the changes in ® and ¯ are more modest in this case.
2.5 A Kaleckian model
Our Kaleckian model differs from Harrodian models with respect to the specifi-
cation of accumulation. Unlike in the Harrodian framework, the utilization rate u
becomes an accommodating variable, and a shift in aggregate demand may gener-
ate a permanent change in utilization.28 The profit share, by contrast, is treated as
exogenous, ¼ = ¼¯; and the labor supply is taken be perfectly elastic (that is, the
28A steady growth path for the Kaleckian model may have utilization at the normal or desired level,
despite the accommodating changes in utilization. This equalization of actual and desired utilization
rates can be achieved if the desired utilization rate itself adjusts to the actual rate (Lavoie 1995,
Dutt 1997).
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Table 2.4. Harrodian dual economy II
Constant ® and
¯ regime
Variable ® and
¯ regime
The retention ratio 0.101 0.081
Equity issues 0.117 0.071
Real interest rate -0.349 -0.273
Utilization 0.376 0.329
Profit share 0.341 0.272
Propensity to hold equity - -0.025
1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the growth rate with respect
to the parameters listed in the first column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002) except the specification of consumption and the closure of the
model. The alternative specification of consumption is given by the one in Godley
and Lavoie (2007).
model describes the dual-economy case). The Kaleckian model, finally, often imposes
‘stagnationist’ assumptions which ensure that an increase in the profit share will re-
duce utilization; most of our results for the comparative statics of changes in financial
behavior do not depend on these additional assumptions.
2.5.1 Inelastic stock-flow ratios
By using the definition of ® and ¯, Tobin’s q, the debt-capital ratio, and the ratio
of retained earnings to capital can be written as:
q = (®+ ¯)u
m = ¯u
c = sf (¼ ¡ r¯)u
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Thus, for given values of ¼¯; ® and ¯, the accumulation function (2.4) becomes a
function of utilization only:
I
K
= f(u; ¼¯; r; q;m; c) = f(u; ¼¯; r; (®+ ¯)u; ¯u; sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯)u) ´ Á(u;®; ¯; r; ¼¯; sf )
From (2.8) and the product market equilibrium condition, we now have
Á(u;®; ¯; r; ¼¯; sf ) = [sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯Á(u) + ®Nˆ ]u (2.25)
We may interpret the terms in the bracket on the right hand side of (2.25) as the
average saving rate. Following the Kaleckian tradition, we assume that the traditional
Keynesian short-run stability assumption holds in the long run, too, that is, we assume
that saving is more responsive than investment to changes in the utilization rate. If
the ®¡ and ¯¡ratios are exogenous, we then have
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0 > 0 (2.26)
and - assuming positive autonomous investment, Á(0;®; ¯; r; ¼¯; sf ) > 0 - it can be
shown that there is a unique positive solution for u in the interval (0; 1
¯
).
For empirically reasonable magnitudes of the negative effect on capital accumu-
lation of the debt-capital ratio, accumulation is increasing in the utilization rate, i.e.
Á0(u) > 0;29 and we have the following comparative statics for the utilization rate:
29The mathematical condition for Á0(u) > 0 is ¯jfmj < fu + fq(®+ ¯) + fcsf (¼¯ ¡ r¯).
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@u
@¼
=
(1¡ ¯u)f¼ + usff(1¡ ¯u)fc ¡ 1g
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
(2.27)
@u
@sf
=
(¼¯ ¡ r¯)uf(1¡ ¯u)fc ¡ 1g
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
< 0 (2.28)
@u
@Nˆ
= ¡ ®u
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
< 0
@u
@r
=
(1¡ ¯u)(fr ¡ fcsf¯u) + sf¯u
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
du
d®
=
fq(1¡ ¯u)u¡ Nˆu
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
du
d¯
=
(sfr ¡ g)u+ (1¡ ¯u)(fq + fm ¡ fcsfr)u
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
The stagnationist case is obtained if an increase in the profit share generates
a decline in utilization. Comparing (2.27) and (2.28) it is readily seen that in this
stagnationist case an increase in the retention rate must depress the rate of utilization:
it follows from (2.26) and (2.27) that (1¡¯u)fc < 1 is a necessary condition for @u@¼ < 0.
However, the determinate sign of the partial derivative of the utilization rate with
respect to the retention ratio can also be justified directly by the empirically mild
assumption that (1¡¯u)fc < 1.30 Given this assumption, an increase in sf lowers the
utilization rate since, for a given u, saving rises more sharply than investment, and
the utilization rate must decrease in order to restore the product market equilibrium.
Analogously - and independently of whether @u
@¼
< 0 - the average saving rate rises
as Nˆ increases since more household income goes to purchasing equities rather than
buying consumer goods. This depresses the level of effective demand and results in a
lower rate of utilization.
The increase in the real interest rate has a negative impact on both saving and
investment. It lowers the amount of corporate saving, and the decrease in retained
earnings depresses accumulation for a given rate of utilization. Saving falls more
30It is difficult to see how an increase in retained earnings - keeping constant u; ¼; r; q;m - can
lead to a more than one-for-one increase in investment, that is, one would expect fc · 1.
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sharply than investment if the direct negative impact on investment of changes in r
is not too large, i.e. (1 ¡ ¯u)(fr ¡ fcsf¯u) + sf¯u > 0. Under this assumption, to
restore the product market equilibrium, a higher utilization rate is required. However,
if (1 ¡ ¯u)(fr ¡ fcsf¯u) + sf¯u < 0, the higher real interest rate requires a lower
utilization rate for the product market equilibrium. The effects of changes in ® and
¯; again, are ambiguous.
The effects on accumulation of changes in the financial variables are given by:
@g
@¼
= f¼ + sfufc + Á
0 @u
@¼
(2.29)
@g
@sf
= fc(¼¯ ¡ r¯)u+ Á0 @u
@sf
(2.30)
@g
@Nˆ
= Á0
@u
@Nˆ
< 0 (2.31)
@g
@r
= fr ¡ fcsf¯u+ Á0@u
@r
(2.32)
The result for @g
@¼
in equation (2.29) is parallel to Marglin and Bhaduri’s (1990) anal-
ysis of wage and profit led growth in a stagnationist regime. The direct and positive
effect on accumulation of an increase in the profit share may or may not be domi-
nated by the effect of a decline in utilization. A rise in the retention rate - equation
(2.30) - also produces conflicting effects on accumulation. The first term in (2.30),
fc(¼¯ ¡ r¯)u, captures a direct positive impact on accumulation from an increase in
the amount of internal funds, but an increase in the retention rate also has a negative
effect on accumulation by lowering the utilization rate (the second term in (2.30),
Á0 @u
@sf
, is negative). Which effect dominates is an empirical matter but - using the ex-
pressions for @u
@¼
and @u
@sf
- it follows that in this model @g
@sf
> 0 is a sufficient condition
for growth to be profit led.31
31We have
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The effect on capital accumulation of an increase in the rate of equity issues is
more clear-cut. An increase in Nˆ leads to a lower rate of utilization, and the lower
utilization rate depresses capital accumulation.
Real interest rates have ambiguous effects. The direct effect on accumulation of
a rise in the real rate of interest is negative but the derived effect on accumulation
via changes in the utilization may be positive: fr ¡ fcsf¯u in (2.32) is negative, but
the sign of Á0 @u
@r
in (2.32) can be positive or negative, leaving unclear the sign of the
total effect. The ambiguity that characterizes the effects of changes in ® and ¯ on
utilization also carry over to the effects on the growth rate.
Financialization, finally, may have been associated with a downward shift in the
accumulation function, f (or Á). A downward shift of this kind leads to a lower
utilization rate, and this fall in utilization exacerbates the decline in accumulation.
Strikingly, the comparative static results for a Kaleckian dual economy resemble
those for the mature Harrodian economy. A fall in the rate of new equity issues is
expansionary in both models. In the Kaleckian model it leads to a higher utilization
rate and a higher accumulation rate; in the Harrodian model profits and employment
both increase. A decrease in the retention rate, moreover, may (but need not) increase
both the utilization rate and the capital accumulation rate in the Kaleckian model
and it raises profits and employment in the Harrodian case.
@g
@¼
= f¼ + sfufc + Á0
@u
@¼
= f¼ + sfufc + Á0
(1¡ ¯u)f¼ + usff(1¡ ¯u)fc ¡ 1g
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
= f¼ + Á0
(1¡ ¯u)f¼
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
+
sf
¼¯ ¡ r¯ [(¼¯ ¡ r¯)ufc + Á
0 (¼¯ ¡ r¯)uf(1¡ ¯u)fc ¡ 1g
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
]
= f¼ + Á0
(1¡ ¯u)f¼
sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + ¯(Á0u+ g) + ®Nˆ ¡ Á0
+
sf
¼¯ ¡ r¯
@g
@sf
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2.5.2 The Lavoie-Godley specification of consumption and accumulation
In Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002), the accumulation function is given by
g = °0 + °1sf ( ¼¯u¡ rm)¡ °2rm+ °3q + °4u
where °0, °1, °2, °3, and °4 are positive constants. Using the definitions of q, m, ®
and ¯, this accumulation function can be rewritten:
g = °0 + [°1sf ( ¼¯ ¡ r¯)¡ °2r¯ + °3(®+ ¯) + °4]u (2.33)
If the ® and ¯ ratios are constant, we have a special linear version of our function
Á(u) in the previous section, and the sensitivity of investment to the utilization rate
depends on the various parameters, including ® and ¯. The Lavoie-Godley specifica-
tion of consumption and portfolio behavior, however, implies that the ® and ¯ ratios
are endogenous and that the response of investment to changes in u will be affected
by the endogenous adjustment of the stock-flow ratios ® and ¯.
The consumption function and households’ portfolio choice have been described
already in section 2.4.1.2. For convenience we reproduce the key equations (2.22)-
(2.23) here:
u¡ g = u
h
1¡ sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯)¡ ¯g ¡ xg
u
i
= Ã(y; °) (2.34)
¯
®+ ¯
= z(r; re; y; q) (2.35)
where ° = ®ug ¡ xg, y = [1 ¡ sf (¼¯ ¡ r¯) + pˆ¯]u, re = (1¡sf )(¼¯¡¯r)u+g(®u¡x)®u , and
q = (® + ¯)u. Unlike in section 2.4.1.2, g and u are endogenously determined while
¼ is a parameter.
The system (2.33)-(2.35) determines four endogenous variables, g, u, ® and ¯
((2.34) contains two equations). This system is equivalent to the steady-growth sys-
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tem in Lavoie and Godley (2000-2001).32 It can be compared to one in which accu-
mulation is described by (2.33), but in which ® and ¯ are assumed constant (that is,
in which we drop (2.35) and the last equation in (2.34)).
Table 2.5. Kaleckian dual economy I
Utilization Accumulation
Regimes
Constant
® and ¯
regime
Variable
® and ¯
regime
Constant
® and ¯
regime
Variable
® and ¯
regime
The retention ratio -0.162 -0.186 -0.024 -0.028
Equity issues -0.342 -0.352 -0.085 -0.087
Real interest rate 1.055 0.197 -0.163 -0.327
Profit share -0.680 -0.780 -0.099 -0.118
Propensity to hold equity - 0.296 - 0.092
1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the utilization rate and the growth
rate share with respect to the parameters listed in the first column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2002) including the specification of consumption.
Table 2.6. Effects of changes in financial variables on stock-flow ratios in Kaleckian
dual economy I
sf x r
0.55 0.75 0.95 -0.05 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.0275 0.05
® 1.951 2.079 2.179 2.040 2.079 2.075 1.814 2.079 2.660
¯ 2.426 2.589 2.717 2.537 2.589 2.587 2.226 2.589 3.377
Notes: 0.75(sf ), 0.05(x), 0.0275(r), and the values for the parameters other than sf , x,
and r are the same as those used in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002).
Analytical solutions are hard to obtain, but using the original parameter values in
Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) our inelasticity conditions for stock-flow ratios survive
in this Kaleckian Lavoie-Godley system. Table 2.5 describes the numerical results.
32The only small difference between Lavoie and Godley steady-state system and ours lies in the lag
structure of variables. In our analysis, we make all level variables in each equation contemporaneous.
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Qualitatively, the macroeconomic effects of financialization on the steady state are
the same in the fixed ®; ¯ system and the Lavoie-Godley model. In both models, the
effects of an increase in the retention rate are negative for both utilization and accu-
mulation. Thus, given the parameter configuration, the direct positive impact of a rise
in sf on accumulation is dominated by its negative utilization effect on accumulation.
A rise in the share of investment financed by new issues has a contractionary effect
on both utilization and accumulation. An increase in the real interest rate on the
utilization rate has a positive effect on the utilization rate, but this positive utiliza-
tion effect is offset by the negative effect of the higher interest rate on accumulation:
accumulation slows down in the face of the higher real rate of interest.
The similarity between the systems with constant and endogenous ® and ¯ ratios is
not just qualitative. The derivatives of u and g with respect to the various parameters
are also similar in magnitude. Thus, the effects on u and g of induced adjustments of
® and ¯ are quantitatively small.33 This result is not surprising since, as indicated by
Table 2.6, the values of the ® and ¯ ratios appear to be rather insensitive to variations
in the financial parameters (the parameter changes in the table are very substantial).
The sensitivity of the qualitative results to variations in parameters of the con-
sumption function is shown in Table 2.7. The effect of changes in the real interest
rate could not be signed unambiguously for the case with a constant ® and ¯, and it
is therefore not surprising that the effect of changes in r on utilization may depend
on the precise parameters. The effects that could be signed with a constant ® and
¯ are robust: the direction of the effects is preserved in the variable ®; ¯ case for all
meaningful combinations of the consumption parameters. The violations in the top
left corner of Table 2.7 arise when, as a result of low consumption, the model gener-
33There is one possible exception: the quantitative effect of the real interest rate on utilization
differs substantially in the two systems. Our numerical exercises, however, show that the difference
tends to decrease if we consider non-marginal, discrete changes in the interest rate.
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Table 2.7. Sensitivity analysis in Kaleckian dual economy I
a2
a1 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
1000 5 5 5 5 ° ° ° ° § § §
100 5 5 5 ° ° ° ° ° § § §
10 5 5 5 ° ° ° ° ° § § §
7.5 5 5 5 ° ° ° ° ° § § §
4.5 5 5 5 ° ° ° ° ° § § §
3.0 5 5 ° ° ° ° ° ° § § §
1.5 5 ° ° ° ° ° ° ° § § §
1.0 5 ° ° ° ° ° ° § § § £
0.5 ° ° ° ° ° ° § § § § £
1. The table shows that our stock-flow inelasticity conditions hold for a wide range of
values of the consumption parameters a1 and a2 in the original Lavoie and Godley
model (2001-2002).
2. Cases indicated by “°”: The conditions for the stock-flow inelasticity hold for the
partial derivatives of u and g with respect to changes in sf , x and r. usf < 0, ux < 0,
ur > 0, gsf < 0, gx < 0, and gr < 0.
3. Cases indicated by “§”: The results are the same as cases with “°” except that ur > 0
in the case of fixed ® and ¯ but ur < 0 in the case of variable ® and ¯.
4. Cases indicated by “5”: The results are the same as cases with “°” except that usf > 0
and gsf > 0 for both fixed and variable ® and ¯. However, in these cases, ¼ ¡ r¯ < 0.
5. Two cases indicated by “£”, no economically significant solution is obtained.
ates an outcome with low utilization, high indebtedness, and an inability of firms to
cover the real interest payments on their loans (¼ ¡ r¯ < 0).
Turning, finally, to the alternative specification in Godley and Lavoie (2007), a
similar picture emerges. Table 2.8 compares the effects of parameter changes using
this specification to the constant ®; ¯ case. Table 2.9 illustrates the sensitivity of
® and ¯ to variations in sf ; x and r, and Table 2.10 indicates the sensitivity of the
inelasticity conditions to variations in the consumption parameters. All the results
are in line with what we observed for the 2001-02 specification.
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Table 2.8. Kaleckian dual economy II
Utilization Accumulation
Regimes
Constant
® and ¯
regime
Variable
® and ¯
regime
Constant
® and ¯
regime
Variable
® and ¯
regime
The retention rate -0.470 -0.487 -0.076 -0.079
Equity issues -0.806 -0.742 -0.186 -0.173
Real interest rate 0.587 0.154 -0.128 -0.223
Profit share -1.592 -1.64 -0.257 -0.267
Propensity to hold equity - 0.391 - 0.104
1. Numbers in the table show the partial derivatives of the utilization rate and the growth
rate with respect to the parameters listed in the first column.
2. The structure and parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2002) except the specification of consumption. The alternative specification of
consumption is given by the one in Godley and Lavoie (2007).
2.6 Conclusion
Financialization is a short-hand expression for a number of developments over
the last 30 years. The term is convenient but these developments may not have the
coherence and unity suggested by the term and they may not signal the transition to
some new ‘regime’.
This chapter is an attempt to show how the macroeconomic effects of some of
the observed changes in financial behavior can be analyzed using existing theoretical
frameworks. The models in sections 2.4-2.5 differ along three dimensions: (i) the role
of labor constraints (mature vs dual economies), (ii) accumulation regimes (Harrodian
vs Kaleckian specifications), and (iii) the specification of household behavior (elastic
vs inelastic stock-flow ratios). All three dimensions are important when it comes
to evaluating the effects of the behavioral changes that have been associated with
financialization.
Looking first at the third dimension, the comparative statics in the elastic stock-
flow case are reversed compared to the case with inelastic stock-flow ratios. Phrased
101
Table 2.9. Effects of changes in financial variables on stock-flow ratios in Kaleckian
dual economy II
sf x r
0.55 0.75 0.95 -0.05 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.0275 0.05
® 0.804 0.824 0.830 0.855 0.824 0.777 0.799 0.824 0.861
¯ 0.994 1.023 1.035 1.058 1.023 0.967 0.978 1.023 1.089
Notes: 0.75(sf ), 0.05(x), 0.0275(r), and the values for the parameters other than sf , x,
and r are the same as those used in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002). The structure and
parameter values of the model are the same as in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) except
the specification of consumption. The alternative specification of consumption is given by
the one in Godley and Lavoie (2007).
in this way, however, the result is not interesting since reversal of the results formed
the basis for the definition of elastic stock-flow ratios. More interesting is the finding
that all our specifications fall into the category of inelastic stock-flow ratios. We
may not be able to conclude from this that all reasonable specifications are inelastic.
We have shown, however, that a range of empirically plausible specifications will be
stock-flow inelastic; it is striking, in particular, that models like that of Lavoie-Godley
(2001-02) which have been built up from flow-flow relations also generate stock-flow
ratios that are inelastic.
Assuming inelastic stock-flow ratio, some of the main results for the other two
dimensions are summarized in Table 2.11. Consider a change in new issue policies.34
A decrease in new issues will be expansionary in the mature Harrodian economy as
well in the Kaleckian dual economy. Expansionary means different things in the two
regimes: the growth rate is exogenously given in the mature economy and expansion-
ary refers to an increase in the rate of employment; in the dual economy, on the other
hand, the labor supply is infinitely elastic (and the rate of employment ill-defined),
and an expansionary effect is one that raises the growth rate.
34The effects of changes in retention rates are a little less clear in that - essentially for Marglin-
Bhaduri reasons - the growth effects are ambiguous in the Kaleckian dual-economy case.
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Table 2.10. Sensitivity Analysis in Kaleckian dual economy II
c2
c1 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95
0.003 5 5 ° ° § §
0.005 5 ° ° ° § §
0.01 ° ° ° ° § §
0.02 ° ° ° ° § §
0.04 ° ° ° ° § §
0.06 ° ° ° ° § §
0.08 ° ° ° ° § §
0.10 ° ° ° ° § §
0.20 ° ° ° § § §
1. The table below shows that our stock-flow inelasticity conditions hold for a wide
range of values of c1 and c2 when we modify the specification of the consumption
function in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) keeping intact other parts of the model.
The alternative specification of consumption is given by the one in Godley and Lavoie
(2007).
2. Cases indicated by “°”: The conditions for the stock-flow inelasticity hold for the
partial derivatives of u and g with respect to changes in sf , x and r. usf < 0, ux < 0,
ur > 0, gsf < 0, gx < 0, and gr < 0.
3. Cases indicated by “§”: The results are the same as cases with “°” except that
ur > 0 in the case of fixed ® and ¯ but ur < 0 in the case of variable ® and ¯.
4. Cases indicated by “5”: The results are the same as cases with “°” except that
usf > 0 and gsf > 0 for both fixed and variable ® and ¯. However, in these cases,
¼ ¡ r¯ < 0.
The Harrodian dual economy produces the opposite result: a decrease in new
issues reduces the growth rate.35 Intuitively, the growth rate (along the steady growth
path) is constrained by saving in the Harrodian dual economy, and a decrease in new
issues reduces saving and thereby the growth rate. This argument is a straightforward
generalization of what happens in the textbook version of Harrod’s model. In a mature
35The Harrodian dual economy could be split into two cases, depending on the sensitivity of the
growth function with respect to changes in the profit share. We focus on the high-sensitivity case,
cf. section 2.4.1.2.
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Table 2.11. The effects of a decrease in the retention ratio or the rate of net issues
of equities in different regimes
Mature Economies Dual Economies
Harrodian
Profit share: Increase
Employment: Increase
Growth: Decrease
Kaleckian
Utilization: Increase
Growth: Ambiguous when sf #
Growth: Increase when Nˆ #
economy, by contrast, the growth rate of output and the rate of accumulation will
adjust to the natural rate. A decrease in new issues tends to reduce saving, and an
increase in profits is needed to compensate for this reduction and maintain the rate of
accumulation at the natural rate. An increase in profitability, in turn, must be offset
by a rise in employment in order to keep the growth rate of output at the natural rate.
Basically, moving from a mature to an dual-economy setting turns an expansionary
change into a contractionary change.
Moving from a Harrodian to a Kaleckian economy also tends to reverse the com-
parative statics. This, again, generalizes results that are well-known from compar-
isons of the textbook Harrod model with standard stagnationist formulations (e.g.
Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984)). The only difference is that here we have ex-
panded the models to include financial factors that are usually left out.
These comparisons between mature and dual-economy versions of the Harrodian
model and between Harrodian and Kaleckian versions of the dual economy provide
some intuition for the similarity between the mature Harrodian economy and the
Kaleckian dual economy: these latter economies differ in two dimensions and the two
reversals of the comparative statics offset each other.
Of course, the dependence of the comparative statics on the specification of the
model is not surprising. One contribution in this study, however, is to clarify the
conditions under which the different results obtain. Moreover, most studies of ad-
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vanced capitalist economies by heterodox economists seem to be informed by either a
Harrodian mature-economy perspective or by the Kaleckian dual-economy framework
(our own preference lies with the former, but the majority view probably favors the
latter). The two perspectives are quite different, but our results in this paper show
that when it comes to an evaluation of the effects of the changes in financial behavior
over the last 30 years, the qualitative conclusions are rather similar. A downward
shift of the accumulation function will - not surprisingly - be contractionary in both
frameworks, but contrary to the fears among some heterodox economists, key de-
velopments associated with the process of financialization have expansionary effects:
decreases in retained earnings, a decline in new issues of equity and increased reliance
on external finance tend to be expansionary in both frameworks.
Financialization involves broader issues that go beyond the questions discussed in
this chapter. One set of issues concerns international capital flows and the constraints
implied by these flows on the policy options of nation states. Leaving aside the inter-
national dimension, issues of power provide an another example. It is often claimed
that financialization is associated with the increased power of financial institutions.
Auerbach (1988), however, presents the case for an alternative view:
The present relationships between banks and firms, far from signalling
the growing dominance of financial institutions represent a precisely con-
trary development. They result from the efforts of financial institutions to
accommodate themselves to a far more insecure environment, one made
insecure by the activities of financial institutions in competition with each
other and by the ever more stringent demands made upon them by their
clients, especially their business customers. (p. 198)
Disregarding power issues, an increase in competition and insecurity may have impli-
cations for financial stability as well as for the time horizons used by both firms and
financial institutions. A relatively recent but now largely forgotten literature ques-
tioned the relative merits of competitive, market-based Anglo-Saxon financial systems
compared to German-Japanese systems. The latter, it was argued, might help to al-
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leviate a short-termist bias (e.g. Cosh et al 1990). More generally, a competitive
financial system would not necessarily - even if it were fully ‘efficient’ - produce good
macroeconomic results if the investment in physical and/ or human capital gives rise
to significant externalities (as suggested by traditional development theory, post Key-
nesians like Kaldor, and recent endogenous growth theory). In the case of positive
externalities, ‘artificially low’ interest rates may be desirable (Auerbach and Skott
1992).36
One may note, finally, that concerns over the excesses and questionable benefits of
the financial system have been voiced before and that even the extent of resources that
are put into the financial system may cause concern. Thus, Tobin (1984; reprinted
1987) confessed
to an uneasy Physiocratic suspicion, perhaps unbecoming in an academic,
that we are throwing more and more of our resources, including the cream
of our youth, into financial activities remote from the production of goods
and services, into activities that generate high private rewards dispropor-
tionate to their social productivity. (1987, p. 294)
Tobin’s conclusion was motivated in part by the fact that 16 out of an elite group
of 46 executives whose earnings exceeded one million dollars in 1983 were officers of
financial companies. He also noted that graduates from the School of Organization
and Management at Yale who took jobs in finance had starting salaries four times
the poverty threshold for four-person families, and observed that the average holding
period for shares was only 19 months and that the Department of Finance categories
of Finance and Insurance generate 4.5-5 per cent of GNP (1987, p. 282). TheseX
36The relatively strong German and Japanese economic performance during the Golden Age could
be explained, of course, by other factors, unrelated to the financial systems. Likewise, the rela-
tively poor performance by the two economies in the more recent years may not reflect a need for
reforms of the financial and/or labor market systems, as claimed by OECD and other international
organisations. See Nakatani and Skott (2007) for discussion of the Japanese case.
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numbers seem almost quaint by today’s standards,37 and developments over the last
20 years can only reinforce ones Physiocratic suspicions.
37In 2005, among CEO’s in the top 189 efficient firms classified by Forbes, 164 earned more
than $2 million (or approximately $1 million in 1983 dollars) and 46 of them belonged to financial
companies (diversified financials, banking, and insurance). The average compensation of those 46
CEO’s in financial companies was $9.6 million or about 170 times the median U.S. family income
in 2004 (see The State of Working America 2006/2007 published by Economic Policy Institute). In
2004, the average holding period for shares had dropped to 12.1 months (NYSE Historical Statistics,
http://www.nysedata.com). Finance and Insurance, as categorized by the Department of Commerce,
accounted for 5.5% of employee compensation, about 5% of the employed labor force, 7.5% of after-
tax corporate profits, and about 3% of personal consumption in 1983; in 2005 those corresponding
figures were 7.6%, 4.3%, 11.1% and 5.9% in 2005, respectively (calculated from U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Account).
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CHAPTER 3
FINANCE, SECTORAL STRUCTURE AND THE BIG
PUSH
3.1 Introduction
Complementarities among different investment projects may cause coordination
failures where no investment project can break even if it is implemented alone, while
simultaneous implementation of the investment projects (big push) makes individual
projects profitable. The idea of big push dates back to Baran (1957), Myrdal (1957),
Nurkse (1958), and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943). Due to the presence of pervasive com-
plementarities, uncoordinated investment decisions may lead to an underdevelopment
trap where no investment project is actually made and, in order to avoid this underde-
velopment trap, coordinated implementation of investment projects may be needed.
Murphy et al. (1989) formulates this big push idea. Several contributions have
since been made in the big push literature (i.e. see, among others, Ciccone and Mat-
suyama, 1996; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Rodrick, 1996; Skott and Ros, 1997). While
existing studies have focused on various mechanisms that generate big push results,
less attention has been paid to the role of the financial sector in addressing the prob-
lem of coordination failure generated by investment complementarities.1 Da Rin and
1There have been a number of empirical studies in the literature regarding finance and devel-
opment. See Demirguc-Kunt (2006) and Levine (2003) for survey. One important topic in this
literature is whether financial development explains countries’ growth performance. Many studies
along this line accept the view that “the role of financial markets and institutions arise to miti-
gate the effects of information and transaction costs that prevent direct pooling and investment
of society’s savings” (Demirguc-Kunt, 2006, p.1) From this perspective, good financial markets are
identified as “deep” markets which mean more liquid stock markets and larger banking sectors.
The role of financial institutions in coordinating investment projects in the presence of investment
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Hellman (2002) is an important exception. They investigate the implications of intro-
ducing banks with market power into the Murphy-Schleifer-Vishny type model, and
show that private banks can act as catalysts for industrialization and solve the coordi-
nation failure if the banks have sufficient monopoly power to secure profits from costly
coordination and are sufficiently large to mobilize a critical mass of firms. Thus, Da
Rin and Hellman suggest that banks’ profit maximizing behavior is consistent with
mobilizing the critical mass of complementary investments.
It is difficult to deny the argument that the existence of banks with sufficient
size and market power can solve coordination failures caused by investment com-
plementarities. In principle, a complete monopolist can internalize gains generated
by complementary investment projects and inefficiency caused by externality can be
eliminated by the monopolist. An agent with a ‘sufficient’ degree of market power
may be able to mimic the solution by the monopolist. However, more important
questions are how the sufficient level of market power that can solve a coordination
failure is determined, and what kinds of factors affect the determination of the critical
level of market power.2 This chapter focuses on the effect of sectoral structure on
the determination of the critical level of market power. In the Da Rin and Hellman
model, the decision-making by the bank with market power is on whether to finance
firms investing in the modern sector characterized by investment complementarities
complementarities, which is the main focus of this paper, has received less attention in this line of
research.
2There is some empirical support for a positive relationship between bank concentration and the
growth of particular types of firms. For example, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argues that younger
firms have easier access to credit if banks have market power because banks with market power
expect themselves to be able to extract future profits with those younger firms. This argument is
based on the assumption that that new entrants in an industry are characterized by more innovative
technologies, which would confer banks with market power increasing opportunities of sharing profits
with the firms. Their argument is based on the existence of relationship banking. Cetorelli and Gam-
bera (2001) suggest that higher bank concentration is conducive to the growth of industries where
young firms heavily rely on external finance. However, in general, the empirical findings regarding
the relationship between concentration and the growth of firms are mixed. More importantly, the
implications of investment complementarities for the role of banks with market power have received
little attention in these studies.
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or invest at a risk-free interest rate. In our model, we explicitly introduces the tradi-
tional sector in which investment projects are strategically substitutable. The bank
with market power considers financing investment projects in the traditional sector
as well as those in the modern sector, and its profit maximization determines opti-
mal credit allocation over the sectors. The characteristics of traditional and modern
sectors interact with the bank’s decision on loan allocation. In particular, I explore
a possibility that the existence of strong traditional sectors is an obstacle to private
coordination by the bank with market power. The bank with market power may
fail to provide a solution to the problem of coordination failure if they find it more
profitable to finance firms in the traditional sector than in the modern sector. This
will be the case if the economy has relatively strong traditional sectors which provide
ample profit opportunities for banks with market power.
The role of market power in promoting or discouraging the industrialization pro-
cess has been analyzed by de Fontenay (2004) but with a focus on industrial firms.
de Fontenay suggests that firms with market power have a dual role in industrializa-
tion process: firms with market power may encourage investment in complementary
industries but other firms may be discouraged from investing by the risk of hold-up
by the firm with market power. de Fontenay maintains that whether the positive or
negative impact will be dominant depends on the market structure and institutions
by which firms with market power are organized. The analysis in de Fontenay (2004)
makes a point similar to ours: the introduction of market power into big push models
may not provide a solution to coordination failures and the role of market power
depends on the underlying structural aspects of an economy.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we develop a model
which pays explicit attention to sectoral structure. Section 3.3 discusses the inter-
sectoral and intrasectoral relations that characterize the real sector of an economy.
Section 3.4 studies multiple equilibria under a competitive banking system. Section
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3.5 investigates the conditions under which banks with market power induce or fail to
induce industrialized equilibrium. In section 6, we discuss some implications of our
results.
3.2 Model
We consider an economy in which a final good is produced by two intermediate
good sectors. The model shares some common features found in big push models
(incl. Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996; Murphy et al., 1989; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996).
Banking structure and firms’ belief structure are introduced along the line of Da Rin
and Hellman (2002).
3.2.1 Production processes
The economy has a final good Z which is produced by two goods X and Y under
a perfectly competitive condition. The production process is characterized by the
following CES production function:
Z =
h
®X1¡
1
² + ¯Y 1¡
1
²
i ²
²¡1
; (² > 1) (3.1)
where ² is the elasticity of substitution of X and Y . The price of Z, PZ , is normalized
at one.
Good X is produced by a perfectly competitive firm using a finite number of
intermediate goods x(i)’s indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n. The intermediate goods, x(i)’s,
are produced by monopolistically competitive firms, and the elasticity of substitution
among x(i)’s in producing X is denoted as ¾. Thus, the production technology for
good X is represented by
X =
"
nX
i=1
x(i)1¡
1
¾
# ¾
¾¡1
; (¾ > 1) (3.2)
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We will call the set of monopolistically competitive firms 3 producing x(i)’s “sector
I”. n is the number of firms which actually invest in sector I. In our model, n is
endogenously determined by firms’ entry decisions.
Similarly, good Y is produced by perfectly competitive firms each of which uses
as inputs a variety of intermediate goods y(j)’s indexed by j = 1; 2; :::. Formally,
Y =
"
mX
j=1
y(j)1¡
1
¿
# ¿
¿¡1
; (¿ > 1) (3.3)
The set of monopolistically competitive firms producing y(i)’s will be called “sector
II”. m is the number of firms which actually invest in sector II.
Given that there are two sectors I and II, one may want to call ² the inter-sectoral
elasticity of substitution and ¾ and ¿ the intra-sectoral elasticity of substitution.
As we will see, the relative magnitude of ², ¾ and ¿ will produce several sectoral
structures (The meaning of a ‘sectoral structure’ used in this paper becomes clear in
section 3.3).
Turning to the intermediate gods x(i) and y(j), production of x(i) units of each
variety in sector I requires a ¢ x(i) units of labor and a start-up cost KI. Both a and
KI are assumed to be exogenously given. Similarly, production of y(j) units of each
variety requires b ¢ y(j) units of labor and a start-up cost KII where b and KII are
constant. Since the effect of the difference between KI and KII is not our primary
focus, we will assume that KI = KII ´ K. The presence of the start-up cost4 implies
that there is an increasing returns to scale.
3The Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier
(1982)) is “grossly unrealistic” (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 2000). For our purposes, however,
it provides a tractable and useful way of representing coordination problems in the entry decisions.
4A general discussion on the implications of different fixed cost assumptions for industrialization
theories is found in Gans (1997).
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The crucial assumption in this model is that the start-up cost must be financed
by borrowing from banks. Since bank financing of firms in intermediate good sectors
is essential in this model, banks’ decisions to extend loans and set interest rates play
an important role in initiating production processes in the intermediate good sectors
which in turn affects equilibrium of the model.
Each firm i is charged the interest rate ri and each firm j is charged rj. Banks
set these interest rates to maximize their profit. Let us denote the price of x(i), the
price of y(j), and the wage rate as px(i), py(j), and w, respectively. Profits earned
by firm i in sector I and firm j in sector II then can be written as:
¼I(i) = px(i) ¢ x(i)¡ w ¢ a ¢ x(i)¡ (1 + ri)K (3.4)
¼II(j) = py(j) ¢ y(j)¡ w ¢ b ¢ y(j)¡ (1 + rj)K (3.5)
Thus, each firm’s profit in intermediate good sectors depends on the price of the
intermediate good it produces, the demand for the good, the wage rate, the level of
fixed cost and the interest rate charged by banks.
3.2.2 Banking sector
There are two types of banks in the model. On the one hand, there are a number
of competitive fringe banks each of which can finance up to K; in other words, each
fringe bank cannot finance more than one firm. Financing K incurs some costs of
½cK to each fringe bank. On the other hand, there is a big bank ¡ a bank with
market power ¡ which can finance up to A firms where A > 1. The big bank’s cost
of financing K is given ½mK where ½m < ½c. This implies that the big bank has a
cost advantage over competitive fringe banks. Da Rin and Hellman (2002) sees this
cost advantage as coming from the big bank’s “superior skills, a lower cost of capital,
or some regulatory advantages.”(p.376)
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Each fringe bank will offer a firm a particular rate of interest. The big bank will
offer A firms interest rates. Firms that receive offers from banks will decide whether
to accept the offer. Whether a firm i or j accepts a particular loan offer depends on
the profitability of its investment project: profits given by (3.4) and (3.5) must be
nonnegative in order for firms to accept the offers.
It is assumed that Bertrand competition prevails among fringe banks. Thus, fringe
banks’ behavior is characterized by marginal cost pricing (r = ½c) and in equilibrium
each fringe bank will make zero profit. In contrast, the big bank has market power and
sets its interest rates. There are two constraints on the exercise of this market power.
On the one hand, because there are fringe banks, interest rates cannot exceed ½c. We
may call this the Bertrand constraint. On the other hand, the lending capacity of the
big bank is fixed: it can finance only up to A firms. We may call this the capacity
constraint. If the big bank finances n firms in sector I and m firms in sector II, then
the capacity constraint is given by n+m · A. Each of two constraints may or may
not be binding in equilibrium.
Due to its market power and its capability to make positive profit, the big bank
has a strategic position which may affect the model’s outcome. In the later part of
this paper, we look for some conditions under which the model generates multiple
equilibria: one equilibrium is characterized by the full development of sector I and
the other by no development of sector I due to a coordination failure. Under those
conditions, firms in sector I become strategically complementary (defined in 3.3.2)
and the entry decisions of firms into sector I suffer from a coordination problem. A
crucial question is under what circumstances the market power of the big bank can
solve this coordination problem. The answer, it turns out, depends critically on the
sectoral structure of an economy as well as the degree of market power.
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3.2.3 Model closure
Full employment is assumed. Given a fixed size of labor force, L, the labor market
equilibrium condition is
nX
i=1
a ¢ x(i) +
mX
j=1
b ¢ y(j) = L (3.6)
For expositional convenience, we normalize the units of intermediate goods so that¡
¾
¾¡1
¢
a = 1 and
¡
¿
¿¡1
¢
b = 1.5
3.3 Sectoral structure
3.3.1 Profit functions
Banks offer interest rates to firms and firms which receive banks’ offers decide
whether to accept those offers by considering their profits net of interest payments.
A firm will accept an offer only if its investment project is expected to be profitable.
Given the interest rates and firms’ expectations of m and n, we can derive profit
functions for individual producers in sector I and sector II. The determination of
those interest rates itself will be discussed later.
Proposition 2 In the model described in section 3.2, intermediate good producers
have the following profit functions for given m, n and interest rates:
¼I(n;m; ri) =
®²
h
®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + ¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
i 1
²¡1
n
²¡¾
¾¡1
a®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + b¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
(1¡ a)L¡ (1 + ri)K (3.7)
¼II(n;m; rj) =
¯²
h
®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + ¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
i 1
²¡1
m
²¡¿
¿¡1
a®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + b¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
(1¡ b)L¡ (1 + rj)K (3.8)
Proof. See Appendix F.
5This implies that b > a (b < a) whenever ¿ > ¾ (¿ < ¾).
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Figure 3.1. Profit Functions of Intermediate Good Producers
The relationship between individual firm’s profit and other firms’ investment de-
cisions is determined by intersectoral (²) and intrasectoral (¾ and ¿) elasticity of
substitution. In the following section, we classify different cases of the profit func-
tions according to the interfirm and intersectoral relations
3.3.2 Strategic complementarity and substitutability
In order to characterize the properties of profit functions of intermediate good
producers, we will use the following terminology:
² Firms in a sector are strategically complementary if each firm’s profit is increas-
ing in the number of firms investing in that sector.
² Firms in a sector are strategically substitutable if each firm’s profit is decreasing
in the number of firms investing in that sector.
² Sector X is strategically complementary to Sector Y if each firm’s profit in
Sector Y is increasing in the number of firms investing in Sector X.
² Sector X is strategically substitutable to Sector Y if each firm’s profit in Sector
Y is decreasing in the number of firms investing in Sector X.
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Note that the first two statements define intrasectoral relations within a sector
while the last two statements define intersectoral relations. For instance, firms in
sector I are strategically complementary (substitutable) if @¼I
@n
> 0 (@¼I
@n
< 0). 6
We define a sectoral structure as a particular combination of intersectoral and in-
trasectoral relations. Several sectoral structures can obtain depending on parameters,
², ¾ and ¿ . Below we focus on a particular case in which multiple equilibria naturally
emerge: firms in sector I are strategically complementary among themselves (@¼I
@n
> 0
for all n and m), firms in sector II are strategically substitutable (@¼II
@m
< 0 for all
n and m), and sector I and II are strategically substitutable to each other (@¼I
@m
< 0
and @¼II
@n
< 0 for all n and m). This case is illustrated by Figure 3.1 (a) and (b). In
Figure 3.1(a), firm’s profit in sector I is increasing in n and the function shifts down
as m increases. In Figure 3.1(b), firm’s profit in sector II is decreasing in m and the
function shifts down as n increases. Proposition 37 specifies the restrictions on the
parameter values required to obtain this type of sectoral structure.
Proposition 3 Given the profit functions (3.7) and (3.8), for any n and m,
(i) Firms in sector I are strategically complementarity (@¼I
@n
> 0) if and only if ¾ < 2
and ¾ < ².
(ii) Firms in sector II are strategically substitutable (@¼II
@m
< 0) if and only if ¿ > 2
and ¿ > ²
(iii) Sector I and II are strategically substitutable for each other (@¼I
@m
< 0 and @¼II
@n
<
0) if ² > b
a
+ 1
6These inequalities may hold only locally: the signs of relevant partial derivatives depends on
the level of n and m. If there is no dependency of the signs of those partials on n and m, strategic
complementarity or substitutability may be said to hold globally.
7This proposition is obtained by examining the partial derivatives of (3.7) and (3.8) with respect
to n and m but the procedure is rather tedius.
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Proposition 3 (i) tells us that a sufficiently low intra-sectoral elasticity of substi-
tution in sector I (¾) compared to the inter-sectoral elasticity ² makes the profit level
of intermediate good producers in sector I increase in n. When ¾ < 2 and ¾ < ²,
firms’ investment projects in sector I become global strategic complements.8 For
expositional convenience, we will call sector I, the sector characterized as strategic
complementarities, ‘the modern sector.’
Proposition 3 (ii) shows that a sufficiently high elasticity of substitution in sector
II makes profits made by intermediate good producers in sector II decrease in m.
We will call sector II ‘traditional sector.’ It is worth noting that our ‘traditional’
sector is ‘traditional’ not because the sector has decreasing or constant returns to
scale technology rather than increasing returns but because it is characterized by
strategically substitutable firms. In fact, in our model, firms in our ‘traditional sector’
(sector II) have increasing returns to scale technology due to the existence of fixed
start-up cost (See equation (3.5)).9
Proposition 3 (iii) gives us a condition under which the modern sector (sector
I) and the traditional sector (sector II) are strategic substitutes for each other, i.e.
individual firm’s profit function in one sector is decreasing in the number of firms
8¾ < 2 is not necessary for local complementarity but for global complementarity. While the
assumption for global complementarity (¾ < 2) is not essential for our analysis, it greatly simplifies
our analysis without losing any insight. If we have only ¾ < ² not ¾ < 2, the profit function (3.7)
is initially increasing in n but beyond some point decreasing in n for any given m. In this case,
we cannot have an outcome where n is increasing without bound. However, it is still possible to
obtain two equilibria in which the values of n are finite. In contrast, ¾ < ² is essential to obtain
local complementarity. Thus, even when goods in sector I are highly substitutable (a high value
of ¾ which exceeds 2), investment projects in sector I can be strategically complementary for some
ranges of n and m as long as ¾ < ². This aspect is closely related to the notion of Hicks-Allen
complements. See Matsuyama (1995).
9The characteristics of individual producers’ technology are not necessarily seen as the ultimate
determinant of making an economy ‘traditional’ or ‘less developed.’ Even old large plantation
methods of production may exhibit increasing returns to scale for a certain range of production
scale. For instance, there is no unanimous consensus regarding the degree of scale economies of
large-scale slave plantations in the antebellum southern economy in the U.S. See Ransom and Sutch
(2001, pp.73-78).
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actually investing in the other sector. This requires a sufficiently large intersectoral
elasticity of substitution (² > b
a
+ 1).
Due to the parameter restrictions in Proposition 3, the economy has potential
to exhibit multiple equilibria. The following two sections provide an analysis of the
effects of banking structure on the determination of equilibrium.
3.4 Multiple equilibria in a competitive banking system
Let us assume that there is no bank with market power and all banks, which can
finance at most one firm, are subject to Bertrand competition. Then banks will adopt
marginal cost pricing, i.e. ri = rj = ½c for all i and j. The solution to the model
without bank with market power is simply the same as the solution to the model
where each intermediate good producer faces (1 + ½c)K of fixed start-up cost with
interest payments.
Consider firms’ entry decisions in sector I and II. Firms’ expected profits are
determined by their expectations on the number of firms investing in sectors and
banks’ interest rate policies. Firms are assumed to share a common belief. We will
focus on two particular types of beliefs, the optimistic and the pessimistic belief
following Da Rin and Hellman (2002). The optimistic belief is defined as the one in
which firms believe that the largest n in the equilibrium set and the corresponding
value of m will be realized. The pessimistic belief is defined as the one in which firms
believe that the smallest n in the equilibrium set and the corresponding value of m
will be realized.
Whenever a firm’s investment project is expected to generate nonnegative profit,
it will decide to invest. The following assumptions will be imposed to make our
problems non-trivial.
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m¯ ´
"
¯
²
²¡1L
(¿ ¡ 1)(1 + ½c)K
# ¿¡1
¿¡2
¸ 1 (3.9)
n¯ ´
·
(¾ ¡ 1)(1 + ½c)K
®
²
²¡1L
¸¾¡1
2¡¾
> 1 (3.10)
It can be shown that the first inequality ensures the positiveness of the equilib-
rium m when pessimistic beliefs prevail. Without the second inequality, n always
diverges to 1 and m converges to 0 and, therefore, the case with multiple equilibria
is eliminated. As long as n¯ > 1, a single investment alone in sector I will not be
profitable for any nonnegative m. Industrialization requires mobilizing a minimum
number n¯ of investment projects in sector I.
Suppose that every firm believes that the modern sector (sector I) will expand
without bound. This implies that they believe that the traditional sector (sector
II) will eventually vanish because due to the strategic substitutability between those
two sectors the indefinite expansion of the modern sector eventually makes any invest-
ment project in the traditional sector unprofitable. This belief system is self-fulfilling.
Because for any n > n¯ and m = 0, which is implied by the optimistic belief, any in-
dividual investment project in sector I is profitable and n will grow without bound.
At a sufficiently large value of n, any investment project in sector II becomes unprof-
itable given that every firm in sector II believes nobody else will make in the sector.
Thus, firms’ optimistic belief leads to industrialization equilibrium where the modern
sector will be fully developed.
Now assume that every firm believes the modern sector will never develop (n = 0).
This belief implies that they must believe that m¯ number of firms will enter the
traditional sector in equilibrium. This belief system again generates a self-fulfilling
equilibrium. The modern sector will never develop under this pessimistic belief.
We have shown that the model generates multiple equilibria in which one equilib-
rium represents industrialization with a fully developed modern sector and the other
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an underdevelopment trap with no development of the modern sector. Note that the
introduction of banks without market power does not change the basic feature of the
model. Actual equilibrium depends on the belief structure only. In section 3.5, we
will examine the implication of introducing a bank with market power into our model.
3.5 Market power and industrialization
We consider decision-making by a bank with market power and its effect on the
outcome of the model.
It is easy to see that under the optimistic beliefs, the existence of the big bank
will make little difference. To see this, let us assume that every firm which considers
investing in the modern sector believes that the modern sector will expand without
bound and the traditional sector will eventually vanish. Then for any finite interest
rate every firm will invest in the modern sector because the belief that n ! 1 and
m! 0 implies that the expected profit made by a firm in sector I eventually becomes
positive due to intersectoral and intrasectoral relations specified in the model (see
Figure 3.1 (a) and equation (3.7)). In addition, no firm will invest in the traditional
sector because the profit in the sector becomes negative as n ! 1 and m ! 0 for
a finite interest rate (see Figure 3.1 (b) and equation (3.8)). The big bank’s profit
maximization implies that both the capacity constraint and the Bertrand constraint
must be binding. Otherwise, the big bank could increase its profit by slightly increas-
ing interest rates or the amount of loans. Thus, in equilibrium, the big bank will end
up with financing A firms in the modern sector at ½c, the maximum permissible rate
under the Bertrand constraint. Other firms will be financed by fringe firms at the
same rate of interest. The only difference between this case and the case without the
big bank is that the big bank will make positive profits, (½c ¡ ½m)KA.
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The rest of this section will focus on the case of pessimistic beliefs. The main
purpose is to clarify the relation between the sectoral structure and the minimum
degree of market power required to solve coordination failures.
3.5.1 Bank decision problem
In this section, we are interested in the relationship between the size of the bank’s
lending capacity (A) (in short, the bank size below) and the sectoral structure of an
economy. For the rest of the paper, we replace the profit functions (3.7) and (3.8) of
intermediate good producers by their linear versions (3.11) and (3.12) below where
all parameters are positive constants.10
¼I(n;m; ri) = Á0 + Á1n¡ Á2m¡ (1 + ri)K (3.11)
¼II(n;m; rj) = °0 ¡ °1n¡ °2m¡ (1 + rj)K (3.12)
The discussion on the sectoral structure in section 3.3 allows us to give natural
interpretations to parameters in (3.11) and (3.12). Following our assumptions in
section 3.3, firms in the modern sector (sector I) are strategically complementary
(@¼I
@n
= Á1 > 0), firms in the traditional sector (sector II) are strategically substitutable
(@¼II
@n
= ¡°2 < 0).
The cross derivatives of (3.11) and (3.12) which describe intersectoral relations are
both negative ¡ sector I and II are strategically substitutable to each other ¡ and
their magnitudes are given by Á2 and °1. Constant terms in (3.11) and (3.12) (Á0 and
°0) are the shifting parameters which determine the ‘height’ of the profit functions for
any given n and m. The levels of Á0 and °0 may reflect government subsidy policies,
distribution of foreign aids over sectors, and the degree of abundance of sector-specific
resources or technology.
10By this linear specification, we do not lose main qualitative features of the model in section 3.2
and 3.3.
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The bank with market power has two alternatives regarding optimal loan alloca-
tion over sectors. In the first alternative, the bank decides to induce an industrialized
equilibrium. In order to do this, the bank has to find a way of mobilizing the firms
in the critical mass of industrialization. If it succeeds in mobilizing the critical mass,
the modern sector would fully develop on its own while the traditional sector would
vanish. We expect there are some costs involved in mobilizing the critical mass and
solving coordination failures. These costs will be reflected in the bank’s profit calcu-
lation.
In the second alternative, the bank decides not to mobilize the critical mass of
industrialization. In this case, the bank will extend loans to firms in the traditional
sector and may extend loans to a limited number of firms in the modern sector.11
In each alternative, the bank decides on interest rates and allocate loans so as to
maximize its profits and, by comparing the profits from each alternative, the bank
will decide whether to induce an industrial equilibrium or an underdevelopment trap.
Let us analyze two cases one by one.
3.5.2 Profits from inducing industrialization
The critical mass of industrialization n¤c is defined as the value of n which satisfies
¼I(n;m
¤; ½c) = Á0 + Á1n¡ Á2m¤ ¡ (1 + ½c)K = 0, where m¤ is firms’ common belief
on the number of firms investing in sector II. We then have:
n¤c ´
Á2m
¤ + (1 + ½c)K ¡ Á0
Á1
(3.13)
Let us assume that n¤c > 1 for all m
¤ ¸ 0. Without this assumption, the model
does not have a coordination problem since any single investment project in sector I
11The number of firms in the modern sector to which the bank would grant loans must be smaller
than that of firms in the critical mass because otherwise the modern sector would fully develop on
its own which contradicts the scenario in this second alternative.
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will be profitable no matter how many other firms invest in the sector. In order for
the big bank to mobilize firms in the critical mass, it has to subsidize those firms by
managing interest rates. If firms’ expectations on m is m¤,12 the big bank will charge
the interest rates by the following rule in order to make investment projects of the
firms in the critical mass break even:
½¤i =
Á0 + Á1i¡ Á2m¤
K
¡ 1 for all i 2 [1; n¤c ] (3.14)
(3.14) is obtained by solving ¼I(i;m
¤; ri) = 0 for ri.13 The big bank cannot charge
firm i in the critical mass any interest rate above the level specified in (3.14) because
if so, it will fail to induce the firm to invest,14 thereby failing to mobilize the critical
mass. Moreover, the bank has no reason to charge firm i any other rate lower than
the rate specified in (3.14) because it has the profit maximizing objective. Thus,
the interest rates given by (3.14) are the maximum permissible rates on the loans
extended to the firms in the critical mass. It is worth noting that (3.14), together
with our assumption that n¤c > 1 for all m
¤ ¸ 0, implies that the rates charged to
firms in the critical mass (½¤i ) must be strictly lower than the competitive rate (½c),
in other words, ½c > ½
¤
i for all i 2 [1; n¤c ].
While the big bank charges the rates dictated by (3.14) to firms in the critical
mass, the bank will charge ½c for other firms outside the critical mass, i.e. i 2 (n¤c ; A]
because it is subject to the Bertrand competition. It is trivial to see the capacity
12In order for firms’ beliefs to be rational, m¤ must be zero in the case where the bank induces an
industrialization equilibrium.
13In Da Rin and Hellman (2002), the condition dictating this type of interest rate policy is called
‘elimination constraint.’ Unlike their model, the interest rate policy given by (3.14) in our model
depends on sector I firms’ expectations on m. Keeping others constant, a rise in m¤ requires
a lower interest rate (½¤i ). Intuition is simple. Since we assume that two sectors are strategically
substitutable, if firms in sector I expect sector II to expand, they expect their profits to be negatively
affected, thus a lower interest rate is required to make them break even.
14For any i 2 [1; n¤c ], if ri > ½¤i , then ¼I(i;m¤ri) < 0
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constraint will be binding and no credit will be granted to firms in sector II, i.e.
n = A and m = 0.
Now we can derive the bank’s profits denoted as ΠH earned from inducing indus-
trialization:
ΠH =
n¤cX
i=1
(½¤i ¡ ½m)K + (A¡ n¤c)(½c ¡ ½m)K (3.15)
=
n¤cX
i=1
(½¤i ¡ ½c)K + (½c ¡ ½m)KA (3.16)
=
n¤cX
i=1
·
Á0 + Á1i¡ Á2m
K
¡ 1¡ ½c
¸
K + (½c ¡ ½m)KA
= ¡1
2
Á1n
¤
c(n
¤
c ¡ 1) + (½c ¡ ½m)KA (3.17)
Two remarks follow from observing (3.17). First, the bank’s profit from inducing
industrialization is increasing in its size A: dΠH
dA
= (½c ¡ ½m)K. Second, since we
assume that n¤c > 1, ¡12Á1n¤c(n¤c ¡ 1) in (3.20) is always negative. Thus, the bank’s
profit in this case must be strictly lower than (½c ¡ ½m)KA, i.e. ΠH < (½c ¡ ½m)KA.
The analysis in this section can be summarized by Proposition 4:
Proposition 4 Suppose that pessimistic beliefs prevail, n¤c > 1 for all m
¤ ¸ 0, and
the bank with market power decides to induce industrialization. Then:
(i) Let ½¤i be such that ¼I(i;m
¤; ½¤i ) = 0. The bank with market power will charge
½¤i to firm i in the critical mass (i 2 [1; n¤c ]) and ½c to firms outside the critical
mass (i 2 [n¤c ; A]). The firms in sector I not finaced by the big bank will be
financed by fringe banks at ½c
(ii) ½¤i < ½c for all (i 2 [1; n¤c ]).
(iii) The bank’s profit is given by ΠH = ¡12Á1n¤c(n¤c ¡ 1) + (½c ¡ ½m)KA and ΠH <
(½c ¡ ½m)KA
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3.5.3 Profits from inducing an underdevelopment trap
Now suppose that the bank with market power considers inducing an underdevel-
opment trap. We want to find the bank’s optimal interest rates and loan allocation.
Let us define mL such that:
mL ´ °0 ¡ (1 + ½c)K
°2
(3.18)
mL is the equilibrium number of firms investing in the traditional sector if there
is no bank with market power and every competitive bank will charge ½c subject to
Bertrand competition.
Depending on whether mL > A or mL · A, we have two different cases.
3.5.3.1 Strong traditional sector: mL > A
Let us start with the case in which mL > A. In this case, the bank size is less
than the equilibrium number of firms investing in the traditional sector which would
occur if there is no bank with market power. This condition may hold for the country
which has large profitable traditional sectors due to high °0 or low °2.
Suppose that the bank with market power decides to induce an underdevelopment
trap. Then it will use its entire resources to finance firms in the traditional sector at
½c under the Bertrand constraint. There is no reason why the big bank extends loans
to firms in sector I because the bank should provide loans to firms in sector I at a rate
strictly lower than ½c. Instead, the big bank can provide its entire loans to firms in
sector II at ½c. The loan offers from competitive fringe banks at ½c will be accepted
by firms which could not obtain finance from the big bank. In equilibrium exactly
mL firms in the traditional sector will make break-even since every bank will charge
½c.
15 Thus, in equilibrium, A firms in sector II will be financed by the big bank and
15Given that firms believe the modern sector would not develop at all (they should believe this
in order for their beliefs to be rational), the profit of a representative firm in sector II is given by
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mL ¡ A in the same sector by fringe banks. Let us denote as ΠL the level of profit
in the underdevelopment trap. As long as mL > A, ΠL = (½c ¡ ½m)KA . From this
and Proposition 4 (iii), we have:
ΠH < ΠL if mL > A:
In other words, as long as mL > A, the bank with market power will induce an
underdevelopment trap because it is more profitable to induce the underdevelopment
trap than an industrialization equilibrium. From (3.18), mL is positively related to
°0 and negatively to ½c, K and °2. Thus, the higher °0 and the lower ½c, K and °2,
the more likely the condition mL > A be met for a given size of A. The analysis
in this section suggests that under the condition mL > A, banks with market power
may fail to be a catalyst for industrialization since their profit maximization motives
guide them to manage the traditional sector rather than stimulate the modern sector.
Proposition 5 follows:
Proposition 5 Suppose that mL > A and pessimistic beliefs dominate. Then:
(i) In an underdevelopment equilibrium, mL firms will enter sector II where mL ´
(°0 ¡ (1 + ½c)K)=°2.
(ii) If the bank with market power chooses an underdevelopment trap, it will charge
½c to A firms in sector II. mL¡A firms in sector II will be financed by competitive
fringe banks.
(iii) If the bank with market power chooses an underdevelopment trap, it will make
a profit of ΠL = (½c¡ ½m)KA which is always greater than the profit if it would
¼II(0;m; ½c) = °0 ¡ °2m ¡ (1 + ½c)K. Firms will keep entering sector II up to the point where
¼II(0;m; ½c) = 0 which gives us the equilibrium level of m.
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make in the case of industrialization. Thus, the bank’s final decision is, indeed,
to induce an underdevelopment trap as long as mL > A.
3.5.3.2 Weak traditional sector: mL · A
Let us look at the other case in which mL · A. This case represents an economy
with a relative weak traditional sector. This may be due to low °0 or high °2. The
bank’s profit maximization problem is given by:
max
m;n;r;ri
(r ¡ ½m)Km+
nX
i=1
(ri ¡ ½m)K (3.19)
s.t. r · ½c (3.20)
m+ n · A (3.21)
¼II(n;m; r) = 0 (3.22)
¼I(n+ 1;m; ½c) · 0 (3.23)
¼I(i;m; ri) = 0 (3.24)
r represents the uniform rate of interest the bank charges on the loans granted
to firms in the traditional sector.16 ri’s are the rates of interest on the loans to
firm i in the modern sector. (3.19) is the bank’s objective function showing its total
profit. (3.20) and (3.21) are the Bertrand constraint and the loan capacity constraint,
respectively. (3.22) describes the equilibrium relation between m, n and r which is
implied by the zero profit condition for a representative firm in the traditional sector.
(3.23) ensures that the economy should not industrialize: if this condition does not
hold, the modern sector may fully develop on its own. (3.24) shows the interest rate
discriminating policy set by the big bank. This policy specifies the rate of interest for
16The bank does not have any incentive to interest-rate-discriminate firms in the traditional sector
while it does have in the modern sector characterized by strategic complementarities among firms.
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each firm i in the critical mass which makes each firm i break even at a given level
of m. Based on the analysis of this maximization problem, proposition 6 follows and
the proof is given in Appendix G.
Proposition 6 Suppose that mL · A and pessimistic beliefs dominate. Then the
bank with market power has a profit maximization problem given by (3.19)-(3.24).
(i) The profit maximization problem has a global maximum.
Let us write the maximized profit as a function of A and denote this as ΠL(A).
Then, ΠL(A) has the following properties (ii)-(v).
(ii) ΠL(A) is bounded from above. In other words, the capacity constraint (21) will
eventually become slack.
(iii) ΠL(A) is nondecreasing in A and continuous.
(iv) ΠL(mL) > ΠH(mL).
(v) As long as the capacity constraint (3.21) is binding, dΠL(A)
dA
< (½c ¡ ½m)K.
Proof. See Appendix G.
Proposition 6 along with proposition 4 and 5 will be used to construct the profit
curves of the big bank in 3.5.4 and to see the bank’s final decision on sectoral credit
allocation.
3.5.4 Bank’s final decision on sectoral allocation
The bank with market power will make its final decision on whether to induce
industrialization or underdevelopment by comparing profits ΠH and ΠL. Based on
proposition 4(iii), 5(iii) and 6(ii)-6(v), we can construct profit curves of the big bank as
shown in Figure 3.2. As the bank size (A) increases, the bank profit from promoting
industrialization (ΠH) is unboundedly increasing starting from a negative level of
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profit, ¡1
2
Á1n
¤
c(n
¤
c¡1), while the profit from inducing an underdevelopment trap (ΠL)
is nondecreasing starting from origin and eventually bounded since the expansion of
the modern sector has a limit in this regime and as a result benefits from investment
complementarities in the modern sector are limited.
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Figure 3.2. Bank’s Decision
Proposition 4, 5 and 6 imply that there exists a unique A¤ such that ΠL(A¤) =
ΠH(A
¤). A¤ is the minimum bank size required for the bank to induce an industri-
alization equilibrium. For a range of the bank size A < A¤, the bank with market
power decides not to promote industrialization. This case does not exclude a limited
expansion of the modern sector, but the bank will not push forward the process of
industrialization to the extent that the modern sector can develop on its own in this
regime because it undermines its own profitability. Only when A exceeds the critical
value A¤, the bank has an incentive to promote industrialization. Two remarks are
in order.
First, the minimum degree of market power required to induce the big bank to
promote industrialization (A¤) depends on the position of ΠH and ΠL, which in turn
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is affected by the sectoral structure. Any change in a parameter which will shift up
the bank profit in an underdevelopment case will raise A¤. In Figure 3.3, an upward
shift in ΠL increases the critical level from A
¤ to A¤¤. Changes in parameters which
are favorable for firms’ profits in sector II (i.e. a rise in °0 or a fall in °1 or °2) tend
to shift up the bank’s profit function in an underdevelopment trap case and raise the
critical value of A.
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Figure 3.3. The Effect of an Increase in Profitability in the Traditional Sector
Second, it is worth noting that the critical value A¤ is greater than mL. We may
interpret mL as a status quo size of the traditional sector. Thus, the existence of a
strong traditional sector may be captured by a high value of mL which makes the
condition mL > A more likely to hold. As long as mL > A, the bank with market
power will induce an underdevelopment trap because the traditional sector provides
profit opportunities better than the modern sector (Proposition 5 (iii)).
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3.6 Implications
The analysis in the previous section suggests that the conditions under which the
bank with market power can play a catalytic role for industrialization depend critically
on the sectoral structure of an economy. A degree of market power sufficient to solve
a coordination problem for one economy may not be sufficient to solve it for another
economy. Banks with market power may fail to solve coordination problem when
they have strong profit opportunities in traditional sectors. Thus, the conditions
under which the bank’s profit maximization motive is compatible with the goal of
promoting industrialization may not be met under some circumstances. In this regard,
Epstein’s institutional study (2005b) is suggestive. Epstein emphasizes that central
banks not only in the developing countries but also in the now developed countries
have engaged in sectoral policies in order to support economic sectors. Historical
cases supporting this arguments includes some ‘private central banks’ such as some
continental European central banks in the nineteenth century, the Bank of France,
the Bank of the Netherlands, and the Bank of Italy. After discussing these examples,
Epstein adds a caveat:
“One should not overestimate the extent to which these central banks were
agents of development in the sense of having a developmental vision and
intent. These central banks were private, not public. As a result, their
interest was in making a profit. At times, this concern even conflicted
with their activities as central banks. Still, however imperfectly, these
central banks helped mobilize and allocate finance to industry and to
government in the service of economic development, sometimes directed
by a developmental vision from the state.” (Epstein, 2005b, p.10)
Epstein’s study suggests that there can be conflicts between private profit max-
imizing motives and a national interest of industrialization. Despite these conflicts,
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some optimistic perspective may suggest that spontaneous coordination among pri-
vate agents can achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome and avoid a Pareto inferior outcome
if they recognize that they will get huge gains from spontaneously coordinating them-
selves. However, proponents of a big push have given doubts to this possibility,17 and
the analysis in this chapter suggests that the presence of profit opportunities in the
traditional sector can be an obstacle to that kind of spontaneous coordination. This
may be why government sponsored development banks, rather than private agents,
have played a crucial role in promoting industrialization or sectoral development in
many developing countries (Chang, 2002).18
17See Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Matsuyama (1995).
18Armendariz de Aghion (1999) emphasizes the role of development banking from another per-
spective such as cofinancing arrangements and coownership with private financial institutions.
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APPENDIX A
DATA SOURCES AND CALCULATIONS FOR FIGURES
IN CHAPTER 1
¤ Figure 1.1 Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporations (1952-2007)
(a) The Ratio of Debt to Capital Debt (credit market instruments) = com-
mercial paper + municipal securities + corporate bonds + bank loans + other
loans and advances + mortgages. Capital = replacement cost of structures +
replacement cost of equipment and software. Sources: Federal Reserve Board,
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table B.102. Author’s calcula-
tion.
(b) The Ratio of Debt to Profit Debt = credit market instruments. Profit mea-
sures are before tax and after depreciation. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States, Table B.102 and Table F.102; Author’s calculation.
(c) The Ratio of Interest Payment to Profit Interest Payment = (nominal
bank prime rate¡ CPI inflation)£ credit market instruments. Profit measures
are before tax and after depreciation. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, Table B.102 and Table F.102; Federal Reserve Board, Federal
Reserve Statistical Release; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Consumer Price
Index. Author’s calculation.
(d) The Ratio of Net Issues of Equities to Fixed Investment Net is-
sues of nonfinancial corporate equities divided by nonfarm nonfinancial corpo-
rate (gross) fixed investment. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United
States, Table F.102. Author’s calculation.
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¤ Figure 1.2 Households (1952-2007)
(a) The Ratio of Personal Consumption Expenditures to Disposable
Personal Income Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States,
Table F.6 and F.100. Author’s calculation.
(b) Debt-Income Ratio Household debt and income refer to credit market in-
struments and disposable personal income in the accounts, respectively. Sources:
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table B.100. Author’s calcula-
tion.
(c) The Ratio of Equity Holding to Deposit Holding: Households and
Nonprofit Organizations (1952-2007) Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts
of the United States, Table B.100. Author’s calculation.
¤ Figure 1.2 : Nonfarm Nonfinancial Corporations (1952-2007)
(d) The Rate of Return on Equity The rate of return on equity = (net
dividends + capital gains) ¥ market value of equity outstanding. Capital
gains = ∆ market value of equity ¡ net new equity issues. CPI inflation rates
are used to obtain the real rates. Sources: Flow of Funds Accounts of the
United States, Table B.102 and Table F.102; Bureau of Labor Statistics, The
Consumer Price Index. Author’s calculation.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To prove the existence of a limit cycle for the system of (1.37), (1.39), and (1.42),
we need to show that the Jacobian matrix (1.45) evaluated at (m(¸), ®(¸), z(¸), ¸),
where (m(¸), ®(¸), z(¸)) is a fixed point of the system,1 should have the following
properties:
² The Jacobian matrix has a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues ¯(¸)§ µ(¸)i
such that ¯(¸¤) = 0, µ(¸¤) 6= 0, and ¯0(¸¤) 6= 0 and no other eigenvalues with
zero real part exist at (m(¸¤), ®(¸¤), z(¸¤) , ¸¤)
where ¸¤ is a Hopf bifurcation point.
To apply the above condition for the Hopf bifurcation to the current context, I
will use the fact that the Jacobian matrix will have a negative real root and a pair of
pure imaginary roots if and only if:
(R1) Tr(J) = Fm +Gz < 0
(R2) J1 + J2 + J3 = FmGz ¡ ³ 0 ¢G® > 0
(R3) Det(J) = ¡³ 0 ¢ (FmG® ¡ F®Gm) < 0
(R4) ¡Tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3) +Det(J) = ¡(Fm+Gz)(FmGz ¡ ³ 0 ¢G®)¡ ³ 0 ¢ (FmG®¡
F®Gm) = 0
Let us denote the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix as ¹(¸) and ¯(¸)§ µ(¸)i.
1Note that in our case the fixed point is independent of the value of ¸.
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Proof of (I)
Suppose that G® < 0. Then (R3) is always met. In order to satisfy (R1) and
(R2), we should have Gz < min
n
jFmj; ³0jG®jjFmj
o
. (R4) is quadratic in Gz. (R4) can be
rewritten as:
a1G
2
z + a2Gz + a3 = 0 (B.1)
where
a1 ´ ¡Fm > 0
a2 ´ ¡(F2m ¡ ³ 0G®) S 0
a3 ´ ³ 0F®Gm < 0
Solving (B.1) for Gz, we obtain one negative and one positive real roots. Let us
select the negative root2, which is given as:
b ´ (jFmj
2 ¡ ³ 0G®)¡
p
(jFmj2 ¡ ³ 0G®)2 + 4³ 0jFmjjGmjF®
2jFmj < 0 (B.2)
Since Gz = ·re
@re
@z
¡ ¸, the value of ¸ that satisfies (R4) is: ¸ = ·re @re@z + jbj. Let
¸¤ ´ ·re @re@z +jbj. We have shown that if Gz < min
n
jFmj; ³0jG®jjFmj
o
and ¸ = ¸¤, then the
Jacobian matrix has a negative real root and a pair of imaginary roots: ¹(¸¤) < 0,
¯(¸¤) = 0, and µ(¸¤) 6= 0. To prove ¸¤ is indeed the bifurcation point, we still need
to show that ¯0(¸¤) 6= 0. To prove ¯0(¸¤) 6= 0, let us use the following fact:
¹(¸) + 2¯(¸) = Fm +Gz
2¹(¸)¯(¸) + ¯(¸)2 + µ(¸)2 = FmGz ¡ ³ 0 ¢G®
¹(¸)[¯(¸)2 + µ(¸)2] = ¡³ 0 ¢ (FmG® ¡ F®Gm)
2It can be shown that the positive root is irrelevant for the analysis.
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Totally differentiating both sides with respect to ¸, we get
266664
1 2 0
2¯(¸) 2[¹(¸) + ¯(¸)] 2µ(¸)
[¯(¸)2 + µ(¸)2] 2¹(¸)¯(¸) 2¹(¸)µ(¸)
377775
266664
¹0(¸)
¯0(¸)
µ0(¸)
377775 =
266664
¡1
jFmj
0
377775 (B.3)
The right hand side of (B.3) is obtained using the fact that @Gz
@¸
= ¡1 and ¸ does not
affect all other partial derivatives than Gz. Evaluating (B.3) at ¸ = ¸
¤, we have:
266664
1 2 0
0 2¹(¸¤) 2µ(¸¤)
µ(¸¤)2 0 2¹(¸¤)µ(¸¤)
377775
266664
¹0(¸¤)
¯0(¸¤)
µ0(¸¤)
377775 =
266664
¡1
jFmj
0
377775
Solving this for ¯0(¸¤), we finally get:
¯0(¸¤) =
2¹(¸¤)µ(¸¤)jFmj ¡ 2µ(¸¤)3
4¹(¸¤)2µ(¸¤) + 4µ(¸¤)3
< 0 since ¹(¸¤) < 0
Thus, ¯0(¸¤) is strictly negative.
Proof of (II)
Suppose that G® > 0 and Gz < 0. Then (R1) is always satisfied. To meet (R2)
and (R3), we need G® < min
n
jFmjjGz j
³0 ;
F®jGmj
jFmj
o
. The rest of the proof is essentially
the same as that of (I).
Proof of (III)
Routh-Hurwitz necessary and sufficient conditions for the local stability of a three
dimensional system are (R1), (R2) and (R3) with replacing the equality in (R4) by the
inequality: ¡Tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3) +Det(J) > 0. Suppose that G® > 0 and Gz > 0.
Then (R2) is always violated and the fixed point is unstable. At the same time, since
(R2) is not met, it is impossible to get a limit cycle a la the Hopf bifurcation.
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APPENDIX C
FUNCTIONS AND PARAMETER VALUES FOR THE
SIMULATION IN CHAPTER 1
Investment function is linear in the utilization rate and consumption function in
household disposable income and wealth.
g = °0 + °1u (C.1)
I
K
= g + ± (C.2)
C
K
= c1[u¾ ¡ sf (¼u¾ ¡ ± ¡ rm)] + c2q
The condition for the goods market equilibrium (Y = C + I) gives us the equilib-
rium profit share:
¼ =
Á(u) + ± ¡ (1¡ c1)u¾ + c2(1 + ®)m+ c1sf (± + rm)
c1sfu¾
´ ¼(u;m; ®)
The growth function is assumed to take the following nonlinear form.
Yˆ = h(¼; e) = h0 +
h1
1 + exp[¡h2(¼ + h3 ln(h4 ¡ e) + h5))] (C.3)
Given this specification and chosen parameter values, the response of output
growth to changes in the profit share is small at high and low values of the profit
share but large at intermediate values.
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Nonlinearity plays an important role in firms’ debt dynamics and households’
portfolio dynamics (C.4 and C.5). Function ¿ and ³ is very steep at ½T
rm
= ¿¡1(0) and
z = 0, respectively.
m˙ = ¿
³ ½T
rm
´
= ¿0 +
¿1 ¡ ¿0
1 + exp[¡¿2
¡
½T
rm
¡ ¿3
¢
]
(C.4)
where ½T = ¼(u
¤;m; ®)u¤¾ and u¤ =
1
°1
(n¡ °0)
®˙ = ³(z) = ³0 +
³1 ¡ ³0
1 + exp[¡³2(z ¡ ³3)] (C.5)
z˙ = · (reju=u¤ ¡ r; ®)¡ ¸z = ·0 + ·1(reju=u¤ ¡ r)¡ ·2®¡ ¸z (C.6)
where reju=u¤ = ½T ¡ ± ¡ rm+ (1 + ®)(m˙+mn) + ®˙m¡ n
®m
:
Table C.1. Parameter values
°0 °1 h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 ¾
-0.93 1.2 -0.02 0.07 60 0.4 1.1 0.423 0.5
n ± sf r c1 c2 ·0 ·1 ·2
0.03 0.09 0.7 0.04 0.65 0.04 0.066 0.007 0.06
¸ ³0 ³1 ³2 ³3 ¿0 ¿1 ¿2 ¿3
0.0105 -0.24 0.03 30 -0.7 -0.15 0.011 20 10.6
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APPENDIX D
ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF THE TREND RATE OF
PROFIT
A weighed moving average specification may provide an alternative measure of
the trend rate of profit:
½T =
Z t
¡1
´ exp [¡´(t¡ º)]½ºdº where ¹ > 0 (D.1)
where ½º is the current rate of profit at each moment of time º 2 (¡1; t] and
´ exp [¡´(t¡ º)] represents the weight attached to ½º in the calculation of the trend
rate of profit at time t, which exponetially decreases as º gets futhur back to the past.
This specification implies that the trend profit rate is constantly updated based on
the following averaging process.
½˙T = ´(½¡ ½T )
where ½ = ¼(u;m; ®)u¾. Note that the expression for the current profit rate ½ includes
capicity utilization (u) as well as the debt ratio (m) and the equity-deposit ratio (®).
Thus, the system of short cycles and that of long waves become interdependent.
The two specifications, (1.34) and (D.1), produce qualitatively similar results.
The basic idea behind both specifications is to smooth actual profitability and get a
measure of the long-run trend of profitability and one would expect the two specifica-
tions to produce qualitatively similar results. Simulations confirm that this is indeed
the case. Analytically, the specification (1.34) is more tractable and the analysis in
Chapter 1 has been based on (1.34).
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APPENDIX E
PROCEDURE FOR NUMERICAL RESULTS IN 2.4.1.2,
2.4.2.2 AND 2.5.2.
In 2.4.1.2, 2.4.2.2, and 2.5.2 we used numerical methods to examine the compar-
ative statics of two models: one with constant stock-flow ratios, ® and ¯, and the
other with Lavoie-Godley specifications on consumption and portfolio choice and in-
duced variations in the stock-flows ratios. The analysis was conducted in the context
of Harrodian mature economies (2.4.1.2), Harrodian dual economies (2.4.2.2), and
Kaleckian dual economies (2.5.2) and the results summarized in Table 2.1 to 2.10.
In this appendix, we present the procedure that was used to find the values of the
derivatives of the endogenous variables with respect to financial and other parame-
ters. We do this in the context of Kaleckian dual economies (see Table 2.5 in 2.5.2)
where the model with variable stock-flow ratios is the same as the one in Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002). The procedure in the other cases is similar and, in fact, less
complicated. Note that Table 2.1, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 are produced based on the
specification of consumption in Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) - the flow-flow spec-
ification represented by (E.3) below- while the other tables (Table 2.2, 2.4, 2.8, 2.9
and 2.10) are produced based on that in Godley and Lavoie (2007). In the latter,
the consumption function (E.3) is replaced by C
K
= c1fu¡ sf (¼u¡ rm)g+ c2q where
c1 = 0:75 and c2 = 0:064, keeping intact other equations and parameter values.
The Kaleckian dual economies with the variable ® and ¯ ¡ Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002)
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g = sf (¼u¡ rm) +mg + xg (E.1)
g = °0 + °1sf ( ¼u¡ rm)¡ °2rm+ °3q + °4u (E.2)
u¡ g = a1fu¡ sf (¼u¡ rm)g+ a1
a2
° (E.3)
m = (1¡ ¸0 + ¸1r ¡ ¸2re)q + ¸3fu¡ sf (¼u¡ rm)g (E.4)
where re =
(1¡sf )(¼u¡rm)+°
q¡m and ° = g(q ¡m)¡ xg.
The symbols used here are the same as the ones in the main text of this paper. The
inflation rate is assumed to be zero. (E.1) describes firms’ finance constraint, (E.2)
is the investment function, (E.3) describes the equilibrium condition for the product
market where the right-hand side specifies households consumption behavior as a
function of household distributed income and capital gains. (E.4) shows households’
demand for money (portfolio choice). The following values are used by Lavoie and
Godley (2001-2002).
°0 = 0:0075 °1 = 0:5 °2 = 0:5 °3 = 0:02 °4 = 0:125
sf = 0:75 x = 0:05 ¼ = 0:2498
a1 = 0:8 a2 = 4:5
¸0 = 0:45 ¸1 = 0:2 ¸2 = 0:0133 ¸3 = 0:0001 r = 0:0275
Given these parameter, (E.1)-(E.4) determine the steady-state values of u, g, q
and m. The system has multiple solutions due to nonlinearities of some equations.
The number of solutions is six but five of them can be discarded on economic grounds
since at least one of the variables ¡ including re ¡ is negative. The positive numerical
solution is:
u¤ = 0:188 g¤ = 0:0545 q¤ = 0:8789 m¤ = 0:487 (E.5)
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The partial derivatives of the solutions for u and g with respect to sf , x, r, ¼, and
¸0 are evaluated at (u
¤, g¤, q¤, m¤). The obtained values were reported in the third
and fifth columns of Table 2.5.
Using the definitions of ® and ¯, we obtain the following equilibrium values for ®
and ¯:
®¤ =
q¤ ¡m¤
u¤
= 2:07936 ¯¤ =
m¤
u¤
= 2:58914
Using these steady-state values of stock-flow ratios, we can transform the variable
® and ¯ regime to the constant ® and ¯ regime by dropping the consumption and
portfolio choice functions.
Constant ® and ¯ regime
g = sf (¼u¡ rm) +mg + xg
g = °0 + °1sf ( ¼u¡ rm)¡ °2rm+ °3q + °4u
q = (®¤ + ¯¤)u
m = ¯¤u
By construction, the above four equations must yield the same steady state values
as in (E.5). Then, the partial derivatives of the solutions for u and g with respect to
sf , x, r, ¼, and ¸0, again, are evaluated at (u
¤, g¤, q¤, m¤). The second and forth
columns of Table 2.5 report these values.
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof. The final good producer solves the following cost minimization problem where
PX and PY are price indices for good X and Y :
Minimize
fX;Y g
PXX + PY Y (F.1)
subject to Z =
h
®X1¡
1
² + ¯Y 1¡
1
²
i ²
²¡1
(F.2)
The first-order conditions give us the solution to the minimization problem:
X = ®²P¡²X Z
£
®²P 1¡²X + ¯
²P 1¡²Y
¤¡ ²
²¡1 (F.3)
Y = ¯²P¡²Y Z
£
®²P 1¡²X + ¯
²P 1¡²Y
¤¡ ²
²¡1 (F.4)
From the zero profit condition for the final good sector, we have:
PZ =
£
®²P 1¡²X + ¯
²P 1¡²Y
¤¡ 1
²¡1 (F.5)
PZ is the final good price, which is normalized to unity (PZ = 1).
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A representative firm that produces good X faces the following cost minimization
problem:
Minimize
fx(i)gni=1
nX
i=1
px(i)x(i)
subject to X =
"
nX
i=1
x(i)1¡
1
¾
# ¾
¾¡1
(F.6)
The first order conditions, along with (F.6), are given by:
px(i)¡ ¸
µ
¾
¾ ¡ 1
¶" nX
i=1
x(i)1¡
1
¾
# 1
¾¡1
x(i)¡
1
¾ = 0 for all i (F.7)
The zero profit condition can be written:
PXX ¡
nX
i=1
px(i)x(i) = 0 (F.8)
Similarly, a representative firm that produces good Y has the following cost mini-
mization problem:
Minimize
fy(j)gmj=1
mX
j=1
py(j)y(j)
subject to Y =
"
mX
j=1
y(j)1¡
1
¿
# ¿
¿¡1
(F.9)
The first order conditions and the zero profit condition are:
py(j)¡ ¹
µ
¿
¿ ¡ 1
¶" mX
j=1
y(j)1¡
1
¿
# 1
¿¡1
y(j)¡
1
¿ = 0 for all j (F.10)
PY Y ¡
mX
j=1
py(j)y(j) = 0 (F.11)
(F.6), (F.7), (F.9) and (F.10) give each intermediate good producer a conditional
factor demand curve. The elasticity of demand for each i- and j-producer is ¾ and ¿ ,
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respectively.1 Thus, the profit maximization behavior of each individual intemediate
good producer implies the following mark-up pricing rule:
px(i) =
¾
¾ ¡ 1aw for all i
py(j) =
¿
¿ ¡ 1bw for all j
By normalizing
¡
¾
¾¡1
¢
a =
¡
¿
¿¡1
¢
b = 1, we have:
px(i) = py(j) = w for all i; j (F.12)
Furthermore, by symmetricity, we know that each producer produces the same quan-
tity of output:
x(i) = x for all i (F.13)
y(j) = y for all j (F.14)
It follows from (F.6), (F.9), (F.13) and (F.14) that:
x = n
¾
1¡¾X (F.15)
y = m
¿
1¡¿ Y (F.16)
(F.8), (F.12) and (F.15) are combined to give us the expression for the price index
for good X in terms of the wage rate and the number of i-producers.
PX = pxn
1
1¡¾ = wn
1
1¡¾ (F.17)
1This follows the conventional assumption in the literature that intermediate good producers do
not engage in strategic interactions among them.
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Similarly, using (F.11), (F.12) and (F.16), we have the expression for the price index
for good Y .
PY = pym
1
1¡¿ = wm
1
1¡¿ (F.18)
The zero profit condition for the final good sector, (F.5), together with (F.17) and
(F.18), yields the expression for the equilibrim wage rate for given m and n.
w(m;n) =
h
®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + ¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
i 1
²¡1
(F.19)
Next, we need to find the expressions for x and y for given m and n. Note that from
(F.3), (F.4), (F.17) and (F.18), the relative factor demand from the final good sector
is given by:
X
Y
=
µ
¯PX
®PY
¶¡²
=
µ
¯n1=(1¡¾)
®m1=(1¡¿)
¶¡²
(F.20)
In symmetric equilibrium, the labor market clearing condition is written as:
anx+ bmy = L (F.21)
Then, (F.15), (F.16), (F.20) and (F.21) can determine x and y for given m and n.
x(m;n) =
®²n
²¡¾
¾¡1L
a®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + b¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
(F.22)
y(m;n) =
¯²m
²¡¿
¿¡1L
a®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + b¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
(F.23)
It is straightforward to see that (F.12), (F.19), (F.22), (F.23), (3.4) and (3.5)
imply the profit functions (3.7) and (3.8).
¼I(n;m; ri) =
®²
h
®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + ¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
i 1
²¡1
n
²¡¾
¾¡1
a®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + b¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
(1¡ a)L¡ (1 + ri)K (3.7)
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¼II(n;m; rj) =
¯²
h
®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + ¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
i 1
²¡1
m
²¡¿
¿¡1
a®²n
²¡1
¾¡1 + b¯²m
²¡1
¿¡1
(1¡ b)L¡ (1 + rj)K (3.8)
149
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Proof. Using firms’ profit functions (3.11) and (3.12), the maximization problem
(3.19)-(3.24) can be transformed to the following problem:
max
m;n
[°0 ¡ °1n¡ °2m¡ (1 + ½m)K]m+
nX
i=1
[Á0 + Á1i¡ Á2m¡ (1 + ½m)K] (G.1)
subjec to
°1
°2
n+m ¸ mL (G.2)
m+ n · A (G.3)
Á0 + Á1(n+ 1)¡ Á2m¡ (1 + ½c)K · 0 (G.4)
(G.2) rewrites the Bertrand constraint (3.20) in terms of n and m. (G.4) is the
deindustrialization constraint which is equivalent to (3.24).
(i) It is easy to show that (G.2), (G.3) and (G.4), along with nonnegative constraints
(m ¸ 0 and n ¸ 0), forms a nonempty compact set under the assumptions
A ¸ mL and n¤c > 1. Since the objective function (G.1) is continous, the
maximization problem has a global maximum in the constraint set.
(ii) From the objective function (G.1), we have:
@ΠL
@m
(m;n) = °0 ¡ 2°2m¡ (°1 + Á2)n¡ (1 + ½m)K
@ΠL
@n
(m;n) = Á0 + (1=2)Á1 ¡ (°1 + Á2)m+ Á1n¡ (1 + ½m)K
Let us consider a set S0 such that S0 ´ f(n;m) 2 R2+j @ΠL@m (m;n) < 0 and @ΠL@n (m;n) <
0g. Then construct another set S(A) such that S(A) ´ f(n;m) 2 R2+j m+ n =
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A and Á0 + Á1(n + 1) ¡ Á2m ¡ (1 + ½c)K · 0g. It is easy to see S(A) is a
subset of the constraint set for the maximization problem. Furthermore, S(A) is
contained in S0 for a sufficiently large A. We want to show that the maximum
solution to the problem cannot belong to S(A) for a sufficiently large A. To
show this, we can choose a sufficiently large value A0 so that S(A0) ½ S0. Let us
denote as (n(A);m(A)) the maximum (m;n) associated with a given A. Then,
by construction of S0 and S(A), (n(A);m(A)) =2 S(A) for any A > A0 because
if (n(A);m(A)) 2 S(A), then (n(A);m(A)) 2 S0, and by slightly decreasing the
value of n(A) to n(A) ¡ ², the bank can raise its profit due to the fact that
@ΠL
@n
< 0 for any (m;n) 2 S0. This, however, contradicts the assumption that
(n(A);m(A)) is a maximum. This proves that the capacity constraintm+n · A
should be eventually slack as A becomes very large.
(iii) Since the objective function is continuous and the compact constraint set con-
tinuously expands as A grows, ΠL(A) is nondecreasing in A and continuous.
(iv) Proposition 4.3 (iii) yields that ΠL(mL) > ΠH(mL).
(v) If the capacity constraint (G.2) is not binding, dΠL(A)
dA
= 0. If only the capacity
constraint (G.2) is binding so that there exists an interior solution, we must
have @ΠL
@m
= @ΠL
@n
and dm
dA
+ dn
dA
= 1 at the optimum. Then,
dΠL(A)
dA
=
@ΠL
@m
dm
dA
+
@ΠL
@n
dn
dA
=
@ΠL
@m
= [°0 ¡ °1n¡ °2m¡ (1 + ½m)K]¡ °2m¡ Á2n
= (r ¡ ½m)K ¡ °2m¡ Á2n
If another constraint as well as the capacity constraint is binding, we then have:
dΠL(A)
dA
· (r ¡ ½m)K ¡ °2m¡ Á2n
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Thus, for all cases, we obtain:
dΠL(A)
dA
· (r ¡ ½m)K ¡ °2m¡ Á2n
= (½c ¡ ½m)K ¡ (½c ¡ r)K ¡ °2m¡ Á2n
From the Bertrand constraint (3.20), r · ½c, we have
dΠL(A)
dA
< (½c ¡ ½m)K
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